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Abstract 
 
 
  
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the role of home country legal institutions 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the reporting quality, pricing and performance of 
foreign initial public offerings (IPOs) in US capital markets. The specific characteristics 
of foreign IPOs as have been recognized within the recently expanding literature on 
cross-listed firms make the focus of this research highly interesting and relevant given the 
growing number of firm that chose to make their initial public offering in foreign 
markets, typically the US markets. Using a unique dataset of foreign issuers in the US, 
this thesis addresses some of the unresolved issues of the impact of institutional 
differences on information asymmetry in foreign IPOs. To do this, I look at different 
agency problems over the life cycle of new issuers.  
Specifically, the first empirical study of this thesis explores the earnings quality in 
foreign IPOs in the US and the relation to home country institutions. The second empirical 
study of this thesis investigates the effects of the home country institutions on the level of 
underpricing of foreign IPOs in the US, and whether underpricing is significantly different 
after the enactment of SOX. The third empirical study investigates the effects of the home 
country institutions on the long-run stock performance of foreign IPOs in the US, and 
whether performance is significantly different post the enactment of SOX.  
The main findings of this thesis suggest that home country legal institutions matter 
to the reporting characteristics, to the costs of capital at the initial listing date and to the 
aftermarket stock performance of foreign IPOs in the US. Furthermore, there is mixed 
evidence regarding the effects of SOX on the reporting characteristics, to the cost of 
capital at the initial listing date and to the aftermarket stock performance. In contrast with 
some previous research on cross-listed firms, the results of this study suggest that 
although foreign IPOs may abandon their home capital markets by listing in the US, their 
reporting characteristics and costs of capital are nonetheless influenced by home country 
institutions. 
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 Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
Over the last two decades there has been an increase in the number of firms 
seeking to raise capital in foreign markets, with US being the main target. A report on 
initial public offering (IPO) trends by PWC (2012)1 points out that the share of IPOs 
in foreign markets has reached about 19% of the total IPOs globally. The data on US 
IPOs show that share of foreign IPOs increased to 25% of total IPOs in the US in 
20092. The increase in cross-border IPOs to the US can be explained by the fact that 
this can allow firms to mitigate potential adverse effects of poor home country 
institutions (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Doidge et al., 2007; Stulz, 2009), or 
conversely, the desire to avoid tougher home institutions (Licht, 2003; Siegel, 2005). 
According to this view, foreign IPOs are regarded differently to domestic IPOs in the 
host country and even potentially differently to each other due to the differences in 
their home country institutions. Most research on foreign firms to date has largely 
focused on crossed-listed firms to the US with prior listing in their home country 
(e.g., Coffee, 2002; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Lang et al., 2006). However, there 
are a number of important differences between foreign IPOs and cross-listed firms 
concerning their scrutiny by regulators, the legal apparatus available to investors, data 
availability and reporting requirements they have to comply with (e.g., Caglio et al., 
2013). This, in turn, suggests the presence of information asymmetry problems in 
foreign first-time issuers that have been largely overlooked are different than that of 
mature cross-listed firms.  
                                                 
1
 The Cross-Border IPO Trends 2012 report of PWC (2012) had been retrieved from  
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/audit-services/ipo-centre/assets/pwc-cross-border-ipo-trends.pdf on 6 
July 2013 
2
 Retrieved on 30 June, 2012 from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2009foreign.pdf 
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The increasing phenomenon of listing abroad together with the shortage of 
empirical evidence related to foreign IPOs in the US make this group of firms an 
interesting focus for academic research. Consequently, this thesis attends to some 
unresolved questions regarding the impact of institutional differences on information 
asymmetry in foreign IPOs by studying the information asymmetry problems inherent 
in new foreign issues in the US. I investigate the relation between the reporting 
quality, underpricing and aftermarket stock performance, and the soundness of home 
legal environment of these firms in three empirical papers with each focusing on a 
different stage in the IPO life cycle. Using a unique dataset of foreign IPOs listing on 
US capital markets in the years 1990-2009, I study the relation between earnings 
management in foreign IPOs and home country institutions. I then investigate 
whether home country institutions are associated with the initial pricing at the listing 
date and the long-term stock performance subsequent to listing.  
In conducting my analysis I note that during the sample period a few structural 
changes have taken place in the US, which may have affected the foreign issuers. 
More specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)3 introduced new reporting 
requirements, corporate governance, auditing procedures, and information disclosure 
requisites. All were set with the aim of increasing investors’ confidence and 
eventually decreasing costs of capital for listed companies (Coates, 2007). Although 
strongly debated and subsequently contested, these changes were imposed on both 
domestic and foreign firms listed on US capital markets (Piotroski and Srinivasan, 
2008). To my knowledge, no study has investigated the specific effects of SOX on 
foreign issuers in terms of asymmetric information problems in the initial offering 
stage originating from the firm’s specific home institutional environment. Thus, 
bearing in mind that foreign IPOs come from a diverse range of countries, I further 
study the effects of SOX on foreign IPOs and whether the Act has had a different 
impact on foreign firms coming from weak and strong institutional environments. 
                                                 
3
 The terms “Sarbanes Oxley Act”, “SOX” and “the Act” are used synonymously throughout this 
thesis. 
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To explore the relation between home institutions and the information 
asymmetry problem, I conduct three related studies. The first empirical study of this 
thesis focuses on the earnings quality of foreign IPOs prior their listing in the US. In 
this study I compare measures of earnings management of foreign IPOs in the US to 
US IPOs. The results of this study show that foreign IPOs are characterized by higher 
level of earnings management (more extreme reporting or earnings inflation) than 
domestic US IPOs. Also, earnings management by IPOs from countries with weaker 
institutions is either the same or lower than earnings management of IPOs from 
countries with strong institutions. Additional findings include evidence that a litigation 
threat constrains earnings management more in IPOs from countries with weak legal 
institutions. Furthermore, results show a constraining effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
on earnings management of IPOs from countries with weak institutions.  
Prior research indicates that information asymmetry problems influence the 
initial pricing of IPOs (Welch, 1989; Ritter and Welch, 2002). The second empirical 
study of this thesis therefore investigates the effects of the home country institutions 
on the levels of underpricing of foreign IPOs in the US, and whether underpricing is 
significantly different after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. My findings 
indicate that there are differences in the level of underpricing based on IPOs home 
country institutions. Specifically, firms that are coming from countries with stronger 
legal institutions enjoy lower costs of capital (as indicated by their level of 
underpricing) relative to firms that come from weaker home country institutions. 
Additionally, this study shows no evidence that SOX has affected underpricing when 
home country institutions are controlled for. These findings shed light on the 
differences between cross-listed firms and suggest that while foreign IPOs may 
abandon their home capital markets by listing in the US, their costs of capital are 
nonetheless influenced by home country institutions.  
The third empirical study of this thesis investigates the effects of home country 
institutions on the long-run stock performance of foreign IPOs in the US, and whether 
performance is significantly different after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
My findings indicate that the long-run performance of IPOs from weaker home 
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country legal institutions is higher than the long-run return of IPOs from stronger 
ones. I also find that foreign IPOs outperform matching domestic US IPOs. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence for a change in the long-run performance of the 
foreign IPO sample as a whole as a result of SOX. However, there is some evidence 
for a higher aftermarket stock performance of IPOs from stronger home institutions 
post-SOX relative to the pre-SOX period. The findings shed light on the differences 
within cross-listed firms and suggest that the cost of capital of foreign IPOs is 
influenced by home country institutions even when they leave their home capital 
markets by listing on US capital markets. 
Collectively, the results of the three empirical chapters contribute to the 
understanding of the role of home country institutions in the pricing and reporting of 
foreign IPOs in the US. Specifically, results suggest that foreign IPOs from weak 
home institutions are subject to a higher litigation threat that constrains earnings 
management and at the same time are priced lower by investors. Furthermore, in 
contrast with some previous research on cross-listed firms, the results of this study suggest 
that although foreign IPOs may abandon their home capital markets by listing in the US, 
their reporting characteristics and costs of capital are nonetheless influenced by home 
country institutions. In addition, the thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion 
regarding the effectiveness of SOX in reducing the costs of capital and its effects on 
the competitiveness of US capital markets in attracting foreign capital. Specifically, it 
presents mixed evidence with respect to the effects of SOX on the reporting 
characteristics, to the cost of capital at the initial listing date and to the aftermarket stock 
performance.  
The reminder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the 
foreign IPOs sample selection and collection process and the motivations to focus on 
this group of firms. Section 1.3 discusses the motivations study the potential 
consequences of the enactment of SOX on foreign IPOs listed on US capital markets. 
Section 1.4 outlines the significance and contributions of the thesis and section 1.5 sets 
forth the structure of the thesis.  
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1.2 Foreign IPOs in the US Market 
The motivation to focus on foreign IPOs requires justification. Specifically, how 
do foreign IPOs in the US differ from domestic IPOs? First, when seeking capital, US 
firms face different choices to foreign companies. These include listing on one of the 
US domestic markets or raising capital by other means and not listing at all. US firms 
are typically reluctant to list outside of the US due to liquidity considerations, media 
coverage, investors’ preferences (Pagano et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003). On the other 
hand, foreign companies face the option to list in their home country as well as listing 
abroad, typically in the US. Thus, foreign IPOs listing in the US should be influenced 
by different factors to domestic US issuers, and this listing choice acts as a signal to 
investors (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  
Second, when listing in a US market, a foreign firm enters into a larger pool of 
investors, many from the US, and thus the firm should reliably communicate its value 
and attract the interest of US investors. The reluctance of domestic investors to invest 
in foreign companies is recognized as “home-bias” and suggests that foreign firms 
face different problems than domestic issuers in attracting investors. This argument 
follows the findings by Covrig et al. (2007) that show an increase in share of foreign 
stocks in mutual funds’ portfolios as a result of voluntary adoption of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS).  
Third, Doidge et al. (2009) report a difference in ownership concentration and 
private benefit controls between domestic companies and foreign issuers in the US. 
They argue that foreign issuers are likely to have a high degree of both and so may 
have weaker governance.  
Fourth, some researchers find differences in relation enforcement between 
foreign issuers and domestic firms. For example, Frost and Pownall (1994) report 
better compliance of domestic firms with reporting rules than foreign firms. They 
argue that this suggest ‘a difference between regulatory monitoring and enforcement 
between foreign and domestic firms’ (p. 77). Langevoort (2008) suggests that since it 
is more expensive to monitor and take actions against foreign issuers, the SEC will use 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
- 8 - 
 
its limited resources on the regulation of domestic companies. It is argued that this will 
bring the highest potential benefits for US investors given the scarcity of resources 
(Lang et al., 2006).  
Fifth, foreign IPOs are coming from countries with different institutional 
environments. According to the institutional theory, these variations are highly 
important to the understanding of firms’ performance owing to the country-of-origin 
specific factors (Bell et al., 2008; Bruner et al., 1999, 2006; Moore et al., 2010). 
These arguments combined suggest that the foreign IPOs group is unique with 
respect to IPOs at the host as well as the home country, to mature US firms and to 
cross-listed firm to the US and therefore requires a specific consideration and focus.  
1.3 Changes in the Regulatory Environment in the US 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in response to high-profile 
accounting scandals that occurred in the preceding years. The Act aimed at restoring 
investor confidence, and as a result, at reducing the costs of capital for listed 
companies. With that goal in mind, US legislators composed accounting and corporate 
governance related reforms which came to be enacted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
The effects of SOX on the costs of listing and reporting have contributed to the 
ongoing debate regarding the Act’s effectiveness, especially with respect to 
information asymmetry problems (DeFond et al., 2005; Litvak, 2007; Coates, 2007; Li 
et al., 2008). Different studies examine the effects of SOX on all companies listed on 
US capital markets. In the case of foreign firms, studies have mostly focused on their 
initial public offering (IPO) performance and the delisting of foreign registrants from 
the US. Some report a positive impact of SOX on firms’ performance (Li et al., 2008) 
while others report negative effects (Zhang, 2007; Kamar et al., 2008). However, not 
much has been done to shed light on the effect of the Act’s implementation 
specifically on foreign IPOs short-term and long-term performance in the US markets. 
This differs from domestic IPOs due to the altered agency problems originated from 
information asymmetry between management, underwriters and capital providers. 
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Furthermore, literature reports conflicting evidence for the overall effect of SOX 
requirements on performance and information issues of foreign IPOs (Litvak, 2007; 
Zhang, 2007).  
The strength of competitiveness in US capital markets is determined by the 
levels of liquidity and diversification. These factors also influence the attractiveness of 
the US market for foreign issuers (Romano, 1998). Since the requirements of SOX do 
not make a distinction between local and foreign listed companies, it is important to 
examine the specific effects of SOX on the costs and benefits for foreign issuers and to 
evaluate how valuable the Act is for foreign companies, even more with respect to 
their home country institutions. My review of the literature has shown that there has 
been relatively little academic attention paid to the case of foreign IPOs. Specifically, 
too little consideration has been attributed to the links between asymmetric 
information problems in the different stages of the IPO life cycles, the country-of-
origin factors such as legal and institutional framework, and changes in the host 
country institutional framework as a result of the Act. Moore et al. (2010) document 
significant evidence for the institutional environments on performance. Other scholars 
argue for a strong connection between information asymmetry problems and IPO 
performance (Ritter and Welch, 2002). The authors suggest a strong impact of SOX on 
the information environment and performance of domestic firms in the US. In 
addition, La Porta et al. (1998) find that the companies which will benefit the most from 
cross-listing to markets with stricter regulations are those with highly concentrated and 
poorly regulated domestic market. Thus, the stricter regulatory environment following the 
introduction of SOX should have a different effect on foreign companies with respect to 
their home country institutions. Yet, clear evidence for the relationship between these 
suggested factors is lacking.  
This research aims to contribute to the growing debate by studying the 
interactions between asymmetric information problems in different stages of the IPO 
process of foreign firms and changes in reporting and auditing requirements 
introduced by SOX on foreign IPOs performance with respect to their institutional 
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environments. This focus implies key implications of the attractiveness and soundness 
of the US capital markets and on the costs and liabilities of foreign companies.  
The question of the potential effects of SOX on foreign IPOs with respect to 
asymmetric information problems remains to be clarified. First, the Act is likely to 
affect the motivations to list on US capital markets. SOX changed the legal liabilities 
of company managers and other insiders. In the post-SOX period, self-dealing became 
more costly. Therefore, by listing in the US, managers send a stronger signal to 
minority investors by giving up on some of the control and thus there is a shift in 
wealth from insiders to investors (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). The magnitude of 
this signal is suggested to be even stronger for companies coming from countries with 
weak investor protection environments.  
Second, Leuz (2007) argues that the enactment of SOX implies both higher costs 
of self-dealing for managers, and so reduces private benefits, but also larger potential 
benefits for the firm in the form of lower costs of capital. According to this hypothesis, 
insiders opt to list in the US only when the benefits outweigh the costs and thus when 
growth opportunities are sufficiently valuable and imply high returns on capital to 
initial owners. Therefore, SOX can be expected to change the balance of the cost and 
benefits and better align the incentives of insiders and investors in foreign listed 
companies. 
Third, since foreign issuers inherit agency problems from their home country 
level institutional and legal setting (Engelen and van Essen, 2010); they are expected 
to be affected differently by changes imposed by SOX on disclosure and governance 
standards.             
Hence, the case of foreign IPOs is interesting due to the higher relevance of 
asymmetric information problems between managers, investors and other 
stakeholders of the issuing firms (Francis et al., 2010; Bruner et al., 1999). The costs 
associated with asymmetric information such as underpricing, defined as the 
difference between the first day closing price and the offer price (Loughram and 
Ritter, 2002), are expected to be smaller in the post-SOX period than the ones of the 
pre-SOX period for all IPOs. This can be reasoned by the expected reduction in 
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asymmetric information resulting from the SOX requirements as reported in Kaserer 
et al. (2008). This outcome is expected to be even stronger for foreign IPOs due to the 
fact that foreign IPOs are subject not only to the “liability of newness” (caused by the 
modest publically available information and typically short historical operating 
record), but also to the “liability of foreignness”, which referred to the additional 
costs endured by foreign issuers resulting from information asymmetry problems 
between different parties (Moore et al., 2010). Furthermore, international market 
experience higher potential for an unequal distribution of information between 
national and foreign investors. Finally, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) argue that the 
net effect of SOX on the relative cost and benefit generate by listing in the US 
depends upon the IPO’s characteristics and the alternative listing options and thus 
vary across foreign listing candidates. The institutional environment of the IPO is 
suggested to have a relation to this net effect. 
1.4 Data Selection 
The foreign IPO sample selection process starts by identifying companies that 
were first time issuers to US markets between 1990 and 2009. Only firms with no 
prior listing in any market within or outside of the US are included in this sample. 
According to the Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database classification, 
foreign firms are firms that were incorporated and whose primary executive offices are 
located outside of the US (Bruner et al., 2006). I exclude equity listings that originate 
from spin-offs of publically-listed companies or from mergers and acquisitions, 
following Bruner et al. (2006), as well as utility firms. Further eliminated are warrants, 
units and rights offerings. Firms that are based in the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, 
and Bermuda are also removed from the sample. This is due to the fact that those are 
typically US firms within the financial services industry that are registered in these 
locations for tax reasons and, although they comply with the definition of foreign 
companies, they do not fit the specific context of this research. I also exclude all firms 
with insufficient financial data.    
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I have obtained a copy of each firm’s prospectus to manually extract the 
variables needed for the empirical investigations that constitute this thesis and are not 
available in any widely available database. This is done through the Edgar database 
provided by the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC), the Perfect Filing database 
and Professor Jay Ritter’s private collection of company prospectuses. This gives us a 
unique dataset to analyze which has resulted in several original findings. 
1.5 Significance of the Thesis 
This thesis contributes to the growing literature concerning the impact of legal 
and economic incentives on the reported and performance outcomes of companies in 
several ways. First, there are only a few papers that examine the link between home 
institutions and reporting quality in foreign issuers in US capital markets. As foreign 
IPOs are a large, global and growing phenomenon, this study expands our 
understanding of financial reporting aspects of this important economic activity.  
Second, complementing Lang et al. (2006) it provides evidence that indicates 
that compliance with US rules is not the same for foreign IPOs and cross-listed firms.  
Third, it highlights that reporting outcomes by foreign IPOs traded in the same 
market with same rules applied to all are not uniform and may depend on country of 
origin.  
Fourth, evidence provided here is relevant for the debate on the validity of the 
“bonding hypothesis,” which hinges on the commitment of foreign firms to the US 
legal, reporting and enforcement environments (Coffee, 1999, 2002, and Stulz 1999, 
2009 vs. Licht, 2003 and Siegel, 2005). To the extent that a foreign IPO in the US 
represents the most powerful form of bonding, evidence in this study suggests that 
even this may be insufficient to obtain credible disclosures at a level similar to US 
IPOs. 
Fifth, this thesis is among the first to study earnings management in IPOs using 
data directly from IPO prospectuses. Similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2008) it thus 
better captures the net effect of incentives that prompt earnings management to inflate 
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IPO proceeds and counter-incentives to deflate earnings in the face of heightened 
regulatory scrutiny. Findings are consistent with a different incentive mix for foreign 
IPOs in the US compared to domestic US IPOs.  
Sixth, it adds to the existing body of literature on the effect of SOX on firms’ 
agency problems, in particular relating to information asymmetry evidenced in the 
underpricing and aftermarket performance of foreign IPOs which are traded on US 
capital markets.  
Seventh, it focuses specifically on the role of the institutional differences at the 
country of origin before and after the enactment of SOX. This focus contributes to our 
understanding of how changes in the legal environment of a host country affect the 
flow and performance of foreign issuers and how these relate to their home country 
legal institutions.  
Eighth, it sheds light on the differences in the role of firm level governance 
mechanism and the evolution subsequent to the enactment of SOX. These are revealed 
through the level of underpricing at IPO and the aftermarket stock performance.  
Overall, the focus on the home legal institutions of foreign IPOs as a unique set 
of firms sheds new light on the literature addressing the extent to which institutions 
affect firm performance (Doidge et al., 2007; Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Hail and 
Leuz, 2006). These findings have direct implication towards the ongoing debate about 
the competiveness of the US markets and the procedural costs associated with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and are of interest to both practitioners as well as policy makers. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. The following chapter provides an overview 
on the theoretical background of this study. In particular, it summarizes the reasons 
firms undergo IPOs and the motivations to list abroad. It also discusses the aims of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
The thesis also contains three empirical studies. Each study focuses on the 
effects of home country legal institutions and SOX on foreign IPOs with regard to 
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different information asymmetry problems that occur in different stages of their life 
cycle, i.e. earnings quality in the pre IPO stage, adverse selection through initial 
returns in the first listing day, and changes in moral hazard as expressed though the 
long-term performance.  
The first of these studies form the third chapter of this thesis. This study 
compares measures of earnings management by foreign IPOs listed in the US to 
domestic US IPOs. It also compares measures of earnings management between 
foreign IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions and foreign IPOs from 
countries with weak legal institutions.  
The fourth chapter of the thesis reports the second empirical study. This study 
investigates the impact of the introduction of SOX on information asymmetry 
problems as mitigated through the form of underpricing.   
The fifth chapter of the thesis reports the third empirical study. This study 
investigates the effects of the home country legal institutions on the long-term stock 
performance of foreign IPOs in US capital markets. The study also examines potential 
effects that are associated with changes in the information environment in the US as a 
result of the enactment of SOX in 2002.  
The sixth chapter of the thesis provides the overall conclusions from this work, 
discussed with regards to objectives of the thesis.  
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2.1 Overview 
Over the past few decades, capital markets have experienced enhanced 
international capital mobility. This ongoing globalization, together with technological 
progress and increased sophistication in investors’ diversification strategies, 
introduces a trade-off between market segregation and market consolidation where the 
main issues to be considered are liquidity, information asymmetry, well-functioning 
price mechanism and diversification. This process encouraged firms to seek out the 
most valuable capital market for their needs (Stulz, 1981; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
2006).  
A company’s decision of whether to go public is rather complex. First, it has to 
decide on whether to remain private, financing its growth with internal funding and 
debt, or to go public, extracting the needed funds through issuing equity. Secondly, 
once the latter alternative is chosen, the market in which the company would issue its 
equity is in question. Namely, the firm can issue its stocks in a local market, a foreign 
market or a combination of the two, as in the case of multiple stock listing.  
A decision to go public or to cross-list on a major foreign market is a 
consequence of costs and benefits analysis. The benefits of listing a company abroad 
can include an increasing shareholders base by avoidance of investors’ barriers of 
entry, increased liquidity, provisions of better information and commitment for the 
adoption of superior corporate governance regimes (Pagano et al., 2002). Potential 
costs involve the need to reconcile differences home country and the foreign exchange 
(Amir, et al., 1993), additional requirements on corporate governance (Pegano et al, 
2002), additional disclosure requirements that may entail loss of proprietary 
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information (Beatty and Ritter, 1986), greater litigation risk (Huijgen and Lubberink, 
2005), and higher exposure to regulatory scrutiny (Gietzmann and Isidro, 2010).  
Various studies examined the different motivations of companies to list abroad. 
Coffee (2002) argues that globalization and technology developments are the two 
main factors that enhance market consolidation, and ultimately lead to listing abroad. 
Evidence shows a substantial premium for foreign companies listing abroad over their 
domestic peers (Doidge et al., 2002; Miller, 1999). The most important theories 
aiming at reasoning this documented premium are (1) the Market Segmentation 
Theorem which argues that listing abroad reduces the cross-border barriers for 
investors and generates enhanced liquidity (Forester and Karloyi, 1999). (2) The 
Liquidity Theorem that postulates that when going a broad investors’ base increases 
while credit constraints reduces (Doidge et al., 2002). (3) The Information 
Environment Theorem which suggests that by listing in a capital market with better 
information disclosure requirements, firms signal to investors of their high quality. In 
other words, reliable information reduces the costs of tracking the accurate financial 
situation of the company (Merton, 1987; Blass and Yafeh, 2001). (4) The Bonding and 
Monitoring Theorem which argues that firms from an inferior investor protection 
environment can credibly bond themselves to small private investors by choosing to 
operate in an environment with superior investors’ protection through the form of 
listing abroad (Coffee, 2002). (5) The Institutional and Legal Environment which 
argues for significant relation between country-of-origin institutional factors and 
foreign IPOs performance. According to this view, the legal and regulatory 
environment in the host country plays a major role in limiting agency problems 
(Moore et al., 2010). It is important to note that these theories are commonly 
considered as complementary rather than conflicting. 
The latter three theories stress corporate governance considerations in the 
motivation of firms to list abroad and for investors’ confidence. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) postulate that corporate governance understanding stimulates key institutional 
alterations where such are needed in order to assure a fair return on invested capital for 
investors.  
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An important case of such a change had occurred in 2002, when the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was introduced to the US financial markets by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. This act served as a response to major accounting scandals 
such as the Enron and the WorldCom cases. These had cost investors billions of 
dollars owing to the collapse of share prices of affected companies, while causing a 
loss of public confidence in the nation's securities markets. Thus, the purpose of the 
enactment of SOX was to increase investors’ confidence in reporting and auditing, 
which should lead to a reduction in the cost of capital by enforcing higher reporting 
standards and conducts in the US financial markets. Accordingly, the Act’s resolutions 
were imposed on all companies traded on the US markets, including foreign 
companies. Consequently, both the direct and indirect costs of listing a company on 
US capital markets have been affected substantially for both US and foreign firms. 
The following subsections discuss the relevant issues and considerations of 
foreign issuers in the US from the decision to go public to the differences in 
regulations.    
2.2 Why Going Public 
In the past few decades, the increase in liberalization of capital markets has 
introduced growing financial instruments. Consequently, a company in quest for 
capital faces numerous alternatives. These are typically: internal financing, debt and 
going public. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in an efficient market, that lacks 
corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information, no importance is to be 
attributed to the way a company is financed. Clearly, these conditions do not hold for 
the existing financial markets, and, thus, each of these alternatives holds some costs 
and benefits.  
Internal financing implies obtaining funds, which are needed for company’s 
growth from company’s assets. This alternative is especially relevant in case of 
asymmetric information whereby the cost of capital is set on a high level, to 
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compensate investors for potential adverse selection problems (Hubbard et al., 1995). 
However, internal available resources are very limited for most of the companies.  
As for debt, a company can finance its growth by issuing corporate bonds on for 
investors or by obtaining loans from private investors or financial institutions. The 
advantages of debt are the relatively low cost of capital due to seniority of debt holders 
in case of bankruptcy and, most importantly, the benefits of tax shield. In addition, 
increasing leverage imposes financial discipline on management as it reduces the level 
of available cash in the company (Jensen, 1986). However, debt can also lead to 
underinvestment due to debt overhang problems (Myers, 1977; Johnson, 1998). 
Nevertheless, managers might be encouraged to undertake risky projects when the 
excessive risk is born by debt holders and the upside gains are enjoyed by 
shareholders. However, if lenders anticipate this, they will increase required cost of 
debt for the firm. Moreover, management might reject positive NPV projects, even 
though they increase firm value. According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) the 
marginal benefits of debt decline as debt increases, while marginal costs increases, so 
that a firm optimizing its overall value will focus on this trade-off when choosing the 
optimal levels of debt and equity in its capital structure. 
As for going public, this decision is very complex and it implies costs and 
benefits trade-offs. These are discussed in the next subsections starting with the cost of 
going public and thereafter the potential benefits of going public are presented.   
2.2.1 Costs of Going Public 
Pagano et al. (1998) present the costs of going public as: 
i. Adverse Selection – in the presence of adverse selection hazard, investors 
will demand a compensation for their risk, mostly in the form of IPO 
underpricing. This is mainly the case of young companies ‘with little track 
record and low visibility’ (p. 36). Consequently, two types of companies will 
be encouraged to go public; either young low quality firms or well-known 
large corporations. 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background   
 
- 20 - 
 
ii. Administrative Expenses and Fees- in addition to the costs incurred in the 
IPO process, once listed and traded companies face considerable further 
expanses. These expenses include the yearly costs of auditing, stock exchange 
fees, certification, etc.  
iii. Proprietary Information - public companies must respect the rules and 
regulations of quoting stock exchanges. Accordingly, they are requested to 
reveal key information and in this way harm their competitiveness, also 
known as propriety information. This aspect is crucial for R&D companies, 
which pivot around information and information control.      
 However, as shown in the next subsection, going public suggests also 
substantial benefits to companies.  
2.2.2  Benefits of Going Public 
The following list presents potential benefits of going public: 
 
i. Overcoming Borrowing Constraints – through public offering a company 
bypasses constraints imposed by banks and venture capital firms. These 
constraints can be significant for high-levered company with high growth 
potential. Additional leverage is particularly expensive due to debt overhand 
problems and the alternative of going public is often used to attract investment 
from public investors when the existing debt from financial institutions is 
high. Thus, IPO will be the only way to raise capital if the risk is too high and 
high risk can be borne by investors (Pagano et al., 1998).    
ii. Increasing Lenders Competition – Rajan (1992) argues that through public 
offering a company can reduce the bargaining power of its current lenders. In 
this way they can attract investment for a cheaper cost of capital.   
iii. Liquidity and Portfolio Diversification – by going public a company can 
significantly reduce the costs of trading with private equity. As a result, the 
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reduction of costs, together with the increased availability to dispersed 
investors, increases the liquidity of the company in question. Logically, 
trading volumes also significantly increase. Moreover, public offering allows 
the initial owners to diversify their investment portfolio. This can be achieved 
by either privately investing in stocks of other companies or acquiring stakes 
of other companies to diversify the company’s business. This is mostly 
important in case of risky companies (Pagano, 1993).  
iv. Monitoring - Pagano et al. (1998) argue that a publicly listed firm enjoys 
better managerial monitoring. In their view, managers will have a higher 
discipline and will perform better due to a hostile takeover risk, higher level of 
information disclosure and the introduction of options and stocks in their 
compensation package. In addition, going public might reduce over-
monitoring problems that usually affect private companies with several 
owners. 
v. Investors’ Recognition – public offering can also contribute to the 
company’s advertisement and media coverage. Indeed, listing a company on a 
large stock exchange leads to a wide public acquaintance with the firm’s name 
and line of business. This should positively affect the operating performance 
of the company. 
vi. Change of Control – going public can also be used by initial investors and 
owners as an instrument for initial investors to cash-out on their investment in 
the firm. Zingales (1995) suggests that this will be the case when the potential 
proceeds of public offering for the initial investors are higher than those of 
private sale. He further argues that public companies are more prone to be 
takeover targets than private ones. Therefore, entrepreneurs will be keener to 
list their company on stock exchanges in the expectation to attract acquirers. 
Moreover, it is harder for the acquirers to pressure outside investors than to 
pressure targets on price concession in the case of public companies. Overall, 
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entrepreneurs can facilitate the acquisition of their company better when going 
public.  
vii. Momentum Valuation Advantage - Ritter (1991) regards the initial public 
offering as a way for a company to benefit from overvalued industry. In other 
words, when a management of a private company believes that its publically 
listed competitors enjoy higher stock prices than their real value, it can try to 
reap this premium associated to its industry by going public. In this case, the 
initial owners will get a higher price than the fair price. However, the IPO 
process implies high costs that can actually cancel out this premium. 
           
A number of theories attempt to rank the different financing alternatives. Myers 
(1984) introduces the concept of relevance of asymmetric information in the Pecking 
Order theory. The theory ranks the different financing alternatives, and concludes that 
internal financing should be used first, thereafter debt, and only when this latter option 
is depleted, equity should be issued. In this line of thinking, the financing choice can 
act as a signal for investors. The implication is that the company issues new equity 
when it is overvalued. Therefore, rational investors will attribute a lower value to any 
new equity issuance.  
The following subsection discusses the different listing alternatives for a 
company that chooses to go public.  
2.3 Why List Abroad 
Once a company decides to go public, it has to identify the specific stock market 
on which the equity is to be quoted. In line with the recent movement towards market 
consolidation, a firm faces two alternatives; it can issue its stocks either domestically 
or in a foreign market. The issuing company can also go for a combination of these 
two alternatives, namely, cross-listing or direct listing on foreign securities exchanges. 
The following subsection discusses the different listing alternatives of listing abroad.  
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2.3.1 Different Alternatives of Listing Abroad 
2.3.1.1 Cross Listing 
Cross listing is the action of issuing stocks on at least one additional foreign 
exchange markets besides the domestic market. This paper focuses on American 
cross-listing programs, namely, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). The four 
levels of ADRs are: 
  Level I Facility- this is the simplest form of ADR in which the company 
issues shares that are traded over-the-counter (OTC); also known as “pink 
sheet” market. The benefits of this form for the company are the increased 
liquidity offered by the introduction to the US markets, the quick process, and 
limited information disclosure required. By choosing this form the firm avoids 
complying with US Generally acceptance Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
most of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. 
Moreover, this is the cheapest cross-listing process is relatively to other 
alternatives. However, the disadvantage of this form is that trade can be 
conducted only OTC and therefore, it remains rather limited.  
  Level II Facility – ADR securities are listed on ordinary Exchanges. This 
form is more expansive and time consuming than Level I as the firm must 
conform its accounting procedures to the US GAAP or the IASB IFRS4 and 
fulfill the SEC requirements. The major advantage of this alternative relies in 
the wider exposure to relevant trading parties and easier accessibility to stocks 
by potential investors. 
  Level III Facility – a form in which the company enters the primary and the 
secondary market by conducting the underwriting process in the US markets. 
                                                 
4
 Since 2007, see section 2.3.3 for more information 
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Following this process, the foreign firm must comply with all requirements 
and rules as domestic US companies. Through the issuing process the firm 
must file an offering prospectus (Form F-1) as well as annual financial 
statements (Form 10-F). Moreover, any information disclosed to its 
shareholders in the domestic market ought to be reported to the SEC and filed 
in the US through Form 8-K. As in level 2, the advantages of this alternative 
are the easy accessibility of investors to company’s stock, the large exposure 
to investors and wide media coverage that can boost company’s sales. The 
disadvantages are the high costs of reporting and complying with regulations, 
information disclosure and underwriting costs.         
  Private Offering (SEC Rule 144A) – a form that allows the foreign company 
to be traded on PORTAL which is ‘a private electronic market on which only 
very large institutional investors can trade’ (Coffee, 2002, p. 1785). In this 
form, the company bypasses the regulations of the US GAAP or the IASB 
IFRS and still gets an access to a large pool of institutional investors.  
2.3.2  Direct listing   
This alternative is reasonably similar to Level III Facility but unlike the latter, 
the company is not mainly traded on its domestic market. Therefore, compliance with 
all the US GAAP or the IASB IFRS and SEC regulations and requirements is 
compulsory. The process is typically cheaper than cross-listing because the company 
is required to pay less administrative fees for exchanges as it is listed only on one 
exchange. In addition, the firm is subject to fewer fees for financial services such as 
underwriting and auditing due to the fact that it is listing on one market.  
The following section discusses the impact of listing abroad on companies’ 
valuation.   
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2.3.3 The basic requirements of foreign IPOs 
Although not very relevant to this thesis due to the years covered (1990-
2009), it is important to note that there has been a recent change in the reporting 
requirements of foreign firms. More specifically, since 2007 the SEC has permitted 
the choice of IASB IFRS in financial reporting and thus shifted from requiring 
foreign firms to comply with the US GAAP reconciliations. Except for this important 
development little else has been changed over the last few years with respect to 
foreign issuers in the US. The following subsection describes the most current 
financial statement listing requirements of foreign issuers in US securities offerings 
as documented in the Financial Reporting Manual of the Corporate Finance Division 
of the SEC (2013)5, a report by Latham & Watkins LLP and KPMG (2011)6, and in a 
report by Jones Day (2012)7.  
The US Securities Act of 19338 sets forth the requirements of public securities 
offerings registered with the SEC. These generally require a filing of a registration 
statement with the SEC and consequently the distribution of a prospectus in 
association with the specific offering. The issue prospectus and registration statement 
must include financial information on the issuer’s financial conditions and operating 
performance together with its financial statements. The financial statements must 
consist of a balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in equity, 
statement of cash flows and related notes and schedules as required by the accounting 
system under which the statement has been prepared. The registration statement must 
                                                 
5
 The “Financial Reporting Manual” report by the Division of the Corporation Finance by the SEC had 
been retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.pdf on 20 July 
2013.   
6
 The “Financial Statement Requirements in US Securities Offerings: What Non-US Issuers need to 
know” report by Latham & Watkins LLP and KPMG (2011) had been retrieved from 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/financial-statement-requirements-in-us-securities-offerings on 
20 July 2013. 
7
 The “Foreign Private Issuers of Equity Securities in the United States” report by Jones Day (2012) 
had been retrieved from http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eac766b4-2ad2-4d77-bd26-
6e64e535356c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/421bfeda-3d79-48ea-aec0-
6efa215956bf/Foreign%20Private%20Issuers%202012.pdf on 20 July 2013. 
8
 The US Securities Act of 1933 had been retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf on 
20 July 2013. 
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include audited financial statements which are prepared in accordance with US 
GAAP, IASB IFRS, or local GAAP/non-IASB IFRS reconciled to US GAAP. The 
foreign issuer must provide audited financial statements of the last three fiscal years 
except for cases in which (1) the issuer’s incorporation date is within the required 
fiscal three years, (2) the issuer’s jurisdiction outside of the US does not require a 
balance sheet of the earliest year of the three-year period, and (3) the financial 
statements have been prepared in accordance with US GAAP. In the latter case, the 
financial reports of earliest year of the three-year period may be omitted as long as 
the information has not been previously filed under the US Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 9  In addition, the issuer must provide consolidated interim financial 
statements for issues where the registration statement becomes effective for more 
than nine months within the last audited fiscal year.  
The financial reports of the foreign issuer may be reported in any currency. 
However, the issuer must provide supplementary information to quantify the effects 
of inflation on reported figures when the financial reports are dominated in a currency 
of a country that has experienced cumulative inflation of over 100% in over the most 
recent years prior the filings or when the statements do not include constant currency 
or current cost basis information (Jones Day report, 2012). The foreign issuer should 
also disclose information on revenues and sales, operating profit or loss, and assets 
with respect to industry and/or geographic segments.   
Thus, while local accounting standards are important in the reporting of 
foreign issuers in the US, much effort has been given by US regulators to facilitate 
uniform reporting standards for this group of firms with some flexibility. It is 
important to note that in this thesis all firms have been reported their audited financial 
statements in accordance with the US GAAP or their local GAAP with reconciliation 
to US GAAP and thus financial information is highly comparable. However, potential 
differences in financial reporting resulting from domestic standards may still be 
                                                 
9
 The US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had been retrieved from 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf on 20 July 2013. 
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important and are thus addressed in various ways in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis.    
2.3.4   The Impact of Listing Abroad on Companies’ Valuation  
In recent years, a growing number of firms have chosen to issue their securities 
abroad. At the end of 2006, about 1145 foreign companies were registered on the SEC. 
As evident from Figure 2.1, the distribution of the foreign companies reporting with 
the SEC by year follows trends. Specifically, there is a large annual increase in the 
foreign firms listed prior 2002. Then the numbers are increasing again until the 2008 
subprime crisis.  
 
Figure 2.1 – Foreign IPOs by year 
 
 
Source: Prof. Jay Ritter of the University of Florida10.   
 
However, as Figure 2.2 shows, the relative number of foreign registrants to 
domestic IPOs is increasing even after 2002 suggesting that listing in the US may still 
be attractive to foreigners.  
                                                 
10
 Retrieved on 30 June, 2012 from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2009foreign.pdf 
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Figure 2.2 – IPO Distribution in the US by year, and the share of foreign to all IPOs 
  
Source: Prof. Jay Ritter of the University of Florida11.   
 
The increasing occurrences of international listing over the last decade have 
attracted the attention of many scholars aiming at investigating the impact of listing 
abroad on stock returns. The following subsection introduces the relevant studies 
focused on this issue and sets forth an analysis of the costs and benefits of listing 
abroad. However, it is important to clarify that most of the research involves cross-
listing to the US, unlike this thesis that focuses on exclusive listing with no prior 
listing. Nevertheless, both alternatives are dictated by similar motivations as “most of 
the incentives associated with cross-listing in the US can also affect foreign 
corporations’ decisions to conduct their IPOs in the US” (Yehezkel, 2006, p. 14).   
 
Coffee (2002) stresses that globalization and technology processes are the two 
factors that enhance market consolidation, and ultimately lead to listing abroad. He 
writes: 
 
“Globalization has lowered the barriers to cross-border capital flows, 
including in particular traditional restrictions on foreign investments in 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
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domestic stocks, and because technology has made instantaneous information 
flows feasible, securities markets can now compete on a global basis that 
never previously was possible.” (p. 1759) 
 
Between 1975 and 2006, the percentage of foreign listed companies on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ has increased from 2.12% to 10.78%12. As a result, competition 
between global markets has grown fiercer. Typically, the capital markets that offer the 
most advanced technology, the greatest liquidity and the lowest trading costs are the 
better-off ones. Moreover, there is a clear first-mover advantage as traders are 
attracted to the most liquid markets. As a result, those markets become even more 
liquid. This process is summarized by the commonly used phrase “liquidity attracts 
liquidity” (Di Noia, 2001, p. 55). 
 Furthermore, different studies show a clear “cross-border premium” for 
companies which cross-list to a leading foreign market, typically US market. Doidge 
et al. (2002) find that this premium reaches up to 16.5% comparing to non-cross listed 
companies. Miller (1999) documents significant evidence for abnormal returns in the 
case of cross-listing to major US securities markets. In particular, the author discovers 
that firms from emerging markets enjoy an average abnormal return of 2.63%. 
Moreover, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find an evidence for a significant abnormal 
long-term return for cross-listed companies. In particular, they find excess reruns of 
19% in the year prior to the actual listing as a result of the cross-listing announcement. 
This is followed by additional 1.2% increase in the listing week and a decline of 14% 
of the excess returns during the first year in which the company is dual-listed. This 
evidence is supported by other studies suggesting that firms can increase their value 
through cross-border listing (Coffee, 2002).  
 The following theories analyze different possible motivations for listing in 
foreign markets. It is interesting to note that these theories often complement each 
other rather than compete with each other. 
                                                 
12
 Base on NASDAQ Performance Report 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/stats/Performance_Report.stm   
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i. Market Segmentation Theorem  
This theorem addresses the risk premium required by US investors, which is 
highly affected by cross-border investment barriers. These obstacles emerge from 
different market conditions such as taxation, regulatory restrictions, accounting 
standards, information asymmetries, etc. These costs carry a burden, in particular for 
foreign investors, which add to the required rate of return on investment. In addition, 
the higher costs are expected reduce the foreign investors’ involvement in cross-border 
stock markets. Merton (1987) suggests that managers have incentives to widen 
investors’ base in order to reduce their firms’ costs of capital. He goes further by 
claiming that this is one of the dominant motivations of companies to go public. 
Foester and Karolyi (1999) apply this suggestion to international listing and argue that 
by listing abroad, a firm can further reduce its cost of capital, alleviate investing 
barriers for US citizens and capture a wider base of shareholders. Thus, a larger 
number of investors bear a smaller portion of individual’s risk (risk-sharing) and 
therefore require less compensation for their investment. Thus, a US listing reduces 
the cross-border barriers for investors and enhances liquidity. Miller (1999) finds a 
positive correlation between abnormal returns and the level of restrictions on capital 
flows originated by firms’ cross-listing announcements. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that market segmentation “creates and incentive for firms to cross-list in 
order to achieve market integration” (Coffee, 2002, p. 1779).  
 
ii. The Liquidity Theorem  
Liquidity is typically measured by bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and a 
change in investors’ base. By accessing a more developed capital market abroad, the 
company enters a larger investors’ pool. As a result, firms tend to list securities abroad 
in deep and liquid markets so that they can benefit from the segmentation effect as 
well as a decrease in the cost of capital. The reasoning is a rather simple one; once 
traded in a global liquid market, the firm faces more potential investors, and less credit 
constraints. Logically, these benefits are mostly important to firms with high growth 
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potential. Errunza and Miller (2000) prove that the cost of capital for high growth 
companies does decline significantly as a consequence of cross listing to US markets. 
This effect is even stronger for firms that complete an IPO process in order to finance 
its anticipated growth (Doidge et al., 2002). 
 
iii. The Information Environment Theorem 
A firm might choose to list its equities on foreign markets which require more 
information disclosure than the domestic market. This theorem suggests that by listing 
in such markets, the firm can credibly signal its superior quality to investors by 
committing to a costly disclosure policy. This should have a beneficial effect towards 
a reduction in cost of capital. According to Merton (1987), the increase in reliable 
information reduces the costs of tracking the accurate financial situation of the 
company. This implies an increased demand and lowers cost of capital. Barry and 
Brown (1985) stress the effect of risk on cost of capital by arguing that accurate 
information reduces the investor’s risk and lowers the required rate of return. Lang et 
al. (2003) stress the importance of US analysts’ forecast for foreign firms’ value 
creation. They list numerous motives to clarify why cross-listed firms experience high 
information disclosure. First, the company must comply with additional explicit 
disclosure requirements. Second, the company faces greater implicit pressure by 
analysts to reveal supplementary information to the market. Finally, analysts show 
more interest for cross-listed companies since they attribute to such firms higher 
quality and wider market interest. As a result, a larger number of analysts will follow 
the cross-listed company. In addition, the authors postulate that cross-listed companies 
enjoy more accurate future earnings forecasts, relatively to firms in their domestic 
markets. They argue that stock returns of cross-listed companies are sensitive to 
analysts’ exposure and therefore react positively to higher coverage. Thus, the listing 
firm’s value increases simply by the fact that it is now subject to a more credible and 
wider analyst reporting. The latter increases the investors’ base, lowers the risk faced 
by investors, and, consequently, reduces the cost of capital. Additionally, Pagano et al. 
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(2002) combine the Liquidity Theorem and the Information Environment Theorem 
and conclude that the value of the firm increases because cross-listing positively 
affects transparency and contributes to attracting more domestic as well as foreign 
capital. Furthermore, Carter et al. (1998) argue that the reputation of underwriters 
significantly affects the IPOs’ long-run performance. In other words, long-run returns 
are higher as the reputation improves. Finally, Michaely and Shaw (1995) show that 
the auditors’ prestige positively correlates with the IPOs performance. They claim that 
as auditor’s prestige level increases, the risk associated with the IPO decreases. The 
researchers identify two aspects of such relationship. First, prestigious auditors 
charges higher fees and chose to service less risky clients to maintain their high 
reputation. For high quality firms, the higher fees charged by better auditors serve 
their incentives to reveal their true quality to the market. Second, prestigious auditors 
serve “deeper” investors, and, therefore, face more lawsuits risk in case of 
underperformance of the IPOs. As a result, they are likely to be more accurate in order 
to protect themselves against such lawsuits.  
 
iv. The Bonding and Monitoring Theorem  
Coffee (2002) suggests that a firm can increase its value by listing in foreign 
markets that have stricter investor protection regulations; in particular, minor 
investors. He also argues that the potential benefits will be higher for a firm with weak 
investors’ protection regime in its domestic markets. He writes that through listing in 
US stock exchanges “the listing firm commits to respect minority investors’ rights and 
to provide fuller disclosure” (p. 1780). He also sets forth the potential improvements 
for investors’ protection. First, the listing firm must embrace the SEC standards and 
regulations. Second, investors gain “effective and low-cost remedies that are not 
available in the firm’s home jurisdiction” (p. 1780). Third, the firm is now obliged to 
superior financial information disclosure and must adjust its accounting principles to 
the US GAAP when setting up its financial statements. Forth, the firm increases its 
involvement with highly skilled financial intermediaries such as underwriters, 
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auditors, debt rating firms, and analysts. This will force, or bond, the firm to comply 
with additional requirements that are not strictly legal and yet are at least as important 
for well-functioning financial market. Finally, in addition to general SEC regulations, 
the firm must complete the specific requirements of the targeted exchange market. 
This implies supplementary obligations that will further contribute to investors’ 
protection.  
The bonding theorem suggests stronger value creation for companies from 
emerging countries, due to the significant differences in corporate governance 
regulations and accounting standards as reported by Miller (1999), Switzer (1986) and, 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999). Yet, other researches show a clear motivation for firms 
within developed markets, such as in the case of European companies, to cross-list. In 
fact, Wojcik et al. (2004) show that most of the European firms that cross list to US 
markets follow stricter corporate governance regulation than their domestic peers. A 
possible explanation is that these companies face lower barriers and costs to comply 
with US regulations. Nevertheless, these companies are expected to benefit from the 
cross-border listing in the form of broader awareness and enhanced liquidity.    
To conclude, the theorems suggest that as companies deepen their involvement 
in the US stock markets, from level I to level III or direct listing, their abnormal 
returns as well as their value increase. The reasoning is clear, level I facility does not 
require considerable information disclosure upgrading or any other bonding outcome. 
However, Level II and level III facilities require significant information disclosure, 
corporate governance changes, and other bonding actions. Accordingly, level III and 
direct listing yield the strongest positive market reaction to the announcement of 
credible US listing preparation. The following section introduces the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002 and focuses on its key requirements with regard to domestic and foreign 
companies.  
After discussing the alternative ways of listing abroad and the impact of going 
public on a foreign exchange on companies’ valuation, the next section presents the 
major requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and theirs potential different 
implications for domestic firms and foreign issuers.  
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2.4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
2.4.1  Introduction 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act to the US stock markets on 30th July 2002. It imposed resolutions on all domestic 
as well as foreign SEC reporting companies. During the introductory phase of the Act, 
attempts were made to exclude foreign firms from the requirements without any 
success. In particular, foreign firms did not enjoy any added flexibility as per the 
implementation time frame (Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008).  
The introduction of SOX came as a reaction to a wave of financial scandals in 
the years prior to 2002 that carried nametags such as the Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Merck and Qwest. The increased occurrences of such scandals and the implied costs to 
investors induced a great loss of confidence in the global financial markets. 
Consequently, many investors started filing lawsuits, seeking reimbursement to the 
losses imposed from securities frauds. This confirmed the suggestion by different 
studies to increase the involvement of regulators in the securities markets. In 
particular, La Porta et al. (2002) find that stock markets’ development correlates with 
law enforcement and reforms. In other words, a well-functioning financial market will 
be a market that is effectively regulated, as opposed to a set up that is exclusively 
determined by market forces.       
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a set of regulations and rules assembled in two 
separate bills. The first was introduced by US congressman Michael D. Oxley and 
the second was introduced by US Senator Paul S. Sarbanes. The Act was 
subsequently approved by the US Senate and later by the US president. Different 
studies that have investigated the effects of the SOX on the US market claim that it 
differs considerably from prior analogous legislative documents. Firstly, the Act 
came as a response to financial statement frauds that were conducted by individuals 
in well-known corporations. Secondly, there were significant evidences for 
insufficient financial reports’ transparency with the increasing use of off-balance-
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sheet transactions. Thirdly, the new regulations are focused on improving corporate 
governance and audit features, in addition to financial disclosure functions. Fourthly, 
the new regulations have increased drastically the CEO and CFO criminal liability 
for the quality and precision of financial statements and disclosures (Smith, 2007). 
Finally, Rezaee and Jain (2006) conclude that this act was aimed at: 
  
“Improving corporate governance, enhancing the quality of financial 
reports, promoting audit effectiveness, creating the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate the auditing 
profession, and increasing criminal and civil liability for violations of 
security laws” (p. 632).   
 
Rezaee and Jain (2006) also argue that the two main objectives of this act were 
(1) to identify plausible conflicts of interests between investors and management and 
supervise them in a way that allows investors to enforce their rights. This improves 
corporate governance by aligning the incentives of both the controlling groups and 
other shareholders. And (2), to set up the right incentives and legal consequences for 
those engaged in issuing financial statements. The rationale behind it is that by 
realizing their expertise responsibilities, the responsible individuals should positively 
“affect the superiority, credibility and transparency of financial information as well 
as the quality and objectivity of auditing” (Rezaee and Jain, 2006, pp. 634-635).  
In relation to the effects of the enactment of the SOX on foreign companies 
listed on the US stock markets, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) summarize different 
studies which examine the bonding hypothesis and suggest that the Act “should 
strengthen the credibility of US listings as a bonding mechanism, thus increasing the 
expected benefits from a US listing” (p. 385). The main reasoning behind this 
suggestion is that firms with poor legal and regulatory requirements in their home 
markets can communicate their high quality by listing on foreign markets with 
stricter regulations. This is in line with the theory of La Porta et al. (2006) which 
advocates for the importance of law on a well-functioning financial market and 
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suggests that the introduction of the SOX implies even stricter corporate governance 
and accounting requirements for foreign issuer in the U.S, and, therefore, even 
stronger signaling effect.  
In order to get a deeper understanding with regard to the implications of the 
Act a review of the major requirements and objectives of the Act as presented in the 
following subsection following a review essay by Ernst & Young (2003)13:   
2.4.2   The SOX’s Objectives 
The following section describes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s objectives and 
matches each objective with its relevant issues and legislation rules.  
2.4.2.1 Reporting- Upgrade Disclosures  
 Management Certification -  
In order to improve disclosure practices, section 302(a) and its amendments in 
section 404 of the Act state that both the chief executive officer and chief financial 
officer of the reporting firm are required to certify each quarterly and annual report. 
By certifying the reports the executives declare that the reports in question contain all 
material facts and do not include any false statement. Also, the certifying executives 
must state that the firm is fully following the required disclosure procedures such that 
all information subject to disclosure in SEC reports is reported within the specified 
period. Moreover, the certification indicates that all control deficiencies, significant 
deficiencies, and material weaknesses have been reported to the auditors and audit 
committee. Hammersley et al. (2008) classify these three misstatements according to 
their increasing probabilities and magnitudes respectively. According to the authors, 
up to that time, reporting internal control weaknesses were required solely when 
auditors changed. 
                                                 
13
 Retrieved 12 May 2013 from http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_Sarbanes-
Oxley_Act_at_10_-
_Enhancing_the_reliability_of_financial_reporting_and_audit_quality/$FILE/JJ0003.pdf   
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As a result, management certifications are incorporated into the process of 
financial reporting, which significantly increases the CEO involvement and 
responsibilities in the issues of disclosure. Furthermore, the increasing accountability 
of the CEOs reinforces better management control of accounting issues across all 
relevant individuals in the organization. In addition, these changes enhance the 
engagement of management and audit committee with external auditors.   
     Evaluation of Internal Controls - 
Under section 404 of the Act, management of public company is required to 
“report on the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial 
reporting” (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 6). Additionally, management assertion must be 
attested and reported by the company’s independent auditor. Furthermore, both of the 
reports are to be integrated into the firm’s annual report. Thus, managements are 
responsible to a sound internal-control while auditors are responsible to “attest to the 
soundness of management’s assessment and report on the state of the overall 
financial control system” (Wagner and Dittmar, 2006, p. 133).  
  Off-Balance Sheet and Pro Forma Disclosures - 
The requirements of section 401 state that all off-balance sheet transactions, 
obligations and other relevant information, including non-GAAP financial 
information must be disclosed in the quarterly and annual reports. This section was 
introduced to prevent companies from hiding valuable information from investors in 
the form of off-balance sheet transactions and is a direct result of the renowned 
scandals which led to the enactment of SOX.   
   Real time Issuer Disclosures - 
Section 409 requires companies to report financial condition alterations as well 
as operation changes within two business days. This positively affected the number 
of reported corporate events under Form 8-K filing (Ernst & Young, 2003).  
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2.4.2.2 Roles- Strengthen Corporate Governance  
 Auditor communications and Audit Committees -  
The Act enhances the communication between the company’s audit committee 
and its independent auditor. Section 204 states that auditors must report to the audit 
committees all critical accounting policies and practices, all substitute treatments 
including their implications with respect to the preferred treatment, and any 
additional written material regarding financial statements (Ernst & Young, 2003).  
 Thus, this section promotes more frequent and lengthy interactions between 
external auditors and audit committees. Consequently, it implies a change in the 
relationship and procedures between these two complementary monitoring bodies.  
  Audit committee standards –  
Section 301 aims at regulating the audit committee listing requirements where 
the main objective is to promote higher independency and better quality of audit 
committees. Under this legislation, audit committee members must be part of the 
board of directors and independent. Defond et al. (2005) define independent directors 
as “outside directors with no current or recent business affiliation with the company” 
(p. 185). However, the question of independency remains highly disputed among 
scientists and practitioners. Section 301 also declares that the audit committee is the 
responsible body for the hiring, remuneration, retention, and supervision of the work 
of the auditor. Moreover, the audit committee is responsible for the process of 
managing complaints regarding accounting issues. Also, the audit committee is 
encouraged to include a financial expert defined as an individual holding “accounting 
expertise, or any experience in supervising employees with financial responsibilities 
and overseeing the performance of companies” (Dhaliwal et al., 2007, p. 1). 
Moreover, the Act also requires companies to provide the audit committee with the 
necessary funding that the committee deems for compensation to auditors, fees for 
external advisors and payment of the audit committee expenses (Ernst & Young, 
2003).      
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Accordingly, audit committee members are more independent and better serve 
their intermediate role between management and auditors. Also, members of the 
audit committee identify the importance of financial and accounting knowledge.  
Furthermore, under section 407, the reporting firm must disclose whether its 
audit committee contains a financial expert. The question whether it should disclose 
all its financial experts or only a threshold of one remains subject to company’s 
decision.   
2.4.2.3 Relationships- Intensify Auditors Independence 
 Prohibition of Certain Services by Auditors -  
To facilitate greater auditor independence, section 201 specifies eight 
categories of non-audit services that are prohibited to be provided by the company 
auditor. In other words, an external auditor cannot offer other non-audit services to 
the company while serving as its auditor. However, it is important to mention the 
majority of these non-audit services were already forbidden prior to the introduction 
of SOX. Zhang (2007) argues that the ban on additional non-audit services was set to 
keep intact auditor independence and to decrease the “economic bond between the 
auditor and the client” (p. 81). Nonetheless, the author mentions a counter argument 
made by Schroeder and Hamburger (2002) concerning the benefits of knowledge 
gain through providing other non-audit services.  
Furthermore, the following section, namely section 202, states that all services 
provided by the auditor must be preapproved by the audit committee.  
  Audit Partner Rotation-  
Another measure adopted by the Act is the five year mandatory rotation of “the 
lead audit partner as well as the responsible for reviewing the audit concurring to 
rotate off the audit every five years” (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 12). Also, a five year 
respite is required before those agents are permitted to obtain another role subject to 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background   
 
- 40 - 
 
rotation at the same company.  This again empowers the audit committee as the 
selection of new partners every five year increases the importance of the audit 
committee. 
  Restrictions on Company Hiring of Audit Team Members-  
Section 201 sets a cooling-off period of one year for an employee of the audit 
firm who was part of the auditing team. This is imposed on any auditing related 
position in the hiring company. In addition, section 303 prohibits officers or others 
acting on their behalf to influence, manipulate or misinform any independent auditor. 
Yet, these actions do not include effective debate on accounting and auditing issues 
as well as genuine and sensible inaccuracies. 
2.4.2.4 Enforcement- Increase Oversight 
 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Authority  
With the purpose of enhancing enforcement, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created under section 101 & 102 by SOX intended 
“to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect investors and the 
public interest by promoting informative, fair, and independent audit reports” 
(PCAOB)14. Thus, a private sector, non-profit corporation was formed to oversight 
externally and independently auditors of US public companies that were beforehand 
only self-regulated. The following paragraph sheds light on the organization duties 
and responsibilities.      
 
‘The PCAOB has authority to investigate and discipline 
registered public accounting firms and persons associated with those 
firms for noncompliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
rules of the PCAOB and the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
                                                 
14
 Retrieved from the PCAOB website - http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx on April 14 2013 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background   
 
- 41 - 
 
and other laws, rules, and professional standards governing the audits 
of public companies’ (PCAOB)15.  
 
Section 109 sets the funding mechanism of the PCAOB according to which a 
large part of the PCAOB budget is financed by issuing companies in the form of 
annual fees. The amount of fees is calculated according to market capitalization, and, 
as such, increases the costs of listing on US capital markets.  
    Increases SEC Reviews of Public Filings 
The Act stipulates an increase in the frequency of SEC review of 10-Ks and 
10-Qs reports. Specifically, according to section 408, company’s 10-Ks and 10-Qs 
filings must be reviewed at least once in three years. This was set to increase the 
effectiveness of enforcement in the US. However, in addition to a well-functioning 
monitoring body, the SOX also aims at setting sanctions and penalties to discourage 
individuals from performing misconducts. These are summarized in the following 
subsection.   
2.4.2.5 Penalties- Broaden Sanctions 
 Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits 
In case of financial report restatement that takes place within 12 months of the 
report publication due to misconduct of securities laws and regulations, section 304 
requires that the reporting company’s CEO and CFO will pay back “certain bonuses 
received and profits realized on the sale of securities following the financial report” 
(Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 3).  
Overall, the introduction of the SOX involves higher direct and indirect costs 
for the foreign issuer. Firstly, there are additional auditing and controlling charges 
such as appointing independent members to the Board of Directors (Rezaee and Jain, 
                                                 
15
 ibid 
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2005). Secondly, corporate executives are required to spend more time than before 
on regulation compliance and they will do so at the expense of the running the 
business. Thirdly, more disclosure costs weights on the decision of going public. 
Fourthly, more parties are required to certify or sub-certify the financial reporting. 
Fifthly, internal control and reporting costs have increased significantly. In 
particular, Rezaee and Jain (2005) argue that the costs of compliance with the Act 
range from $1 million to more than $10 million in 22% of the investigated 
companies. Moreover, Smith (2007) presents a survey that assesses an increase of 
142%, from $1.2 million to $2.9 million, in the average annual costs of being public 
for companies with annual revenues below $1 billion as a result of the SOX.     
The analysis of costs and benefits suggests that firms react either positively or 
negatively to the enactment of SOX according to their net gain. If the benefits of the 
Act surpass its costs, shareholders’ value will increase and the company will find it 
favorable to list on the US stock markets. La Porta et al. (1998) find that the 
companies which will benefit the most from cross-listing to markets with stricter 
regulations are those with highly concentrated and poorly regulated domestic market. 
However, when the benefits from SOX do not outweigh the costs, the companies will 
choose to deregister their securities and will choose the cheaper alternative of be 
traded OTC (Leuz et al., 2008). This would be the case for companies with well-
established accounting regulations in their domestic market. Hence, the “bonding” 
gain from cross listing is relatively small.  
2.5 IPO activity around the world 
This subsection provides an overview of the evolution of the IPO activity over 
time and across countries with a specific focus on US markets. In their study on 
global IPO activity in 1990-2007, Doidge et al. (2011) document 29,361 IPOs from 
89 countries with a total of around $2.6 trillion capital raised (adjusted to 2007 US 
dollars). As Table 2.1 shows, between 1990 and 2007 the total number of US IPOs is 
6,126 out of a total of 29,361 globally (that is 22%). In offerings size, the total IPOs 
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capital raised in the US is about $650 billion (adjusted to 2007 US dollars), which is 
about 25% of the total capital raised in IPOs globally. However, the authors point out 
on a relative reduction in the economic dominance of the US in the total IPO share, 
thought overall US firms have kept their high ranking. Specifically, they shows a 
decrease in the share of US IPOs to total IPOs from 27% in during the 1990s to about 
12% during the 2000s but at the same time their relative size has increased from 27% 
of world GDP to an average of 30%. This trend is further supported by a recent report 
on global IPO trends by Ernst & Young (2012)16 that documents 108 US IPOs which 
are about 8.8% of the total of the global IPOs in 2011 with US being the only third in 
ranking preceding by China (first) and Poland (second), as shown in Table 2.2.  
As to the share of capital raised, the report provides evidence of the US being 
second with around $35 billion which is about 21% of the global IPO proceeds in 
2011. The data is presented in Table 2.3. Furthermore, a report on the cross-border 
IPO trends by PWC (2012) 17  documents similar findings and indicates that “the 
center of IPO activity is gradually shifting towards Asia-Pacific” (p. 8). 
The distribution within industries with regard to global IPOs is another 
interesting issue to explore. As reported in Table 2.4, the Ernst & Young (2012)18 
report shows that between 2010 and 2011 the Materials industry has produced the 
majority of total IPOs globally. This evidence is in line with the finding of the PWC 
(2012) report that documents similar evidence in cross-border IPOs between 2007 
and 2011. The major differences between the two reports come from the Oil & Gas 
(Energy) industry that seems to be more important when it comes to cross-border 
IPOs. 
  
                                                 
16
 The Global IPO Trends 2012 report of Ernst & Young (2012) had been retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_IPO_trends_2012/$FILE/Global_IPO_trends_20
12.pdf on 6 July 2013 
17
 The Cross-Border IPO Trends 2012 report of PWC (2012) had been retrieved from  
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/audit-services/ipo-centre/assets/pwc-cross-border-ipo-trends.pdf on 6 
July 2013 
18
 The Global IPO Trends 2012 report of Ernst & Young (2012) had been retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_IPO_trends_2012/$FILE/Global_IPO_trends_20
12.pdf on 6 July 2013 
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Table 2.1: IPO activity for top 25 countries around the world between 1990 and 2007  
 All IPOs Domestic IPOs Global IPOs Only Global 
Country Count 
(rank) 
Proceeds 
(rank) 
Count Proceeds Count Proceeds Proceeds 
Panel A:        
US 6,126 (1) $647.7 (1) 4,931 $352.3 1,195 $295.4 $61.6 
India 4,867 (2) $32.2 (18) 4,777 $17.8 90 $14.4 $12.5 
Japan 2,234 (3) $204.1 (3) 2,130 $135.2 104 $68.9 $22.1 
Canada 2,225 (4) $68.6 (9) 2,020 $47.7 205 $20.9 $15.2 
China 1,764 (5) $254.6 (2) 1,300 $110.1 464 $144.5 $133.1 
UK 1,650 (6) $196.3 (4) 1,356 $77.1 294 $119.2 $68.9 
Australia 1,558 (7) $76.3 (8) 1,400 $34.4 158 $41.9 $18.8 
Hong-Kong 822 (8) $63.6 (10) 541 $12.9 281 $50.7 $43.6 
Taiwan 822 (9) $27.1 (19) 808 $25.5 14 $1.6 $1.5 
South-Korea 779 (10) $58.2 (11) 752 $46.1 27 $12.1 $10.5 
France 750 (11) $122.3 (5) 503 $9.7 247 $112.6 $54.3 
Germany 573 (13) $106.6 (6) 288 $27.6 285 $79 $45 
Singapore 488 (14) $20.3 (22) 404 $7.9 84 $12.4 $10.5 
Thailand 408 (15) $22.9 (21) 333 $11.0 75 $11.9 $6.5 
Indonesia 273 (16) $20.3 (23) 189 $5.0 84 $15.3 $9.9 
Italy 244 (18) $84.2 (7) 54 $9.7 190 $74.5 $32.4 
Norway 179 (20) $18.6 (25) 123 $6.7 56 $11.9 $8.6 
Sweden 143 (23) $33.9 (17) 53 $3.4 90 $30.5 $17.3 
Brazil 128 (24) $39.3 (15) 60 $14.9 68 $24.4 $23.3 
Netherlands 120 (25) $39.6 (14) 26 $4.1 94 $35.5 $28.2 
 
Panel B:        
Malaysia 722 (12) - 697 - 25 - - 
Pakistan 249 (17) - 247 - 2 - - 
Greece 185 (19) - 148 - 37 - - 
Poland 175 (21) - 133 - 42 - - 
Israel 155 (22) - 13 - 142 - - 
Russian Fed. - $43.6 (12) - $13.9 - $29.7 $29.7 
Spain - $41.5 (13) - $3.2 - $38.3 $18.4 
Switzerland - $37.1 (16) - $9.6 - $27.5 $20.2 
Bermuda - $26.5 (22) - $0.1 - $26.4 $26.4 
Mexico - $18.6 (24) - $6.7 - $11.9 $8.6 
        
Total: top 25 27,639 $2,305 23,286 $165 4,353 $1312 $729 
Other countries 1,722 $250 836 $84 886 $165 $129 
All countries 29,361 $2,555 24,122 $1078 5,239 $1477 $858 
 
Note: 
The table lists the top 25 countries based on both total IPO count and total proceeds as presented in Table 2 of Doidge et al. (2011). 
Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds raised in the domestic tranche of global IPOs. For global IPOs the panel reports total 
proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the domestic and international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs 
(proceeds raised in the international tranches only). Panel A lists the countries that are included in the top 25 countries of both total IPO 
count and total proceeds with their ranking in each category. Panel B lists the countries that are included in the top 25 of only one 
category and its rank in that category. Proceeds are in constant 2007 US dollars (billions).   
 
 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background   
 
- 45 - 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: IPO activity for top 10 countries around the world in 2011 
 2011 
Country Count (rank) Proceeds (rank) 
Greater China 388 (1) $72.3 (1) 
Poland 137 (2) $2.7 (9) 
US 108 (3) $36.0 (2) 
South Korea 69 (5) $3.6 (7) 
Canada 64 (6) $2.4 (10) 
   
Australia 98 (4) - 
India 40 (7) - 
Japan 37 (8) - 
UK 28 (9) - 
Indonesia 26 (10) - 
Switzerland - $10.0 (3) 
Spain - $5.3 (4) 
Russian Fed.  - $4.7 (5) 
Brazil - $4.4 (6) 
Italy - $3.0 (8) 
   
Total: top 10 995 $2,305 
Other countries 230 $250 
All countries 1,225 $2,555 
 
Note: 
The table lists the top 10 countries based on both total IPO count and total proceeds as presented in 
Figure 5 of a report by Earnest & Young (2012). Proceeds are in constant 2012 US dollars (billions).   
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Table 2.3: Global IPO activity world between 1990 and  2007  
 All IPOs Domestic IPOs Global IPOs Only Global 
Year Count  Proceeds  Count Proceeds Count Proceeds Proceeds 
1990 303 $29.6 248 $18.5 55 $11.1 $8.8 
1991 891 $71.7 804 $37.9 87 $33.8 $20.5 
1992 1,337 $60.8 1,211 $35.5 128 $25.3 $10.6 
1993 2,078 $150.2 1,860 $92.1 218 $58.2 $28.8 
1994 2,739 $157.7 2,474 $77.7 265 $80.0 $43.2 
1995 2,688 $116.4 2,433 $47.1 255 $69.3 $37.3 
1996 3,100 $168.8 2,766 $81.7 334 $87.1 $45.2 
1997 1,959 $179.8 1,580 $69.8 379 $110.0 $49.2 
1998 1,232 $138.2 922 $32.6 310 $105.6 $39.8 
1999 1,589 $210.0 1,006 $59.3 583 $150.7 $63.2 
2000 2,117 $242.2 1,452 $51.8 665 $190.4 $94.0 
2001 971 $108.1 798 $35.7 173 $72.4 $32.1 
2002 914 $76.5 809 $46.7 105 $29.7 $13.4 
2003 910 $59.1 809 $34.8 101 $24.3 $15.2 
2004 1,529 $133.8 1,279 $62.2 232 $71.6 $45.1 
2005 1,473 $149.4 1,223 $82.6 250 $66.8 $52.4 
2006 1,679 $223.7 1,314 $121.6 365 $102.1 $89.8 
2007 1,850 $278.6 1,116 $89.9 734 $188.7 $169.4 
        
Total 29,361 $2,554.6 24,122 $1,077.5 5,239 $1,447.1 $858.1 
 
Note: 
The table lists distribution in years for both the total IPO count and total proceeds as presented in Table 1 of 
Doidge et al. (2011). Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds raised in the domestic tranche of 
global IPOs. For global IPOs the panel reports total proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the 
domestic and international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the 
international tranches only). Proceeds are in constant 2007 US dollars (billions).   
 
 
 
Table 2.4: IPO activity for top 5 industries between 2009 and 2011 
2009 2010 2011 
Number of Deals Capital Raised Number of Deals Capital Raised Number of Deals Capital Raised 
Industries (101) Industries ($23.2) Materials (307) Financials ($80.0) Materials (268) Materials ($29.2) 
Materials (96) Financial ($22.6) Industries (236) Industries ($57.6) Industries (199) Industries ($26.4) 
Hi-Tech (59) Energy ($12.1) Hi-Tech (180) Materials ($38.5) Hi-Tech (149) Energy ($21.3) 
Con. Products (49) Real Estate ($10.8) Con. Products (113) Energy ($23.2) Con. Products (124) Financials ($15.9) 
Financials (46) Materials ($7.2) Energy (94) Hi-Tech ($20.7) Financial (110) Hi-Tech ($14.7) 
 
Note: 
The table lists the top 5 industries based on both total IPO count and total proceeds as presented in Figure 2 of a report by Earnest & Young 
(2012). Proceeds are in constant 2012 US dollars (billions).   
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Doidge et al. (2011) argue that the trends in the IPOs evolution described 
above are primary due to the significant growth of IPOs in other countries along with 
a lower IPO activity by US firms. The authors provide two possible explanations for 
that phenomenon. The first possible explanation is that the gap between foreign 
countries and the US has decreased and consequently their IPOs rates have become 
more similar to those of US. A second possible explanation is that firms are now 
facing new ways to avoid being affected by institutional hurdles. One of those new 
ways is the choice to go public in global markets and avoiding the constraints 
associated with their domestic markets. Doidge et al. (2011) also call attention to the 
fact that besides the growing activity of IPOs around the world, there has been a 
considerable increase in global IPOs, “which include both IPOs in which some of the 
shares are sold outside the home country of the firm going public, and foreign IPOs in 
which of all the shares are sold outside the home country” (p. 1).  
As Table 2.3 reports, the group of global IPOs accounts for about 60% of the 
total IPO proceeds in the late 2000s, which is a significant increase from early 1990s. 
Doidge et al. (2011) report similar trends between domestic and global IPOs around 
the world; with an annual increase from 1990 to a peak of 3,100 in domestic IPOs 
and 344 in global IPOs in 1996. This is followed by a more volatile count, with the 
number of IPOs falling to merely 910 domestic IPOs and 101 foreign IPOs in 2003. 
However, from 2003 to 2007 there had been a steady growth in both domestic and 
global IPOs with a considerable higher increase in global IPOs compared to domestic 
IPOs. Different studies suggest that the increase in global IPOs can be explained by 
the fact that this allows firms to mitigate potential adverse effects of poor home 
country institutions (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Doidge et al., 2007; Stulz, 2009). 
In terms of proceeds, there had been a rise in total capital raised in the 1990s with a 
peak of $240 billion in 2000 (adjusted to 2007 US dollars). However, the share of 
global IPOs proceeds to total is increasing significantly across all period to a share of 
68% in 2007. More interestingly, when focusing only on global IPOs with no 
domestic listing (so only listing capital on foreign markets instead of completing a 
multiple listing that includes the domestic capital market), the figures show a share of 
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a count of 40% to total IPOs but a share of capital raised of about 61% in 2007. This 
could indicate that the larger firms tend to list abroad with larger offering size.  
Doidge et al. (2011) find a positive and significant relation between the level of 
domestic IPO activity and the quality of the national institutions. They also find that 
countries with weaker institutions have higher rates of firms with global activity and 
so these firms go public in foreign markets to overcome the constraints set by their 
domestic markets. These findings are in line with the Stulz (2009) who argues that 
the ability of entrepreneurs to maximize their proceeds from offerings is highly 
conditioned credibility of disclosure commitments. Interestingly, a report on cross-
border IPO trends by PWC (2012) 19 points out that in the context of cross-border 
IPOs there are major differences between the infrastructure, technology, regulation 
and governance development rates of exchanges in emerging markets with Singapore 
and Hong Kong serving as regional cross-border hubs for IPOs from the Asia-Pacific 
region. The report also points out on China being a key originator of cross-border 
listings, with about 20% of IPOs completed overseas between 2002 and 2011. India 
and Brazil, however, have the lowest proportion of cross-border IPO activity relative 
to their size. In terms of location preferences, PWC (2012) report shows that there is 
a higher IPO intra-regional than inter-regional activity with 631 intra-regional 
listings out of a total of 1,174 IPOs in total between 2002 and 2011. Furthermore, the 
EMEA region experienced the highest intra-regional IPO activity with 335 intra-
regional IPOs out of 421 IPOs in total for the same period. On the other hand, the 
Asia-Pacific region shows the highest inter-regional activity between 2002 and 2011. 
The inter-regional relations show some clear trends; issuers from the Russian 
Federation and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) show a strong 
relationship with London with more capital raised there ($47.2 billion) than capital 
raised in the local markets ($47.2 billion vs. $8.1 billion, respectively). The report by 
PWC (2012) also finds that changes in regulations and listing rules are key factors in 
                                                 
19
 The Cross-Border IPO Trends 2012 report of PWC (2012) had been retrieved from  
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/audit-services/ipo-centre/assets/pwc-cross-border-ipo-trends.pdf on 6 
July 2013 
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setting cross-border IPO activity. In fact, uncertain regulatory environment has been 
argued to be the main concern than issuers have with regard to listing on an emerging 
market exchange. However, these are not limited to emerging markets as regulatory 
changes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have influenced cross-border activity 
(PWC, 2012). The motivations of listing abroad with a specific consideration to US 
markets are presented in section 2.3 of this thesis. In addition, the influences in the 
foreign IPOs setting in the US are further explored in the following empirical 
chapters of this thesis. Figure 2.3 follows the annual cross-border IPO activity by 
volume and proceeds as a proportion of total IPO activity, and Table 2.5 summarizes 
the IPO activity between the top ten issuing countries and the top ten destinations. 
Finally, as Figure 2.4 shows an increase in the use depositary receipts (DRs) 
over the last 20 years. The report by PWC (2012) suggests that the main reason for 
this increase is the fact that this form of offering provides “a mechanism for lowering 
the risk of alternative trading on local exchanges and providing efficient investments 
in different markets” (p. 24).  
The increase in the number of foreign IPOS in the US has promoted interest in 
studying the specific characteristics of these companies (Bruner et al., 1999, 2004; 
Doidge et al., 2009). However, not much is yet known with regard to the relation 
between the reporting quality, underpricing and aftermarket stock performance, and 
the soundness of home legal environment of these firms. The next chapter is the first 
empirical chapter in this thesis. It addresses the information asymmetry problems of 
foreign IPOs in the US with respect to the reporting quality in the fiscal year 
preceding the IPO by investigating the impact of home country institutions on 
earnings management.  
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Figure 2.3 – Annual Cross-Border IPO Activity by volume and proceeds as a proportion of total IPO activity 
 
Source: The Cross-Border IPO Trends 2012 report of PWC (2012) 
 
Table 2.5: Cross Border IPO activity between the top ten issuing countries and the top ten destinations between 2002 and 2011 
 
Australia Canada France Germany Hong 
Kong 
Poland Singapore South 
Korea 
UK US Total 
Top 10 
Total 
Outbound 
Total 
Domestic 
Australia 
 
5 
    
1 
 
23 1 30 30 745 
Canada 1 
   
1 1 
  
24 10 37 40 1,219 
China 8 2 8 14 
  
130 8 34 134 338 347 1,358 
Germany 
    
1 
   
7 2 10 12 178 
Hong Kong  2 2 
   
26 5 11 8 54 55 238 
India 
      
3 
 
32 3 38 38 416 
Ireland 
        
30 2 32 32 2 
Israel 
      
1 
 
17 19 37 37 76 
Russia 
   
1 2 
   
45 4 52 54 30 
US 5 17 
 
1 1 
  
1 62 
 
87 99 1,353 
Total top 10 14 26 10 16 5 1 161 14 285 183 
   
Total Inbound 30 37 18 30 19 20 183 16 480 264 
   
Total Domestic 745 1,219 202 178 663 512 268 717 934 1,353 
   
Note: 
The table lists distribution in years for both the total IPO count and total proceeds as presented in Figure 3 of the PWC (2012) report.  
 
Figure 2.4 – Annual Cross-Border IPO Activity by volume and proceeds as a proportion of total IPO activity 
 
Source: The Cross-Border IPO Trends 2012 report of PWC (2012)
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Chapter 3: 
Paper 1- Earnings Quality in Foreign IPOs in the 
US: The Role of Home Country Institutions 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance researchers have long argued that by improving 
transparency and quality of reporting firms can enforce governance constraints on 
managerial discretion and opportunism. It has been further argued that requiring high-
quality reporting can be harnessed to mitigate agency problems that cannot be 
reduced otherwise (Stulz, 2009). Prior research, however, indicates that even in the 
presence of high-quality reporting standards the ability to manipulate accounting 
numbers by managers may be influenced by economic, legal and political institutions.  
More specifically, studies based on the “bonding hypothesis” suggest that firms 
can reduce or avoid altogether the negative effect of less developed institutions in 
their home countries on their costs of capital by listing in overseas markets with more 
developed institutions. In doing so, they “bond” to the host country’s legal 
institutions (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999). In the extreme case, by issuing securities 
exclusively in the US, foreign firms may credibly commit to the US disclosure and 
enforcement rules. In terms of complying with reporting standards, this presumably 
makes them like any other US firm. Also, being seen as a local firm, foreign IPOs 
should be monitored and treated by US regulators and courts just as US IPOs. These 
arguments support the idea of irrelevance of home institutions for foreign IPOs’ 
reported numbers.  
Though many tend to believe that monitoring and enforcement standards are 
very tight in the US, there has been a debate in the legal, finance and accounting 
literatures about the effectiveness of regulation of foreign registrants in the US 
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studies such as Licht (2003), Siegel (2005), Lang et al. (2006) (hereafter LRW), and 
Licht et al. (2011) have cast doubt that the SEC has been willing and able to monitor 
foreign registrants. Therefore, it is not clear whether an IPO in the US necessarily 
entails a commitment to higher reporting standards. Specifically, it is possible that 
IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions select the US to avoid more 
stringent environments (Licht, 2003; Stulz 2009). This selection can be further 
beneficial if investors perceive them to be of high reporting quality and so spare them 
close scrutiny. On the other hand, investors in IPOs from countries with weak 
investor protection are likely concerned about high level of earnings management and 
information asymmetry, especially if adequate enforcement mechanisms available to 
them in the US or the IPO’s home country are lacking. It is therefore imperative for 
these firms to commit themselves to higher-quality reporting to be able to reduce cost 
of capital.20 
In this paper we compare measures of earnings management by foreign IPOs 
listed in the US to domestic US IPOs. We additionally compare measures of earnings 
management between foreign IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions and 
foreign IPOs from countries with weak legal institutions. Our paper extends LRW, 
who find that cross-listed firms manage earnings more than a matched sample of US 
firms. In addition they find that cross-listed firms from countries with weak legal 
institutions manage earnings more than firms from countries with strong legal 
institutions. They therefore conclude that “the SEC regulation does not supplant the 
effect of local environment” (p. 255).  
We analyze foreign IPOs rather than cross-listed firms for two main reasons. 
First, the extant prior research has largely focused on cross-listing because it has been 
assumed that foreign IPOs are equivalent to US IPOs. Specifically, the typical, but 
                                                 
20
 In order for external investors to provide financing, their legal protection must be assured (Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Chan et al., 2007). Doidge et al. (2007) posit that country institutions matter since they 
influence the costs that firms incur to comply with good governance and the benefits that accrue to 
them from doing so.  Chen et al. (2009) find that the effect of firm level corporate governance on cost 
of equity is influenced by country-level legal protection of investors. More importantly, their study 
reveals that enhanced firm-level corporate governance has a significant negative effect on cost of 
equity capital in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection for its investors. 
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untested presumption by some commentators has been that foreign IPOs have taken a 
step further away from cross-listing or domestic listing and are thus free from the 
influence of home institutions (e.g., Coffee, 2002).21 The second reason concerns the 
scrutiny effect in the IPOs market. It has been argued that, because IPOs involve cash 
raising, investors and the SEC devote more attention to IPOs than to cross-listed 
firms traded in the secondary market (Ndubizu, 2007; Dechow et al, 2010). The 
heightened scrutiny of IPOs by the SEC and other parties implies greater incentives 
for high quality reporting (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). This suggests stronger 
incentives for adopting US-like reporting practices at the IPO stage than subsequent 
to the IPO (i.e., in the secondary market). The findings of LRW may be thus related 
to weaker scrutiny at a later stage and therefore not generalizable to the case of IPOs.  
We collected a sample of 291 foreign IPOs from 35 countries from 1990 to 
2009. Our measure of the strength of home legal institutions is the product of two 
country-level indices: the anti-director rights, based on the Spamann’s (2010) revised 
measure of La Porta et al. (1998), and country-specific measure of enforcement based 
on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Law and Order index. This approach 
to capturing the strength of a country’s institutions is motivated by the need to 
consider not only formal law, but also how it is enforced in practice (Durnev and 
Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). An advantage of the ICRG index is that it is 
revised every year, unlike the anti-director rights index. We employ three models to 
calculate abnormal accruals whereby normal accruals are measured with respect to 
US IPO firms, controlling for time and industry effects. If earnings management in 
foreign IPOs is similar to that in US IPOs, we should find that abnormal accruals in 
foreign IPOs are not significantly different from abnormal accruals in US IPOs. 
Furthermore, if home institutions do not influence reporting choices of foreign IPOs, 
                                                 
21
 We note that the international accounting literature has found that as the strength of legal institutions 
varies from country to country so does the quality of earnings. Specifically, it has been found that 
quality of earnings increases with institutions in several cross-country studies (Ball et al., 2008; Leuz 
et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; 
Boulton et al., 2011). Yet, relatively little is known about the residual influence of home institutions 
when firms either cross-list or avoid altogether their home countries by pursuing an IPO elsewhere.  
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we should not be able to detect statistically significant association between measures 
of the strength of home institutions and abnormal accruals.  
We measure the level of earnings management in two ways. First, to capture the 
overall degree of misreporting by foreign IPOs we use absolute abnormal accruals 
from the three models. Higher absolute values correspond to more extreme reporting 
outcomes, and hence lower earnings quality. In addition, to assess whether 
misreporting is associated with aggressive or conservative reporting we use signed 
abnormal accruals. Importantly, we use hand-collected data from IPO prospectuses. 
This has the advantage, as Ball and Shivakumar (2008, p. 326) point out, that 
abnormal accrual measures are not affected by the subsequent use of the proceeds of 
the IPO. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we provide evidence that foreign IPOs 
manage earnings more than US IPOs. This suggests that the scrutiny effect differs 
between US IPOs and foreign IPOs. Second, we find that earnings management in 
foreign IPOs from countries with weak home institutions is similar or lower than 
foreign firms from countries with strong institutions. Our findings are in contrast to 
that of LRW who find more evidence of earnings management in cross-listed firms 
from countries with weak home institutions.  
In all of our tests we employ multivariate regression design controlling for, 
among other things, leverage, auditor quality, ownership structure, effect of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), and threat of litigation.22 With respect to these control 
variables, we find evidence that high insider ownership is associated with absolute 
abnormal accruals in IPOs from countries with weak home institutions, and that SOX 
constrains earnings management in these IPOs, but not in IPOs from strong home 
institutions countries. Additionally, the threat of litigation reduces earnings inflation 
in IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions, but not from countries with 
weak institutions. This is broadly consistent with some legal scholars’ arguments that 
the foreign registrant’s home countries security laws may matter as much if not more 
than US laws (e.g., Siegel, 2005).  
                                                 
22
 In doing so we depart from LRW and Ndubizu (2007) who do not control for these factors. 
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While our findings are in contrast with those of LRW, this may be attributed, at 
least in part, to the fact that cross-listed firms typically reconcile accounting number 
prepared under their domestic GAAP to US GAAP. These reconciliations may be 
more susceptible to the influence of home institutions, and they are generally of low 
quality (e.g., Amir et al, 1993). We take advantage of the fact that, though in our 
sample most firms report under US GAAP, some firms reconcile home GAAP to US 
GAAP, to examine if the results are robust to controlling for reconciliations. In 
additional analysis we rule out the possibility that reconciliations drive these findings. 
We further employ a range of sensitivity tests, including, among others, control for 
exchange membership, multi-listing and the LRW’s classification of the strength of 
home institutions. Our results are robust to these tests.    
These findings collectively support the notion that home institutions matter for 
reporting practices in foreign IPOs. That is, the corporate governance effect of home 
institutions is present in foreign IPOs. That IPOs from countries with strong 
institutions manage earnings more than IPOs from countries with weak institutions 
suggest that firms coming from countries with less developed institutions may try to 
alleviate US investors’ concerns by enhancing their internal governance. Another 
possibility is that the SEC and other monitoring parties assume that IPOs from strong 
home institutions practice better reporting. This may lead to differential scrutiny 
effect, when the SEC, analysts, investors and potentially auditors may be imposing 
relatively more scrutiny at IPOs from countries with weak institutions, allowing other 
IPOs to engage more aggressively in earnings management.  
We contribute to the growing literature on the impact of legal and economic 
incentives on reported outcomes in several ways. First, there are only a few papers 
that examine the link between home institutions and reporting quality in foreign 
registrants in the US, with Lang et al. (2003), and more closely to our paper, LRW 
being the notable exceptions. As foreign IPOs is a global and sizeable phenomenon, 
this paper expands our understanding of financial reporting aspects of this important 
economic activity. Specifically, we extend Lang et al. (2003) and LRW in that we 
look at a setting where prior research (e.g., Coffee, 2002) suggests that home 
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institutions should matter the least, if they matter at all. In other words, home 
institutions are expected to have little or no influence in this setting, as foreign IPOs 
in the US supposedly fully bypass their home country institutions. We provide 
evidence contrary to this prediction. Second, complementing LRW we provide 
evidence that indicates that compliance with US rules is not the same for foreign 
IPOs and cross-listed firms. Third, we highlight that reporting outcomes by foreign 
IPOs traded in the same market with same rules applied to all are not uniform and 
may depend on country of origin. This is important because of the perception that, by 
choosing to list in the US, most foreign firms circumvent the negative effects of weak 
home institutions and “trade up” the institutional environment.23 Our evidence that 
IPOs from strong home institutions manage earnings more is consistent the notion 
that IPOs in the US constitute a “trading down” effect whereby these IPOs avoid 
tougher rules in their home countries (Licht, 2003). Interestingly, we observe that 
according to our index the US scores below many countries (but not all) that we 
classify as having strong legal institutions.24 Hence we believe IPOs from countries 
with strong institutions may fit the trading down description (we provide additional 
evidence to that effect in Section 5.2). This also points to a possibility that the SEC 
and the wider investor community misperceive these IPOs and thus allow them to 
sneak under the scrutiny radar. Fourth, evidence provided here is useful for the debate 
on the validity of the “bonding hypothesis,” which hinges on the presumed 
commitment to the US legal, reporting and enforcement environments (Coffee, 1999, 
2002, and Stulz 1999, 2009 vs. Licht, 2003 and Siegel, 2005). To the extent that a 
foreign IPO in the US represents the most powerful form of bonding, our evidence 
suggests that even this may be insufficient to obtain credible disclosures at a level 
similar to US IPOs. Fifth, our paper is among the first to study earnings management 
in IPOs using data from prospectuses. Similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2008) it thus 
                                                 
23
 For example, Doidge at al. (2009, p. 426) unequivocally state: “…foreign firms listed in the United 
States face more constraints and potential enforcement actions than similar home-country firms that 
are not listed in the United States.” 
24
 As we explain later, our institutions index incorporates a recent revision by Spamann (2010), 
according to which the score for the US is well below the score computed by La Porta et al. (1998) or 
Djankov et al. (2008).    
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better captures the net effect of incentives that prompt earnings management to inflate 
IPO proceeds and counter-incentives to deflate earnings in the face of heightened 
regulatory scrutiny. Our findings are consistent with a different incentive mix for 
foreign IPOs in the US compared to domestic US IPOs. 
  The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we 
review related literature and how we extend it. In Section 3.3 we outline the research 
design. The sample is described in Section 3.4. The findings are reported in Section 
3.5. , and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Related Literature 
The accounting literature has relatively recently started to investigate the role of 
institutions on reporting outcomes. For example, LRW compare reporting quality in 
cross-listed firms (ADR firms) to US firms and find evidence suggesting poorer 
reporting quality in foreign firms from weak investor protection environment. 
However, because LRW examine ADRs of already listed firms (as well as some 
IPOs), their evidence is not sufficiently clear with regard to the effects of US 
institutions at the transition stage to a public status stage within the organizational 
life-cycle. This event is likely characterized by different levels of information 
asymmetry, regulatory scrutiny and the nature of agency problems (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008). Ndubizu (2007) conjectures that foreign IPOs manage their 
earnings more than first-time ADRs because IPOs involve raising of cash, but first-
time ADRs not. However, his evidence is inconsistent with this conjecture. He also 
finds that both foreign IPOs and first-time ADRs manage earnings more than mature 
US firms. The choice of mature US firms as a benchmark is questionable on two 
counts: First, the stage in the life-cycle and information asymmetry in IPOs vis-a-vis 
mature firms suggest different reporting incentives. Specifically, IPO firms being 
relatively unknown to the public can take advantage by managing earnings to a 
greater extent than mature firms. We therefore believe that a more relevant 
comparison is between foreign IPOs and US IPOs. Second, Ndubizu (2007, pp. 1011) 
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explicitly assumes – what may have been implicitly suggested by others - that foreign 
“firms face US information environments and their decisions to cross-list are not 
directly associated with home-country reporting.” Our arguments in the Introduction 
suggest that this assumption should be challenged.  
It has long been recognized that reporting quality is influenced by both the 
characteristics of the accounting standards a reporting entity has to follow and by 
reporting incentives associated with contracting arrangements. The literature has 
investigated the link between reporting incentives and country-level legal, political 
and economic institutions. In addition, it has attempted to assess the relative strength 
of accounting rules versus institutional-based incentives in explaining variations in 
cross-country reporting outcomes. For example, Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. 
(2003) provide evidence that reporting quality varies between civil and common law 
countries, and incentives related to regulation, taxation and litigation may cause 
variation in the quality of reported numbers. Leuz et al. (2003) highlight the impact of 
both legal and enforcement institutions on the quality of accounting earnings. Using a 
sample drawn from 31 countries they find that variations in earnings management are 
related to variations in institutions. Bushman et al. (2004) and Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) examine how accounting conservatism varies across countries. They find that 
reporting conservatism varies with judicial systems, securities laws, political 
economy and tax regimes. 
An important conclusion made within this literature is that the requirement to 
comply with similar accounting rules (e.g., IFRS or US GAAP) in different countries 
may still provide an ample scope for variation in reporting numbers in the cross-
section of countries. However, a less explored question is what is the effect of home 
institutions on reporting quality when the reporting firm entirely subjects itself to 
another country’s institutional setting? This is an important question bearing in mind 
that foreign listings represent a large population of firms in the US, UK and 
elsewhere. The aforementioned study by LRW advances our understanding of this 
issue by examining properties of reported numbers by cross-listed firms from 34 
countries that many of which have been cross-listed for some time in the US and 
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report under home GAAP with 20-F reconciliations to US GAAP. To the extent that a 
cross-listing creates sufficiently strong commitment (bonding) to the US institutional 
environment and high disclosure standards (Coffee, 2002; Stulz, 2009), variations in 
the properties of reported numbers are not expected to be related to the variations in 
home institutions of these firms. However, this is not what LRW find.  
One possible explanation for the findings by LRW that home institutions matter 
is that cross-listed firms’ corporate governance environment is not entirely isolated 
from home institutions. After all, cross-listed firms still maintain “one foot” in their 
home countries. Many legal matters may still have to be resolved in the home 
country, especially when the interests of domestic shareholders are affected. Even US 
shareholders of cross-listed firms may need to rely on home securities laws (Siegel, 
2005). More broadly, foreign firms may be conducting their business in a way that 
reflects underlying cultural and societal behaviors because their management and 
workforce are largely drawn from their home countries. This local embeddedness, in 
turn, may give rise to various agency problems that cannot be simply eliminated by a 
US listing.    
A second possible explanation to the LRW’s results is related to the very 
foundations of the bonding hypothesis. Licht (2000, 2003) points out that, unlike the 
assumption underlying bonding framework, legal remedies available to shareholders 
of foreign firms listed in the US are markedly weaker than those available to 
shareholders of US firms. He further posits that the motivation for US listing is 
somewhat different to what proponents of “bonding” claim: firms may seek an 
overseas listing because it provides access to cheap finance and enhancing issuers’ 
visibility, not because they want to commit to higher corporate governance standards. 
Similar views are also expressed by Fanto (1996) and Siegel (2005). 
 A third possible explanation for the LRW’s findings for cross-listed firms is 
that bonding is a valid theory in principle, but it is practically weakened by allowing 
cross-listed firms to report under domestic GAAP with poor-quality reconciliations 
(e.g., Amir et al, 1993). Consistent with that, LRW find weaker evidence of earnings 
management in cross-listed firms reporting under US GAAP (roughly 30% of their 
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sample). If reported numbers can be manipulated, then home-based incentives may 
influence their properties. In particular this can be the case when insider holding is 
significant in cross-listed firms (Leuz, 2006, and our own evidence). Because insiders 
may be embedded in their home countries, they respond to home-based incentives in 
shaping reported numbers.   
We develop this literature in a number of ways. First, we look at foreign firms 
that list for the first time, and do so in the US IPOs are generally characterized by a 
high level of information asymmetry, which is compounded in the case of foreign 
firms. Prior research typically looks at cross-listed firms which have been providing 
financial information and were followed by analysts for some time. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) argue that market demand for high-quality information is stronger 
for IPO firms because of regulatory oversight and the high level of information 
asymmetry. Similarly, Ndubizu (2007) further argues the SEC pays more attention to 
IPOs. Therefore, one may expect stronger incentives of foreign IPOs to comply with 
US rules and ignore home institutions compared to mature cross-listed firms. This is 
particularly relevant when the foreign IPO lists only in the US as it does not need to 
satisfy more than one set of investors and regulators.25 In other words, incentives to 
behave as “American firms” are expected to be significantly more pronounced in our 
sample. Therefore, the detection of any influence of home institutions should be 
regarded as strong(er) evidence of their economic significance and reach beyond 
country borders.  
Second, prior literature on foreign listing in the US largely ignores the role of 
auditors, insider ownership, threat of litigation, the effect of SOX and similar factors 
influencing the quality of accounting information (e.g., Lang et al. 2003; LRW; 
Ndubizu, 2007; Boulton et al., 2011). In contrast, we control for these factors. 
Crucially, it helps alleviate concerns with regard to the lack of control for possible 
                                                 
25
 The majority of our sample firms are listed only in the US However, in Section 5.2 we conduct some 
additional tests to see if single-listing IPOs differ from multi-listing IPOs.  
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other explanations for earnings management in foreign IPOs in the US (Leuz, 
2006).26  
Third, we use financial data taken from the prospectuses, not from regulatory 
filing following the IPO. As Ball and Shivakumar (2008) stress, using post-IPO 
financial statements (as in Teoh et al, 1998 and Ndubizu, 2007) is problematic 
because the use of IPO proceeds for growth-oriented investment may bias measures 
of abnormal accruals. Fourth, we use the Spamann’s (2010) revised index of anti-
directors rights. As he notes, the corrected index fails to support previous findings 
that rely on the original La Porta et al.’s (1998) index, or even its more recent version 
(Djankov et al., 2008).  
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Measuring Abnormal Accruals in Foreign IPOs 
We evaluate the level of earnings management employing three widely used 
models of abnormal accruals. Across all models we measure normal accruals by 
estimating model parameters from a cross-section of US IPOs with the same 2-digit 
SIC code and same year as the foreign IPO. That is, we match each individual foreign 
IPO with a cross-section of US IPOs with the same industry membership and year-of-
IPO. A minimum of 10 year-industry observations is required for the US cross-
section. When this minimum number is not available we combine two years or three 
years, until the minimum number of observations is reached. We remove 1% on both 
extremes of each continuous variable (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008).  
The first model of abnormal accruals, or discretionary accruals, is based on the 
Jones (1991) model, as modified by Dechow et al. (1995). We first calculate non-
discretionary accruals using the following model applied to US IPOs: 
                                                 
26
 Firm ownership structure shapes insiders’ reporting incentives and hence reporting quality (Fan and 
Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Fan and Wong 
(2005) show that hiring high-quality auditors can help to mitigate agency problems associated with 
high ownership concentration.  
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1 1 2 3(1/ )t t t t tACC TA Rev PPE                     (3.1) 
 
where accruals (ACCt) is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 
#123) plus depreciation and amortization (Compustat data item #124) minus 
operating cash flows (Compustat data item #308). TAt-1 is the lagged total asset 
(Compustat data item #6). Revt are changes between year t and year t-1 in net sales 
(Compustat data item #12) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year (TAt-1). 
PPEt is gross property plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7) scaled by TAt-1.  
This model differs from the original Jones (1991) model in that it adjusts for 
growth in credit sales. As credit sales are more susceptible to managerial discretion, 
this model yields residuals that are uncorrelated with expected revenue accruals to 
improve the detection of revenue manipulation (Dechow et al. 2010). We calculate 
the first abnormal accrual variable (EM1) for new foreign issuer firm in year t as the 
difference between the accruals reported by the foreign IPO and the predicted value 
of these accruals based on the coefficients in  (1) as follows:  
 
1 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tEM1 ACC TA Rev Rec PPE                  (3.2) 
 
The expression in the square brackets represents the amount of accruals a 
foreign IPO is expected to report had it been a US IPO within the same industry, and 
in the same year. Hence EM1 – as well as the other two measures presented below - is 
regarded as abnormal (or, discretionary) accruals whereby it is benchmarked against 
US IPOs’ accruals.  
The second measure of discretionary accruals is based on the method used by 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003). This measure controls for firm performance by including a 
lagged return on assets (ROAt-1) variable in the accrual regression to eliminate 
possible mechanical relation between performance metric and current period’s 
discretionary accrual estimate (Kothari et al., 2005). As with the first measure we 
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begin with estimating for the US IPOs sample an accrual regression based on the IPO 
year and two-digit SIC code:    
 
1 1 2 3 1(1/ )t t t t tACC TA Rev ROA                 (3.3) 
 
We calculate the second abnormal accrual variable (EM2) for the foreign IPO 
firm in year t as using the coefficients from (3) as follows:  
 
1 1 2 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tEM2 ACC TA Rev Rec ROA                 (3.4) 
 
The third and last measure of discretionary accruals follows Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008), who investigate the magnitude of earnings management around 
initial public offerings in the UK. This measure modifies the Jones (1991) model by 
incorporating conservative asymmetric accruals. Specifically, this model adds to the 
Jones (1991) model piecewise linear variant: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 *t t t t t t t tACC Rev FASSET CFO DCFO DCFO CFO                (3.5) 
 
Note that this model employs the net book value of property, plants and 
equipment, FASSET (Compustat data item #8) and CFOt  as operating cash flow, both 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year and refer to the last financial year 
reported prior the IPO. DCFOt takes the value 1 if CFOt < 0 and 0 otherwise. After 
estimating the model’s coefficients using US IPOs we calculate the third abnormal 
accrual variable (EM3) for the foreign IPO in year t as the regression residual as 
follows:  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ *t t t t t t t tEM3 ACC Rev FASSET CFO DCFO DCFO CFO              
 (3.6) 
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In our analyses we use both the raw (or, signed) measures of abnormal accruals 
EM1 to EM3, as well as their absolute value |EM1| to |EM3|. The raw measures 
capture the sign of the abnormal accrual, whereby a positive (negative) measure 
corresponds to aggressive (conservative), earnings. This measure is particularly 
suitable for assessing whether reporting incentives of foreign IPOs motivate earnings 
inflation. Using absolute measures reflects the view that positive accruals and 
negative abnormal accruals equally capture earnings quality. This is because a larger 
absolute value represents more extreme reporting outcome, or greater extent of 
misreporting.27    
3.3.2 Measuring the Strength of Home Institutions 
 The strength of the IPO’s home institutions is captured in the indicator 
variable INST. It is based on the product of two underlying measures. The first is the 
La Porta et al.’s (1998) index of anti-director rights, as adjusted by Spamann 
(2010).28 The second measure is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Law 
and Order index (taken from http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx). We use the 
product of these two measures because the anti-director rights index covers only 
aspects of de-jure regulation by capturing six sub-indices indicating the letter of the 
law, not its enforcement in practice (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 
2010).29 On the other hand, the Law and Order index assesses the de-facto law and 
order traditions, such as enforcement, of a country as well as the legal system. To 
each foreign IPO we assign the specific country-year score according to the year of 
the IPO and its home country to capture both de-jure and de-facto aspects of investors 
protection (Durnev and Kim, 2005; and Bruno and Claessens, 2010). Consistent with 
earlier studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2006), we next divide the 
                                                 
27
 Using absolute value of abnormal accruals is consistent with the view of accounting regulators, such 
as the IASB and more recently of the FASB, that earnings should not be biased in either direction. 
28
 Spamman (2010) shows that his revised index markedly differs from both La Porta et al.’s (1998) 
original index, as well as its later revision that is provided in Djankov et al. (2008).  
29
 LRW classify countries’ legal systems based only on a single measure - investor protection - 
following La Porta et al. (1998) 
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sample into strong (weak) home institutions sub-samples according to whether the 
country’s score falls above (below or at) the sample median of the product of these 
two measures. The indicator INSTi is set equal to one if the country’s score is above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise.30 
3.4 Regression Models 
We are interested in (1) earnings quality in foreign IPOs in the US relative to 
US IPOs and (2) assessing how differences across institutional environments in the 
country of origin may affect the extent of earnings management in foreign IPOs. In 
the first regression model |EM1| to |EM3| are used as the dependent variables: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 9 11          
i i i i i i i
i i i i t
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX
FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
                                  (γ.7) 
where J = {1, 2, 3}.  
The second regression model uses raw abnormal accruals, EM1 to EM3 as the 
dependent variables: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 9 11         
i i i i i i i
i i i i t
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX
FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
                                 (γ.8) 
 
Our two main variables of interest are the intercept α and the incremental 
intercept, the coefficient on INST – ȕ1. In regression Model 3.7, the intercept can be 
considered as a measure of the baseline absolute abnormal accruals, e.g., the level of 
absolute abnormal accruals not explained by the other explanatory variables of the 
model. Therefore, a negative (positive) intercept is consistent with less (more) 
extreme baseline abnormal accruals of foreign IPOs. Here the word “abnormal” is 
                                                 
30
 An alternative approach is to calculate the median score for each year and so INST is set to one if the 
country’s score in a particular year is above that year’s median. However, country scores are very 
stable, and there is not much difference in the value assigned to INSTi under the alternative way. 
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used with respect to the accruals level expected from a US IPO with similar 
characteristics (per the accruals model). Similarly, the intercept in Model 3.8 captures 
the sign of these baseline accruals. A negative (positive) intercept is consistent with 
conservative (aggressive) baseline abnormal accruals relative to the US IPOs. In 
particular, a negative intercept is consistent with overly conservative reporting or 
some self-serving earnings deflation.31 A positive sign is consistent with incentives to 
inflate earnings more than US IPOs (Teoh et al, 1998). The coefficient on INST 
captures the incremental effect of the strength of home institutions on the intercept. 
For example, finding in Model 3.7 a negative sign of INST would indicate that IPO 
firms from countries with strong institutions provide less extreme reporting outcomes 
than IPO firms from countries with weak institutions.  
These models include control variables as follows. OWNER is the ratio of 
shares retained by insiders (i.e., initial owners) to all shares outstanding after the 
offering. We include this variable because ownership structures vary globally and are 
correlated with both institutions and earnings management (e.g., Leuz, 2006). Auditor 
quality, AUD, an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditing firm is a Big-
6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990-1997, 1998-2001 and 2002 onwards, respectively; 0 
otherwise. It is included since auditors influence the quality of reported numbers, 
especially in the context of issuing shares (Fan and Wong, 2005). IPO is an indicator 
variable that distinguishes between direct share issue in the US, (IPO = 1), and 
American Depository Receipts Level III (IPO = 0). While both direct share issue and 
ADRs Level III involve initial public offering of shares, ADRs may involve 20-Fs 
with reconciliations, whereby direct US listings involve filing 10-Ks (Miller, 1999). 
UW
 
ranks the offering’s leading underwriter’s prestige, as per Jay Ritter’s website.32 
Underwriter prestige has been documented to have a positive impact on reducing 
information asymmetry in IPOs (Balvers et al. 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990). In 
addition, Jo et al. (2007) find that high quality underwriters restrict earnings 
                                                 
31
 Self-serving earnings deflation can occur if managers can eventually use hidden reserves to enjoy 
personal perks, or getting stock options at a lower exercise price.  
32
 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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management for seasoned equity offerings. SOX is an indicator variable that is set 
equal 1 if the IPO takes place after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 
2002 onward), and zero otherwise. It is included to control for (and assess the extent 
to which) the stricter regulatory has influenced earnings management in foreign IPOs. 
FSIZE, a measure of firm size, is calculated as the log of sales at the end of the fiscal 
year preceding the issuing. It is commonly used as a measure of risk (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004) as well as serving as a proxy for SEC attention owing to large size. 
PROFIT is the net income before extraordinary items over sales at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the IPO. We include this variable because earnings management 
may be a function of performance. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets at 
the end of the fiscal year preceding the IPO. It is included to control for the 
possibility that leverage is correlated with both legal institutions and earnings 
management. CFO (e.g., operating cash flow) is a measure of performance that is less 
susceptible to earnings management through accruals and which thus captures real 
performance. Finally, some industries in the US are more prone to legal disputes, 
which may act as constraining factor on earnings management. We therefore include 
an indicator for litigation risk – based on industry membership consistent with 
Frankel et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) – to control for (and evaluate ) the 
effect of US litigation risk on earnings management by IPOs coming from countries 
with different legal institutions.33 We control for possible time-series correlation of 
the residuals within year clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009) and 
consistent with Gow et al. (2010). 34  Appendix 3.A provides a summary of the 
variables used in this paper and their definitions. 
One limitation of models 3.7 and 3.8 is that they assume that all coefficients 
(apart from INST) are the same for foreign IPOs from both countries with strong and 
weak legal institutional environments. However, these coefficients may also vary 
across countries and legal institutions, and so this restriction may not be 
econometrically justified. We therefore run models 3.7 and 3.8 separately for the two 
                                                 
33
 The industries that are more prone to US litigation are identified in Francis et al. (1994)  
34
 Since LIT is essentially industry membership indicator, we do not include further industry dummies. 
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sub-samples – strong and weak home institutions - and report the difference in the 
coefficients using interactions of INST with the other independent variables.35   
3.5 The Sample 
The foreign IPO sample selection process starts by identifying companies that 
were first time issuers to US markets between 1990 and 2009. Only firms with no 
prior listing in any market within or outside of the US are included in this sample. 
According to the Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database 
classification, foreign firms are firms that were incorporated and whose primary 
executive offices are located outside of the US (Bruner et al. 2006). We exclude 
equity listing originated from spin-offs of publically-listed companies or from 
mergers and acquisitions, following Bruner et al. (2006). Further eliminated are 
warrants, units and rights offerings, as well as utility firms. Firms that are based in the 
Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda were also removed from the sample. This is 
due to the fact that those are typically US firms within the financial services industry 
that are registered in these geographical locations for tax reasons and, although they 
comply with the definition of foreign companies, they do not fit the specific context 
of this research. We also exclude all firms with insufficient financial data.    
As reported in Panel A of Table 3.6, the final IPO sample is comprised of 291 
observations. Panel B of Table 3.1 presents industry composition of the sample 
according to the Fama-French (FF) 12-industry classification. This Panel shows that 
the largest group of IPOs in the sample is in the Business Equipment industry (FF6), 
followed by the Telephone and Television Transmission (FF7), and Manufacturing 
(FF3). Panel C of Table 3.6 reports the distributions of IPOs according the country of 
origin in five periodic windows from 1990-2009. Consistent with other studies on 
foreign issuers in the US, the largest number of IPOs is from China (51), followed by 
Israel (48) and UK (29). Most of the IPOs come from the years before 2001, 
                                                 
35
 The interaction models are further described in Section 5. 
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reflecting the burst of internet and dot.com bubble of 2001 and its effect on the high-
tech sector which generates many IPOs (about 55% in our sample).  
We obtained a copy of each firm’s prospectus to manually extract many of the 
variables needed for the empirical investigation. This is done through the Edgar 
database provided by the SEC and the Perfect Filing database. Foreign currency 
figures are translated into US dollar figures based on the exchange rates disclosed in 
the prospectuses. Thereafter we index the US figures to 2005 US dollar value based 
on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the International Monetary Fund36. 
Panel D of Table 3.6 reports summary statistics for each of the variables in the pooled 
sample.37 In addition, the sample is further divided into two sub-samples: strong and 
weak home legal institutions with 133 and 158 firms respectively in each sub-
sample.38 Though the three signed measures of abnormal accruals are similar between 
the weak and strong home institutions, there are a number of other notable differences 
emerging from the univariate analysis. Insider ownership (OWNER) and profitability 
(PROFIT) are higher in IPOs from weak home institutions. These IPOs also tend to 
issue shares directly (rather than using ADRs Level III) to a larger extent than IPOs 
from countries with strong institutions, as is seen from the comparison for the IPO 
variable. Interestingly, post-SOX there are relatively more IPOs from weak home 
institutions. This is consistent with SOX having a negative impact on the magnitude 
of “trading down” by IPOs from strong home institutions. IPOs from strong home 
institutions are more leveraged and have multiple simultaneous more often than IPOs 
from weak home institutions (MULTI is 35% in the Strong sub-sample vs. 11% in the 
Weak sub-sample).     
Table 3.7 reports the correlation coefficients for the various variables. The 
correlations among the three abnormal accrual measures are high, but well below 
unity. This indicates that they capture different outcomes of earnings management. 
                                                 
36
 Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#data on April 2011 
37
 Panel D involves some additional variables that will are used in sensitivity analyses. We refer to 
these when we describe these analyses. 
38
 Since there are a number of countries falling at the median of the institutions index, there are more 
observations classified into the “Weak” group.  
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There is no significant correlation between EM1-EM3 and INST, suggesting no effect 
of home institutions on abnormal accruals in a single factor analysis. Firm size is 
negatively correlated with the three measures of abnormal accruals.  
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Development  
 Number of Firms 
All SDC Platinum new US Foreign listings in years 1990-2009 677 
Excluding observations:  
For which prospectus not available  196 
With offering other than common/ordinary stock 117 
For financial services firms and utilities 10 
With insufficient financial data necessary for our analyses 38 
With less than 10 observations for year and industry matching 1 
  
Final Sample 291 
 
Panel B: Sample Selection by Fama-French 12 Industry Classification  
FF1 Consumer Non-Durables 9 
FF2 Consumer Durables 7 
FF3 Manufacturing 22 
FF4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 3 
FF5 Chemicals and Allied Products 7 
FF6 Business Equipment 118 
FF7 Telephone and Television Transmission 45 
FF8 Utilities - 
FF9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 7 
FF10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 27 
FF11 Finance - 
FF12 Other 46 
   
Total  291 
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Panel C: Country of Origin by Period 
Country 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 Total 
Argentina 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Austria 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Australia 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Canada 0 8 14 2 3 27 
Chile 1 2 0 0 0 3 
China 0 0 6 12 33 51 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 1 0 0 0 1 
France 1 6 5 0 0 13 
Germany 0 2 4 0 0 6 
Greece 0 0 3 2 2 7 
Hong-Kong 1 9 3 3 0 16 
Indonesia 0 1 0 0 0 1 
India 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Ireland 0 3 4 0 2 9 
Israel 3 17 16 5 7 48 
Italy 2 3 1 1 0 7 
Japan 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Jordan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Luxemburg 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Mexico 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 1 13 6 0 1 21 
New-Zealand 1 3 0 0 0 4 
Norway 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Poland 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Singapore 0 2 2 0 2 6 
South-Africa 0 0 0 1 0 1 
South-Korea 0 1 3 3 1 8 
Spain 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Sweden 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Switzerland 0 3 3 1 0 7 
Taiwan 0 0 0 1 1 2 
UK 0 18 9 2 0 29 
Total 14 100 87 35 54 291 
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Panel D: Summary Statistics for Strong and Weak Home Legal Institutions Sub-samples 
 Full Sample: N=291 Strong Home Legal Institutions: N=133 Weak Home Legal: N=158 
 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
EM1 0.925 3.869 -0.069 0.152 0.641 1.045 4.273 -0.097 0.086 0.709 0.825 3.504 -0.069 0.170 0.565 
EM2 0.341 2.449 -0.361 -0.032 0.370 0.395 2.942 -0.505 -0.037 0.333 0.296 1.952 -0.301 -0.024 0.370 
EM3 0.150 1.233 -0.210 0.019 0.372 0.224 1.306 -0.252 -0.018 0.312 0.087 1.168 -0.178 0.052 0.372 
INST 0.455 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
OWNER 0.717 0.158 0.683 0.754 0.801 0.690 0.189 0.642 0.743 0.803 0.740*** 0.123 0.698 0.760* 0.801 
AUD 0.877 0.329 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.887 0.318 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.868 0.340 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IPO 0.459 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.406 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.503** 0.502 0.000 1.000* 1.000 
UW 7.974 1.983 8.000 9.000 9.000 8.017 1.968 8.000 9.000 9.000 7.938 2.001 8.000 9.000 9.000 
SOX 0.305 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.128 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.453*** 0.499 0.000 0.000*** 1.000 
FSIZE 17.727 3.032 16.550 17.693 19.033 17.841 3.176 16.738 17.778 19.227 17.632 2.912 16.453 17.406 18.809 
LEV 0.334 0.371 0.038 0.240 0.500 0.396 0.430 0.066 0.311 0.587 0.282*** 0.304 0.021 0.194** 0.442 
PROFIT -0.610 2.792 -0.184 0.044 0.137 -1.050 3.615 -0.322 0.028 0.091 -0.241*** 1.772 -0.094 0.074*** 0.192 
CFO 0.074 0.232 0.002 0.009 0.034 0.083 0.265 0.002 0.010 0.039 0.067 0.202 0.003 0.009 0.032 
LIT 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RECON 0.260 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.368 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.170*** 0.377 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
MULTI 0.223 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.353 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.113*** 0.318 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
CONTI 0.541 0.154 0.380 0.560 0.670 0.691 0.497 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.417*** 0.865 0.380 0.420*** 0.440 
NYSE 0.308 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.278 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.333 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NASDAQ 0.664 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.707 0.457 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.629 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AMEX 0.027 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Note:  
The table presents the sample selection process (Panel A), composition by industry (Panel B), composition by country and period industry (Panel C) and 
descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as for distinguishing between strong home legal institutions (INST = 1) and weak home legal institutions 
(INST = 0). Panel D also reports the results of tests for the differences in the means and medians (the latter using Wilcoxon rank-test) under the Weak Home 
Institutions block. ,* , **, ***  denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
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Table 3.7: Correlations 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 EM1  
 
                 
2 EM2 0.57                   
3 EM3 0.46 0.55                  
4 INST 0.03 0.02 0.06                 
5 OWNER 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.15                
6 AUD 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01               
7 IPO -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.30              
8 UW -0.06 -0.04 -0.16 0.02 0.00 0.51 -0.32             
9 SOX -0.11 -0.12 0.04 -0.35 0.08 0.11 -0.13 0.10            
10 FSIZE -0.23 -0.24 -0.27 0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.24 0.17 -0.03           
11 PROFIT -0.17 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.52          
12 LEV 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.15 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 0.10 -0.13         
13 CFO -0.05 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.15 0.05 -0.08 0.40 0.05 0.03        
14 LIT -0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.15 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.23 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07       
15 RECON -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.23 -0.04 0.10 -0.23 0.07 -0.27 0.33 -0.08 0.24 0.31 -0.17      
16 MULTI 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.28 0.00 0.18 -0.49 0.18 -0.35 0.22 -0.14 0.18 0.23 -0.05 0.36     
17 CONTI 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.88 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.34 0.03 -0.23 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.15 0.25    
18 NYSE -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.18 -0.21 0.19 0.14 0.56 0.33 0.16 0.53 -0.12 0.28 0.06 -0.12   
19 NASDAQ 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.07 -0.11 0.20 -0.10 -0.16 -0.50 -0.31 -0.16 -0.45 0.10 -0.26 -0.05 0.14 -0.94  
20 AMEX 0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.07 0.04 -0.19 0.01 -0.25 0.07 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 -0.18 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.24 
Note: The table presents Pearson pair-wise correlations for selected variables. Correlations equal or above 0.12 and equal or below -0.12 are significant at the 0.05 level. See 
Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
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3.6 Findings 
3.6.1 Main Findings 
Table 3.8 presents the results of estimating Model 3.7, where the dependent 
variables are the absolute values of the three abnormal accrual measures. For each 
measure |EM1|-|EM3| we estimate this model with interactions between INST and 
the other explanatory variables as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8
* * * *
* * *
*
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX
FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST OWNER INST AUD INST IPO INST UW
INST SOX INST FSIZE INST PROFIT
INST LEV
               
                9 10* *i i i i tINST CFO INST LIT    
  (3.9) 
 
where J = {1, 2, 3}. A positive (negative) intercept implies that a foreign IPO 
from weak home institutions report accruals of larger (smaller) extreme values, or 
larger (smaller) accruals variability, than its US equivalent. The coefficient 1
captures the incremental effect associated with strong home institutions. In this 
specification the coefficients 2 11   capture the effect of the specific regressor 
(OWNER, AUD, IPO, UW, SOX, FSIZE, PROFIT, LEV, CFO and LIT, 
respectively) in IPOs from countries with weak institutions (where INST = 0); the 
coefficients 1 10   capture the incremental effect of the same regressors in IPOs 
from countries with strong institutions (where INST = 1).  
Across the three models the intercept is positive and significant for strong 
home institutions. It is also positive for weak home institutions, but significant in 
two models. This evidence suggests that foreign IPOs manage earnings to a 
greater extent than their US counterparts. Additionally, the magnitude of the 
intercept is higher for strong home institutions than for weak home institutions, 
suggesting more extreme abnormal accruals in IPOs from countries with strong 
home institutions. The difference in the magnitude of the intercept is attributed to 
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the incremental effect of INST. In all three models INST is positive and 
significant, though in the third model marginally so.  
Among the control variables, we find that greater insider holding is 
associated with more extreme reporting in IPOs from weak home countries. The 
difference between the two sub-samples is also significant. This is consistent with 
the governance roles of insiders being contingent on domestic legal institutions: 
when these institutions are strong, insider concentration is irrelevant for earnings 
management, but when institutions are weak, strong insiders exercise more 
reporting flexibility resulting in a high variability of reported numbers. We note 
that Leuz (2006) also finds a positive relation between insider holding and 
earnings management. However, he does not distinguish between sub-samples 
according to the strength of home countries’ institutions. There is a negative 
association of SOX with the three absolute measures of abnormal accruals, but 
only in the weak institutions sub-sample. The difference between the two sub-
samples is significant with respect to SOX. This finding suggests the stricter 
reporting environment that follows SOX constraints earnings management 
through accruals manipulations (Cohen et al., 2008), but this is only evident in 
IPOs coming from weak home institutions. That no such relation is detected for 
strong home institutions is further consistent with weaker monitoring of foreign 
IPOs from strong home institutions by US investors and regulators. Firm size is 
associated with less extreme reporting outcomes, as can be seen from the negative 
and significant coefficient on FSIZE in all regression models. This is consistent 
with larger IPO firms either relying less on earnings management or fearing a 
greater SEC scrutiny, or both.  
Chapter 3. Paper 1- Earnings Quality in Foreign IPOs in the US  
 
- 79 - 
 
Table 3.8: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 11.465 1.500   10.229 2.930   4.282 1.880  
 (0.003) (0.531)   (0.003) (0.082)   (0.003) (0.009)  
INST   9.965    7.299    2.402 
 
  (0.004)    (0.022)    (0.101) 
OWNER 1.107 4.013 -2.906  -0.005 1.927 -1.933  0.372 1.331 -0.960 
 
(0.242) (0.067) (0.075)  (0.994) (0.032) (0.006)  (0.110) (0.000) (0.016) 
AUD 2.268 1.826 0.442  0.428 0.731 -0.303  0.491 0.371 0.120 
 (0.005) (0.112) (0.604)  (0.678) (0.232) (0.730)  (0.023) (0.052) (0.262) 
IPO -1.020 -0.369 -0.651  -0.230 0.238 -0.468  -0.289 0.027 -0.316 
 
(0.143) (0.477) (0.403)  (0.546) (0.069) (0.256)  (0.218) (0.811) (0.219) 
UW -0.297 -0.119 -0.178  -0.239 -0.076 -0.163  -0.099 0.018 -0.117 
 
(0.153) (0.697) (0.512)  (0.008) (0.657) (0.262)  (0.099) (0.760) (0.074) 
SOX -0.052 -1.579 1.527  0.141 -0.792 0.934  0.139 -0.327 0.466 
 
(0.943) (0.038) (0.022)  (0.786) (0.014) (0.043)  (0.596) (0.043) (0.053) 
FSIZE -0.564 -0.157 -0.407  -0.406 -0.164 -0.242  -0.187 -0.151 -0.036 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.054)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.090)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.495) 
PROFIT -0.091 0.128 -0.220  0.063 0.132 -0.069  0.013 0.083 -0.070 
 
(0.279) (0.534) (0.402)  (0.417) (0.278) (0.704)  (0.603) (0.073) (0.195) 
LEV 0.267 -0.158 0.425  -0.176 -0.625 0.449  -0.061 0.405 -0.466 
 
(0.674) (0.865) (0.618)  (0.377) (0.169) (0.328)  (0.783) (0.250) (0.223) 
CFO 1.640 -1.662 3.302  0.908 -0.421 1.329  0.362 0.437 -0.075 
 
(0.213) (0.125) (0.098)  (0.215) (0.050) (0.105)  (0.175) (0.349) (0.885) 
LIT -1.537 -0.439 -1.098  -0.698 -0.584 -0.114  -0.039 0.249 -0.288 
 (0.020) (0.544) (0.153)  (0.150) (0.174) (0.855)  (0.845) (0.334) (0.460) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.191 0.036 0.121  0.134 0.127 0.136  0.222 0.157 0.190 
 
Notes: 
  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals separately for the strong home institutions sub-sample (the 
Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference column reports the difference between the 
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two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients 
for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time 
clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The interactions model: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
* * * * * * *
*
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST OWNER INST AUD INST IPO INST UW INST SOX INST FSIZE INST PROFIT
INST LEV
                 
                  9 10* *i i i i tINST CFO INST LIT    
      (3.9)
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In Table 3.9 we conduct the analysis of Model 3.8 employing the signed 
measures of abnormal accruals, again using interactions with INST as follows:   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8
* * * *
* * *
*
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX
FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST OWNER INST AUD INST IPO INST UW
INST SOX INST FSIZE INST PROFIT
INST LEV
               
                9 10* *i i i i tINST CFO INST LIT    
  (3.10) 
 
where J = {1, 2, 3}. A positive (negative) intercept implies that a foreign IPO 
from weak home institutions report more (less) positive accruals than US IPO 
equivalents. The coefficient 1 captures the effect associated with strong home 
institutions. The interpretation of the coefficients 2 11   and 1 10   is similar 
to that in (9), though this time applied to the raw measures of abnormal accruals.  
Across all three models in Table 3.9 the intercept is positive and significant 
in the strong institutions sub-sample. The intercept is also positive in all three 
models for the weak institutions sub-sample, albeit it is significant only in the 
third model. Nevertheless, the coefficient on INST is positive and significant in all 
three models indicating the two sub-samples are distinctly different. This is 
consistent with a higher degree of earnings inflation in IPOs from countries with 
strong legal institutions compared to IPOs from countries with weak home 
institutions (other things being equal).  
Turning to the control variables, note from Table 3.9 that we find that 
insider ownership is positively associated with the three absolute measures of 
abnormal accruals, but only for the weak home institutions sub-sample. Here, in 
contrast, we do not find any significant effect for OWNER. Taken together, this 
suggests that high insider ownership increases accruals variability, but without 
having a particular direction. In other words, it equally affects earnings inflation 
and earnings deflation. As in Table 3.9, there is evidence of a constraining effect 
of SOX on earnings management in IPOs from weak home institutions. 
Specifically, the coefficient on SOX is negative and significant in two of the 
accruals models in the weak institutions sub-sample. This suggests that SOX 
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reduced earning inflation in the weak institutions sub-sample, though the 
difference with regard to the strong home institutions sub-sample is not generally 
significant. IPO-firm size is negatively related to earnings inflation. Finally, the 
coefficient on the litigation variable LIT is negative in all three models for strong 
home institutions, though significantly so only in two models. The incremental 
effect relative to weak home institutions is nevertheless negative and significant. 
This is consistent with a suggestion that the rule of home law, or lack of it in the 
case of weak home institutions (Siegel, 2005), influences earnings management in 
foreign IPOs in the US 
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Table 3.9: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 11.029 2.474   9.672 1.697   5.071 2.847  
 (0.016) (0.318)   (0.034) (0.285)   (0.000) (0.000)  
INST   8.554    7.975    2.224 
 
  (0.030)    (0.027)    (0.037) 
OWNER 0.614 2.771 -2.157  0.328 1.474 -1.146  -0.215 -0.420 0.205 
 
(0.346) (0.215) (0.279)  (0.626) (0.291) (0.369)  (0.651) (0.220) (0.593) 
AUD 2.046 1.795 0.251  0.590 1.163 -0.573  0.634 0.292 0.342 
 (0.017) (0.145) (0.757)  (0.578) (0.272) (0.530)  (0.049) (0.499) (0.299) 
IPO -1.000 -0.455 -0.545  -0.289 0.092 -0.381  -0.141 -0.217 0.075 
 
(0.173) (0.378) (0.503)  (0.358) (0.662) (0.414)  (0.394) (0.199) (0.765) 
UW -0.286 -0.183 -0.103  -0.070 -0.047 -0.023  -0.133 -0.099 -0.034 
 
(0.133) (0.582) (0.711)  (0.654) (0.864) (0.928)  (0.001) (0.362) (0.703) 
SOX -0.168 -1.468 1.300  -0.272 -0.973 0.701  0.216 0.003 0.213 
 
(0.822) (0.054) (0.039)  (0.625) (0.023) (0.211)  (0.515) (0.984) (0.509) 
FSIZE -0.532 -0.152 -0.380  -0.505 -0.144 -0.361  -0.226 -0.111 -0.115 
 (0.060) (0.013) (0.138)  (0.016) (0.018) (0.063)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.077) 
PROFIT -0.031 0.154 -0.185  0.209 0.203 0.006  0.106 0.118 -0.012 
 
(0.720) (0.460) (0.505)  (0.115) (0.147) (0.980)  (0.091) (0.179) (0.906) 
LEV 0.228 -0.248 0.476  -0.105 -0.549 0.444  -0.140 0.218 -0.358 
 
(0.789) (0.802) (0.625)  (0.628) (0.275) (0.365)  (0.496) (0.403) (0.323) 
CFO 1.675 -1.227 2.902  1.663 -0.029 1.692  0.665 -0.197 0.861 
 
(0.258) (0.275) (0.193)  (0.032) (0.931) (0.093)  (0.040) (0.742) (0.247) 
LIT -1.765 -0.171 -1.594  -1.187 0.146 -1.333  -0.151 0.656 -0.807 
 (0.013) (0.801) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.783) (0.045)  (0.643) (0.022) (0.010) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.121 0.009 0.070  0.111 0.063 0.094  0.132 0.099 0.116 
Notes:  
 
1. The table presents results of the regression models of signed abnormal accruals separately for the strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong 
column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two sub-sample 
coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or 
better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 
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2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The interactions model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
* * * * * * *
*
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i
EMJ INST OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST OWNER INST AUD INST IPO INST UW INST SOX INST FSIZE INST PROFIT
INST LEV
                 
                  9 10* *i i i i tINST CFO INST LIT     (3.10)
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Paper 1- Earnings Quality in Foreign IPOs in the US  
 
- 85 - 
 
Collectively, the findings of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that with respect to 
earnings management there are (1) differences between foreign IPOs and US IPOs 
– foreign IPOs engage in earnings management more than US IPOs, and (2) there 
are notable differences across the two sub-samples. IPOs from countries with 
strong institutions manage earnings more than IPOs from weak home institutions. 
This evidence is in line with Licht (2003) whereby the US offers opportunities for 
many foreign firms to escape home institutions with the objective to have more 
reporting flexibility. Put differently, IPOs from strong home institutions seem to 
trade down their reporting quality.39 On a very broad level, these findings are not 
supportive of the view that foreign IPOs in the US share the same reporting 
incentives as US IPOs even though they nominally apply the same reporting 
standards (US GAAP)40 and are equally subject to the US legal institutions and 
accounting enforcement. Moreover, reporting incentives vary with the strength of 
home institutions. More specifically, home institutions further interact with 
insider ownership, threat of litigation and the passage of SOX in influencing 
reporting outcomes.  
3.7 Additional Analyses 
We conduct several additional tests to address a number of potential 
limitations of the analysis so far. First, about one quarter of foreign IPOs use 
reconciliations rather than report directly under US GAAP. Since prior research 
indicates poor quality of reconciliations, it is possible that the findings reported 
above are mainly driven by this group of IPOs, albeit its small size. To explore 
this possibility, we construct a new indicator variable, RECON, which takes the 
value of 1 if the prospectus includes reconciliations, and zero otherwise. Panel D 
of Table 3.6 provides the descriptive statistics for this variable. Its mean is 0.26 in 
the entire sample, but its incidence is lower among foreign IPOs from weak home 
institutions. This may explain, at least in part, our findings that the intercept is 
lower in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for foreign IPOs from weak home institutions, as they 
                                                 
39
 In Section 5.2 we define the INST indicator relative to the US score, rather than sample median, 
and repeat the analysis to provide more direct evidence on this issue.  
40
 Strictly speaking, about one quarter of the sample reconciles domestic GAAP to US GAAP – we 
investigate the influence of reconciliations in Section 5.2. 
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use US GAAP to a greater extent. This is also consistent with IPOs from countries 
with weak home institutions committing to better reporting because they are 
perceived to be susceptible to governance problems. Table 3.10 reports the 
findings of re-estimating (9) and (10) by adding RECON to the vector of 
independent variables. Panel A reports the findings when the dependent variable 
is the absolute value of the three measures of abnormal accruals, while Panel B 
reports findings when the dependent variable is the signed measure. Both panels 
confirm our previous findings that IPOs from countries with strong institutions 
engage in more earnings management (Panel A) and more earnings inflation 
(Panel B) than IPOs from countries with weak institutions. More specifically, 
comparing Panel A to Table 3.8 we note that the intercepts are similar, except that 
now for |EM2| the intercept is insignificantly different from zero for weak home 
institutions. The difference in the intercept between strong and weak country 
institutions is now significant for all three models. Additionally, the coefficient on 
RECON is insignificant across the three specifications. The effects of control 
variables are broadly the same, though the evidence on the positive effect of 
insider ownership in weak home institutions is somewhat weaker – the coefficient 
is now insignificant for |EM1| - but remains significant in the other two.  
Comparing Panel B to Table 3.9 we note that the intercepts are quite similar. 
As in Table 3.9, IPOs from counties with strong home institutions inflate earnings 
more than their US equivalents. The coefficient on RECON is largely insignificant 
except for EM3 where it is negative in the weak country institutions sub-sample. 
The other findings in Panel B are similar to Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.10: The Effect of Reconciliations 
 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 11.129 0.572   10.209 2.656   4.259 1.723  
 (0.003) (0.844)   (0.003) (0.114)   (0.001) (0.015)  
INST   10.557    7.553    2.536 
 
  (0.005)    (0.015)    (0.044) 
RECON -0.843 -1.990 1.147  -0.051 -0.587 0.536  -0.058 -0.338 0.280 
 
(0.288) (0.293) (0.496)  (0.918) (0.293) (0.490)  (0.847) (0.373) (0.638) 
OWNER 1.091 4.076 -2.985  -0.009 1.946 -1.955  0.371 1.343 -0.973 
 
(0.157) (0.105) (0.143)  (0.991) (0.051) (0.008)  (0.109) (0.001) (0.020) 
AUD 2.362 1.897 0.465  0.434 0.752 -0.318  0.497 0.383 0.115 
 (0.007) (0.107) (0.642)  (0.659) (0.216) (0.704)  (0.032) (0.040) (0.427) 
IPO -1.001 -0.925 -0.076  -0.229 0.074 -0.303  -0.288 -0.068 -0.220 
 
(0.145) (0.378) (0.950)  (0.544) (0.669) (0.501)  (0.216) (0.654) (0.499) 
UW -0.307 -0.125 -0.183  -0.240 -0.078 -0.162  -0.100 0.017 -0.117 
 
(0.151) (0.688) (0.538)  (0.007) (0.651) (0.281)  (0.117) (0.776) (0.095) 
SOX -0.245 -2.035 1.790  0.129 -0.927 1.056  0.126 -0.404 0.530 
 
(0.759) (0.068) (0.049)  (0.808) (0.020) (0.046)  (0.643) (0.025) (0.053) 
FSIZE -0.532 -0.064 -0.468  -0.404 -0.136 -0.267  -0.185 -0.136 -0.050 
 (0.034) (0.428) (0.063)  (0.017) (0.007) (0.069)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.142) 
PROFIT -0.120 0.068 -0.187  0.061 0.114 -0.053  0.011 0.073 -0.062 
 (0.080) (0.771) (0.476)  (0.365) (0.356) (0.760)  (0.502) (0.139) (0.257) 
LEV 0.429 -0.072 0.501  -0.166 -0.600 0.434  -0.050 0.419 -0.470 
 
(0.532) (0.949) (0.588)  (0.439) (0.217) (0.312)  (0.847) (0.272) (0.262) 
CFO 1.875 -1.065 2.940  0.923 -0.245 1.168  0.378 0.538 -0.160 
 
(0.134) (0.059) (0.075)  (0.150) (0.322) (0.119)  (0.162) (0.247) (0.775) 
LIT -1.671 -0.589 -1.082  -0.706 -0.628 -0.078  -0.048 0.224 -0.271 
 (0.009) (0.482) (0.179)  (0.111) (0.169) (0.900)  (0.830) (0.412) (0.534) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.193 0.055 0.131  0.127 0.129 0.132  0.216 0.161 0.189 
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Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 10.682 1.674   9.519 1.512   5.121 3.086  
 (0.019) (0.566)   (0.038) (0.347)   (0.000) (0.000)  
INST 
  9.008    8.007    2.035 
 
  (0.043)    (0.030)    (0.045) 
RECON -0.870 -1.717 0.847  -0.386 -0.397 0.011  0.125 0.512 -0.387 
 
(0.319) (0.328) (0.537)  (0.508) (0.570) (0.990)  (0.441) (0.061) (0.074) 
OWNER 0.597 2.825 -2.228  0.303 1.486 -1.183  -0.213 -0.437 0.224 
 
(0.293) (0.264) (0.362)  (0.626) (0.313) (0.400)  (0.635) (0.243) (0.499) 
AUD 2.143 1.855 0.287  0.634 1.177 -0.543  0.620 0.274 0.346 
 (0.015) (0.142) (0.755)  (0.533) (0.267) (0.537)  (0.042) (0.524) (0.296) 
IPO -0.980 -0.935 -0.046  -0.283 -0.019 -0.264  -0.144 -0.073 -0.071 
 
(0.174) (0.361) (0.968)  (0.383) (0.949) (0.608)  (0.384) (0.579) (0.756) 
UW -0.296 -0.189 -0.108  -0.075 -0.049 -0.026  -0.131 -0.097 -0.034 
 
(0.120) (0.578) (0.718)  (0.625) (0.862) (0.920)  (0.001) (0.363) (0.700) 
SOX -0.367 -1.861 1.495  -0.361 -1.064 0.703  0.244 0.120 0.124 
 
(0.653) (0.092) (0.073)  (0.526) (0.058) (0.275)  (0.459) (0.465) (0.695) 
FSIZE -0.498 -0.072 -0.427  -0.490 -0.126 -0.364  -0.231 -0.135 -0.096 
 (0.085) (0.311) (0.153)  (0.028) (0.001) (0.089)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.120) 
PROFIT -0.060 0.101 -0.161  0.196 0.191 0.004  0.110 0.134 -0.023 
 
(0.372) (0.660) (0.557)  (0.130) (0.195) (0.985)  (0.075) (0.103) (0.804) 
LEV 0.396 -0.173 0.569  -0.031 -0.532 0.501  -0.164 0.196 -0.360 
 
(0.674) (0.882) (0.573)  (0.904) (0.302) (0.255)  (0.444) (0.396) (0.308) 
CFO 1.917 -0.712 2.629  1.775 0.090 1.686  0.630 -0.350 0.980 
 
(0.174) (0.276) (0.165)  (0.012) (0.752) (0.048)  (0.034) (0.531) (0.163) 
LIT -1.904 -0.301 -1.603  -1.249 0.116 -1.365  -0.131 0.695 -0.826 
 (0.008) (0.702) (0.017)  (0.013) (0.840) (0.058)  (0.689) (0.019) (0.008) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.122 0.021 0.075  0.108 0.060 0.091  0.127 0.108 0.118 
Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately 
for the strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference 
column reports the difference between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the 
estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of 
the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
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2. The interactions model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  
* * * * * * *
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
EMJ or EMJ INST RECON OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST RECON INST OWNER INST AUD INST IPO INST UW INST SOX INST FSI
                                    
8 9 10 11* * * *
i
i i i i i i i i t
ZE
INST PROFIT INST LEV INST CFO INST LIT          
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We therefore conclude that reconciliations do not have a strong effect on 
earnings management in foreign IPOs, as the coefficient on RECON is 
insignificant throughout. We also confirm that IPOs from strong country 
institutions report more extreme earnings than their US IPO equivalents as well as 
foreign IPOs from weak home institutions. However, that IPOs from countries 
with weak institutions report more often under US GAAP may explain the 
findings they do not inflate earnings more than their US IPO equivalents once we 
control for underlying GAAP. At the same time, we cannot rule out that IPOs 
from weak country institutions inflate earnings less than foreign IPOs from strong 
home institution.    
Foreign IPOs have the choice on which US exchange to list their shares. 
Frost et al. (2006) argue that disclosure rules, monitoring and enforcement may 
vary across exchanges and thus add an extra layer of monitoring and enforcement 
over and above that set by the SEC and other regulators. This opens up the 
possibility that the exchange selection is correlated with home institutions and 
reporting outcomes. We want to rule out the possibility that the selection of the 
specific exchange, rather than country-level institutions, drive our main results.41 
We therefore construct three new dummy variables, NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, 
to account for exchange membership in the New York Stock Exchange Inc., the 
Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. and the American Stock Exchange Inc., respectively. 
Panel D of Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for these variables. Most of 
foreign IPOs list on Nasdaq (66%) and less than 3% list on the AMEX. There is 
no discernible difference in exchange membership between weak and strong 
country institutions sub-samples. 
We next change (9) and (10) to include the indicators NYSE and NASDAQ 
and report the findings in Table 3.11. The table has two panels and its structure is 
similar to that of Table 3.10. In both Panel A and Panel B the coefficients on 
NYSE and NASDAQ are insignificantly different from zero. There is no difference 
in these coefficients between the weak and strong home institutions sub-samples 
at conventional levels. The intercepts, and the difference in the intercepts between 
                                                 
41
 Specifically, it is possible that IPOs from strong home institutions want to maximize their 
reporting flexibility by selecting a “lenient” exchange believing they will not be scrutinized by the 
SEC as much as the other IPOs.  
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the two institutional sub-samples, are qualitatively the same in Panels A and B as 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. In addition, the inference we draw in the main 
analysis regarding the control variables remains intact. 
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Table 3.11: The Effect of US Exchange Membership 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 15.772 1.069   11.513 2.865   5.663 2.260  
 (0.020) (0.512)   (0.016) (0.034)   (0.022) (0.001)  
INST   14.703    8.648    3.403 
 
  (0.015)    (0.059)    (0.141) 
NYSE -4.498 0.409 -4.907  -0.871 0.037 -0.907  -1.784 -0.357 -1.427 
 
(0.372) (0.838) (0.386)  (0.582) (0.977) (0.667)  (0.323) (0.444) (0.430) 
NASDAQ -4.864 0.563 -5.427  -1.193 0.074 -1.267  -1.746 -0.495 -1.251 
 
(0.332) (0.740) (0.327)  (0.454) (0.947) (0.565)  (0.326) (0.208) (0.478) 
OWNER 1.123 4.008 -2.885  0.054 1.922 -1.868  0.333 1.338 -1.005 
 
(0.264) (0.063) (0.057)  (0.946) (0.033) (0.008)  (0.110) (0.000) (0.005) 
AUD 1.927 1.807 0.120  0.291 0.729 -0.438  0.407 0.388 0.019 
 (0.008) (0.092) (0.876)  (0.794) (0.202) (0.660)  (0.078) (0.036) (0.891) 
IPO -0.905 -0.415 -0.490  -0.228 0.229 -0.457  -0.230 0.068 -0.297 
 
(0.112) (0.449) (0.490)  (0.515) (0.071) (0.238)  (0.282) (0.560) (0.248) 
UW -0.238 -0.145 -0.094  -0.222 -0.079 -0.143  -0.080 0.040 -0.121 
 
(0.212) (0.719) (0.794)  (0.008) (0.734) (0.491)  (0.074) (0.598) (0.089) 
SOX -0.072 -1.532 1.460  0.102 -0.784 0.886  0.156 -0.369 0.525 
 
(0.910) (0.040) (0.011)  (0.829) (0.011) (0.030)  (0.528) (0.027) (0.024) 
FSIZE -0.555 -0.149 -0.406  -0.420 -0.162 -0.258  -0.172 -0.159 -0.013 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.090)  (0.018) (0.012) (0.102)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.774) 
PROFIT -0.108 0.128 -0.236  0.063 0.132 -0.069  0.003 0.084 -0.080 
 
(0.141) (0.527) (0.350)  (0.357) (0.271) (0.688)  (0.832) (0.078) (0.130) 
LEV 0.167 -0.126 0.293  -0.193 -0.618 0.425  -0.103 0.376 -0.479 
 
(0.773) (0.897) (0.723)  (0.402) (0.181) (0.387)  (0.422) (0.301) (0.203) 
CFO 1.465 -1.602 3.067  0.792 -0.404 1.195  0.353 0.382 -0.029 
 
(0.243) (0.100) (0.122)  (0.235) (0.110) (0.147)  (0.135) (0.413) (0.957) 
LIT -1.383 -0.446 -0.938  -0.625 -0.586 -0.038  -0.009 0.256 -0.265 
 (0.051) (0.553) (0.227)  (0.178) (0.185) (0.950)  (0.954) (0.335) (0.475) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.200 0.023 0.120  0.125 0.115 0.126  0.247 0.155 0.203 
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Table 3.6: The Effect of US Exchange Membership (continued) 
Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 16.229 1.925   11.177 1.245   6.945 3.035  
 (0.024) (0.276)   (0.065) (0.380)   (0.017) (0.000)  
INST   14.304    9.932    3.909 
 
  (0.023)    (0.058)    (0.134) 
NYSE -4.631 0.700 -5.331  -0.797 0.446 -1.243  -1.329 -0.223 -1.105 
 
(0.363) (0.732) (0.338)  (0.712) (0.763) (0.602)  (0.528) (0.694) (0.601) 
NASDAQ -5.436 0.792 -6.229  -1.277 0.598 -1.874  -1.773 -0.265 -1.508 
 
(0.289) (0.655) (0.263)  (0.585) (0.645) (0.470)  (0.427) (0.620) (0.507) 
OWNER 0.736 2.801 -2.065  0.424 1.472 -1.048  -0.127 -0.428 0.300 
 
(0.306) (0.201) (0.253)  (0.464) (0.289) (0.396)  (0.733) (0.295) (0.388) 
AUD 1.573 1.762 -0.189  0.412 1.142 -0.730  0.437 0.302 0.135 
 (0.051) (0.123) (0.812)  (0.721) (0.247) (0.489)  (0.299) (0.477) (0.780) 
IPO -0.915 -0.496 -0.419  -0.302 0.046 -0.348  -0.133 -0.201 0.068 
 
(0.150) (0.352) (0.564)  (0.308) (0.834) (0.450)  (0.494) (0.204) (0.780) 
UW -0.215 -0.223 0.008  -0.050 -0.075 0.026  -0.107 -0.086 -0.021 
 
(0.196) (0.606) (0.982)  (0.733) (0.828) (0.934)  (0.012) (0.528) (0.860) 
SOX -0.247 -1.419 1.172  -0.333 -0.925 0.592  0.163 -0.015 0.179 
 
(0.712) (0.061) (0.029)  (0.518) (0.028) (0.220)  (0.604) (0.915) (0.553) 
FSIZE -0.549 -0.145 -0.404  -0.529 -0.136 -0.394  -0.244 -0.114 -0.131 
 (0.080) (0.014) (0.172)  (0.024) (0.017) (0.076)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.073) 
PROFIT -0.042 0.152 -0.194  0.212 0.202 0.009  0.106 0.118 -0.012 
 
(0.551) (0.453) (0.459)  (0.099) (0.138) (0.966)  (0.093) (0.178) (0.899) 
LEV 0.130 -0.224 0.354  -0.119 -0.517 0.398  -0.166 0.208 -0.374 
 
(0.874) (0.828) (0.684)  (0.592) (0.307) (0.391)  (0.417) (0.433) (0.244) 
CFO 1.352 -1.212 2.564  1.496 0.028 1.468  0.501 -0.207 0.708 
 
(0.344) (0.250) (0.252)  (0.034) (0.940) (0.136)  (0.108) (0.749) (0.370) 
LIT -1.533 -0.170 -1.364  -1.088 0.140 -1.228  -0.047 0.657 -0.704 
 (0.047) (0.808) (0.034)  (0.040) (0.798) (0.071)  (0.898) (0.018) (0.034) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.135 -0.003 0.072  0.103 0.053 0.086  0.162 0.089 0.126 
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Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately for the strong 
home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference column reports the difference 
between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which 
the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors 
(Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The interactions model: 
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Not all foreign IPOs issue shares or ADRs Level III exclusively in the US. 
Having an IPO simultaneously in both the US and home country (or another 
country) is likely to diminish the incentives to adhere to US-based rules. That is, 
listing in another country outside the US implies that US institutions may not have 
an exclusive, or even a primary, effect. For this reason we construct a new 
indicator variable, MULTI, which is set equal to 1 if the IPO is also conducted 
outside the US, and zero otherwise. Panel D of Table 3.6 reveals that just over one 
fifth of the sample involves multi-listing. IPOs from countries with strong 
institutions tend to use multi listing to a greater extent than IPOs from countries 
with weak institutions (35% vs. 11%).  
To control for a possible effect of multi-listing on our findings, we modify 
(9) and (10) by adding MULTI to the right-hand-side of these equations. In Table 
3.12 we report the results of re-estimating these models. As before, the table has 
two panels, corresponding to Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The results of Table 3.8 are 
largely preserved in Panel A of Table 3.12. Similarly, the findings of Table 
3.9Table 3.9 are largely intact as per Panel B. There is only very modest evidence 
that multi-listing is related to abnormal accruals, and mostly with respect to 
earnings inflation. In Panel B the coefficient on MULTI is positive and significant 
in both EM1 (for the Weak column) and EM3 models.  
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Table 3.12: The Effect of Multi-Listing 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 11.515 1.299   10.217 2.910   4.287 1.853  
 (0.002) (0.588)   (0.004) (0.078)   (0.003) (0.010)  
INST   10.217    7.307    2.434 
 
  (0.004)    (0.022)    (0.093) 
MULTI -0.923 1.063 -1.985  0.226 0.105 0.121  -0.086 0.146 -0.232 
 
(0.205) (0.140) (0.086)  (0.630) (0.757) (0.855)  (0.728) (0.649) (0.269) 
OWNER 1.290 4.483 -3.193  -0.056 1.974 -2.030  0.389 1.397 -1.008 
 
(0.200) (0.080) (0.108)  (0.938) (0.035) (0.009)  (0.078) (0.002) (0.031) 
AUD 2.313 1.838 0.474  0.418 0.732 -0.315  0.495 0.372 0.123 
 (0.003) (0.112) (0.592)  (0.686) (0.235) (0.717)  (0.023) (0.053) (0.301) 
IPO -1.480 -0.095 -1.385  -0.118 0.265 -0.383  -0.332 0.064 -0.396 
 
(0.134) (0.789) (0.089)  (0.803) (0.079) (0.411)  (0.331) (0.642) (0.169) 
UW -0.265 -0.122 -0.143  -0.247 -0.076 -0.171  -0.096 0.017 -0.114 
 
(0.239) (0.689) (0.602)  (0.006) (0.657) (0.254)  (0.067) (0.766) (0.059) 
SOX -0.437 -1.293 0.856  0.235 -0.764 0.999  0.103 -0.287 0.391 
 
(0.632) (0.028) (0.229)  (0.611) (0.017) (0.029)  (0.707) (0.077) (0.140) 
FSIZE -0.564 -0.184 -0.380  -0.406 -0.167 -0.239  -0.187 -0.155 -0.032 
 (0.020) (0.036) (0.064)  (0.013) (0.017) (0.098)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.584) 
PROFIT -0.094 0.156 -0.250  0.063 0.135 -0.072  0.013 0.087 -0.075 
 
(0.249) (0.449) (0.345)  (0.417) (0.294) (0.707)  (0.600) (0.053) (0.176) 
LEV 0.416 -0.202 0.618  -0.212 -0.629 0.417  -0.048 0.399 -0.446 
 
(0.548) (0.835) (0.471)  (0.327) (0.179) (0.372)  (0.848) (0.268) (0.250) 
CFO 1.854 -1.907 3.761  0.857 -0.446 1.303  0.382 0.403 -0.021 
 
(0.151) (0.122) (0.085)  (0.226) (0.042) (0.117)  (0.166) (0.435) (0.970) 
LIT -1.495 -0.484 -1.011  -0.708 -0.588 -0.120  -0.035 0.243 -0.278 
 (0.019) (0.537) (0.233)  (0.163) (0.178) (0.851)  (0.858) (0.375) (0.490) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.191 0.035 0.120  0.128 0.121 0.130  0.216 0.153 0.185 
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Table 3.7 - The Effect of Multi-Listing (continued) 
Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 11.048 2.256   9.649 1.600   5.037 2.760  
 (0.015) (0.357)   (0.037) (0.301)   (0.001) (0.000)  
INST 
  8.792    8.049    2.277 
 
  (0.034)    (0.032)    (0.049) 
MULTI -0.347 1.154 -1.501  0.433 0.510 -0.077  0.616 0.459 0.157 
 
(0.458) (0.029) (0.043)  (0.373) (0.149) (0.911)  (0.080) (0.009) (0.676) 
OWNER 0.682 3.281 -2.599  0.231 1.699 -1.468  -0.338 -0.218 -0.119 
 
(0.318) (0.193) (0.255)  (0.735) (0.230) (0.289)  (0.459) (0.551) (0.765) 
AUD 2.063 1.808 0.255  0.569 1.169 -0.600  0.604 0.297 0.307 
 (0.014) (0.144) (0.756)  (0.594) (0.272) (0.504)  (0.070) (0.492) (0.301) 
IPO -1.173 -0.157 -1.016  -0.075 0.224 -0.298  0.166 -0.098 0.264 
 
(0.193) (0.653) (0.212)  (0.850) (0.181) (0.543)  (0.410) (0.494) (0.296) 
UW -0.274 -0.186 -0.087  -0.085 -0.049 -0.036  -0.154 -0.100 -0.054 
 
(0.163) (0.575) (0.750)  (0.613) (0.860) (0.889)  (0.001) (0.354) (0.565) 
SOX -0.312 -1.157 0.845  -0.092 -0.836 0.744  0.472 0.126 0.346 
 
(0.701) (0.064) (0.117)  (0.866) (0.057) (0.249)  (0.244) (0.363) (0.355) 
FSIZE -0.532 -0.181 -0.350  -0.505 -0.157 -0.347  -0.226 -0.123 -0.103 
 (0.060) (0.019) (0.161)  (0.017) (0.013) (0.073)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.106) 
PROFIT -0.032 0.184 -0.216  0.210 0.216 -0.007  0.108 0.130 -0.022 
 
(0.712) (0.383) (0.440)  (0.112) (0.140) (0.977)  (0.073) (0.136) (0.823) 
LEV 0.284 -0.296 0.580  -0.175 -0.571 0.395  -0.239 0.199 -0.438 
 
(0.749) (0.771) (0.548)  (0.455) (0.260) (0.390)  (0.246) (0.441) (0.241) 
CFO 1.755 -1.493 3.248  1.566 -0.147 1.713  0.522 -0.302 0.825 
 
(0.230) (0.227) (0.169)  (0.037) (0.699) (0.096)  (0.117) (0.588) (0.252) 
LIT -1.750 -0.220 -1.529  -1.207 0.125 -1.331  -0.178 0.637 -0.815 
 (0.013) (0.763) (0.028)  (0.010) (0.819) (0.035)  (0.503) (0.027) (0.004) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.114 0.009 0.066  0.107 0.061 0.091  0.153 0.103 0.129 
Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately for 
the strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference column 
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reports the difference between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the estimated 
coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals 
within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions.  
 
2. The interactions model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5
6 7
  
* * * * *
* *
i i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
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                
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One point of departure of this study from LRW is that we investigate 
foreign IPOs in the US whereas they investigate cross-listed firms of which many 
are mature firms (that is, firms that have been cross-listed for some time).42 We 
find that foreign firms from countries with strong home institutions manage 
earnings more, not less, than foreign firms from weak home institutions. 
Moreover, we find some evidence that IPOs from countries with weak institutions 
inflate earnings the same way as their US counterparts. In contrast, LRW find in 
their Table 3.10 that cross-listed firms from weak country institutions manage 
earnings more than firms from strong home institutions. Furthermore, they find 
that cross-listed firms from countries with strong institutions manage earnings at a 
level similar to that of US mature firms. Because we employ a different, and more 
recent, index for the strength of country institutions, we cannot safely rule out that 
the difference in the coding of home institutions as strong vs. weak is responsible 
for the differences in findings. To test for this possibility we re-run models 3.9 
and 3.10 using the LRW’s classification. Specifically, we replace INST with 
INST_LRW where INST_LRW = 1 or zero in accordance with LRW’s Table 3.6. 
We report the findings in Table 3.13 using a two-panel structure as with the other 
sensitivity analyses. Before turning to the results, we note that 28 observations (or 
about 10% of the entire sample) we originally classify as coming from countries 
with strong institutions are now classified as coming from countries with weak 
institutions. Inspection of both panels of Table 3.13 reveals no considerable 
change relative to Tables 3.3 and 3.4. This notwithstanding, we find that 
litigations has greater explanatory power in that in both panels it restrains earnings 
management in IPOs from countries with strong institutions more than IPOs from 
countries with weak  institutions. Additionally, SOX loses explanatory power that 
was previously reported. Overall, we conclude that the difference in the findings 
of the two papers is not attributable to the different coding of the strength of home 
institutions.  
                                                 
42
 In Table 1 LRW report their sample comprises 698 firm-year observations corresponding to 181 
unique cross-listed firms. 
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Table 3.13: Using the Lang et al. (2006) Classification 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 6.450 -0.697   5.100 0.317   4.073 0.634  
 (0.051) (0.517)   (0.009) (0.616)   (0.004) (0.182)  
INST_LRW   7.147    4.783    3.439 
 
  (0.047)    (0.012)    (0.019) 
OWNER 7.177 1.298 5.879  3.927 0.267 3.660  1.749 0.841 0.908 
 (0.056) (0.269) (0.099)  (0.133) (0.579) (0.156)  (0.071) (0.000) (0.369) 
AUD 2.057 0.356 1.701  0.967 0.084 0.883  0.384 0.374 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.250) (0.054)  (0.041) (0.705) (0.157)  (0.042) (0.032) (0.971) 
IPO -1.802 -0.027 -1.774  -0.673 0.278 -0.951  -0.489 0.080 -0.569 
 (0.056) (0.876) (0.076)  (0.169) (0.141) (0.060)  (0.087) (0.516) (0.045) 
UW -0.382 0.039 -0.421  -0.204 0.020 -0.223  -0.117 0.027 -0.144 
 
(0.427) (0.662) (0.352)  (0.393) (0.463) (0.341)  (0.277) (0.394) (0.203) 
SOX -0.268 -0.368 0.101  -0.360 0.111 -0.471  -0.043 -0.031 -0.012 
 
(0.639) (0.368) (0.864)  (0.289) (0.371) (0.186)  (0.840) (0.822) (0.960) 
FSIZE -0.428 -0.000 -0.428  -0.283 -0.010 -0.273  -0.204 -0.075 -0.129 
 (0.065) (0.993) (0.066)  (0.010) (0.835) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.011) (0.012) 
PROFIT 0.101 -0.198 0.298  0.224 -0.254 0.478  0.118 -0.086 0.203 
 
(0.546) (0.177) (0.067)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.504) (0.154) 
LEV 0.385 0.555 -0.170  -0.160 -0.304 0.144  0.232 0.103 0.130 
 
(0.766) (0.182) (0.881)  (0.783) (0.150) (0.810)  (0.609) (0.669) (0.737) 
CFO -1.334 -0.661 -0.673  -0.986 -0.145 -0.841  -0.694 0.269 -0.964 
 
(0.459) (0.127) (0.735)  (0.319) (0.456) (0.441)  (0.221) (0.329) (0.129) 
LIT -1.950 -0.020 -1.930  -1.447 -0.116 -1.331  -0.488 0.386 -0.875 
 (0.025) (0.956) (0.008)  (0.039) (0.454) (0.029)  (0.066) (0.045) (0.000) 
N 105 151 256  105 151 256  105 151 256 
Adj R2 0.050 -0.027 0.052  0.077 0.065 0.130  0.175 0.102 0.171 
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Table 3.8: Using the Lang et al. (2006) Classification (continued) 
Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 6.425 0.007   2.806 1.360   3.753 1.343  
 (0.032) (0.995)   (0.262) (0.148)   (0.002) (0.067)  
INST_LRW 
  6.418    1.447    2.410 
 
  (0.034)    (0.623)    (0.077) 
OWNER 5.803 0.355 5.448  5.138 0.154 4.984  1.058 -0.897 1.956 
 (0.107) (0.748) (0.139)  (0.131) (0.848) (0.158)  (0.415) (0.011) (0.092) 
AUD 1.984 0.356 1.628  1.083 0.530 0.553  0.556 -0.200 0.756 
 (0.011) (0.329) (0.048)  (0.204) (0.059) (0.573)  (0.094) (0.318) (0.052) 
IPO -1.588 -0.079 -1.508  -0.965 0.076 -1.040  -0.446 -0.246 -0.200 
 (0.089) (0.710) (0.162)  (0.139) (0.781) (0.120)  (0.120) (0.287) (0.632) 
UW -0.386 -0.036 -0.350  -0.185 0.009 -0.193  -0.170 -0.051 -0.119 
 (0.481) (0.675) (0.506)  (0.627) (0.852) (0.606)  (0.329) (0.315) (0.524) 
SOX -0.291 -0.416 0.125  -0.152 -0.293 0.142  0.083 0.077 0.006 
 (0.649) (0.284) (0.812)  (0.774) (0.052) (0.772)  (0.830) (0.515) (0.989) 
FSIZE -0.397 0.019 -0.417  -0.245 -0.106 -0.139  -0.174 -0.010 -0.164 
 (0.071) (0.643) (0.049)  (0.020) (0.033) (0.153)  (0.001) (0.825) (0.016) 
PROFIT 0.082 -0.006 0.088  0.293 -0.104 0.397  0.126 0.109 0.018 
 (0.643) (0.951) (0.613)  (0.009) (0.580) (0.146)  (0.002) (0.437) (0.903) 
LEV 0.296 0.284 0.013  -0.396 -0.327 -0.069  -0.130 0.129 -0.259 
 (0.820) (0.664) (0.992)  (0.466) (0.247) (0.914)  (0.625) (0.644) (0.600) 
CFO 0.011 -0.601 0.612  -0.708 0.502 -1.210  0.777 -0.378 1.155 
 (0.996) (0.202) (0.796)  (0.420) (0.005) (0.207)  (0.237) (0.200) (0.148) 
LIT -1.726 0.235 -1.961  -1.103 0.187 -1.290  -0.293 0.831 -1.124 
 (0.015) (0.621) (0.008)  (0.072) (0.631) (0.026)  (0.502) (0.021) (0.031) 
N 105 151 256  105 151 256  105 151 256 
Adj R2 0.018 -0.055 0.017  0.061 0.056 0.101  0.056 0.127 0.098 
Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of abnormal accruals reported (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately for 
the strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column) based on the 
classification presented in LRW. The Difference column reports the difference between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions 
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model described below. p-values appear below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. 
All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 
3.A for variable definitions. 
 
 
2. The interactions model: 
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 When discussing Table 3.6 we noted that a large number of IPOs come 
from China (51 observations), Israel (48), UK (29) and Canada (27). To examine 
whether a particular country drives the results we re-run (9) and (10) including a 
country-fixed effect for each country individually and separately. We also exclude 
each country in turn from the full sample; in both cases our main inferences 
remain the same. In Table 3.14 we report findings when we include four country 
fixed effects for these countries.  As before, we have Panel A for |EM1|-|EM3| and 
Panel B for EM1-EM. Comparing Panels A and B to Table 3.3 and 3.4, 
respectively, indicates that our main inferences remain unchanged. In addition, 
there is no consistent effect to any of the country dummies (CHINA, ISRAEL, UK 
and CANADA).  We also excluded China from the sample, but did not find our 
inference changes.  
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Table 3.14: Controlling for Country Effects 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 12.870 1.920 1.920  9.978 2.582   4.268 1.841  
 
(0.002) (0.382) (0.383)  (0.002) (0.104)   (0.006) (0.012)  
INST   10.950    7.396    2.427 
 
  (0.002)    (0.010)    (0.135) 
CANADA -1.154  -1.154  0.417  0.417  -0.023  -0.023 
 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.458)  (0.458)  (0.941)  (0.940) 
CHINA  -0.518 -0.518   0.285 0.285   0.080 0.080 
 
 (0.570) (0.570)   (0.250) (0.250)   (0.705) (0.706) 
ISRAEL  -0.250 -0.250   0.342 0.342   -0.006 -0.006 
 
 (0.753) (0.753)   (0.210) (0.210)   (0.959) (0.959) 
UK -0.978  -0.978  -0.396  -0.396  0.105  0.105 
 
(0.505)  (0.505)  (0.546)  (0.546)  (0.726)  (0.721) 
OWNER 1.217 4.294 -3.077  0.124 1.769 -1.646  0.345 1.290 -0.945 
 
(0.293) (0.105) (0.112)  (0.895) (0.068) (0.024)  (0.216) (0.001) (0.029) 
AUD 2.021 1.750 0.272  0.478 0.773 -0.295  0.493 0.383 0.110 
 
(0.023) (0.133) (0.750)  (0.615) (0.206) (0.720)  (0.010) (0.045) (0.113) 
IPO -0.846 -0.449 -0.397  -0.514 0.178 -0.691  -0.249 0.062 -0.311 
 
(0.146) (0.434) (0.580)  (0.196) (0.501) (0.202)  (0.077) (0.706) (0.207) 
UW -0.353 -0.107 -0.246  -0.233 -0.085 -0.147  -0.098 0.016 -0.115 
 
(0.087) (0.739) (0.345)  (0.004) (0.620) (0.279)  (0.126) (0.780) (0.078) 
SOX 0.063 -1.381 1.444  0.072 -0.878 0.950  0.146 -0.363 0.509 
 
(0.935) (0.010) (0.037)  (0.894) (0.001) (0.062)  (0.610) (0.020) (0.108) 
FSIZE -0.589 -0.182 -0.407  -0.394 -0.144 -0.251  -0.188 -0.149 -0.039 
 
(0.019) (0.072) (0.056)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.075)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.515) 
PROFIT -0.118 0.150 -0.268  0.060 0.121 -0.061  0.014 0.080 -0.065 
 
(0.226) (0.441) (0.297)  (0.492) (0.309) (0.744)  (0.602) (0.077) (0.241) 
LEV 0.287 -0.227 0.514  -0.169 -0.555 0.387  -0.063 0.409 -0.472 
 
(0.643) (0.782) (0.560)  (0.433) (0.228) (0.424)  (0.773) (0.246) (0.214) 
CFO 1.460 -1.708 3.168  0.788 -0.396 1.184  0.389 0.444 -0.055 
 
(0.238) (0.123) (0.080)  (0.252) (0.072) (0.132)  (0.183) (0.344) (0.919) 
LIT -1.751 -0.400 -1.351  -0.761 -0.615 -0.146  -0.019 0.245 -0.265 
 
(0.016) (0.561) (0.059)  (0.138) (0.162) (0.805)  (0.917) (0.323) (0.478) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.190 0.025 0.116  0.127 0.120 0.128  0.210 0.146 0.179 
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Table 3.9: Controlling for Country Effects (continued) 
Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 12.769 3.076 3.076  9.419 1.530   5.296 2.892  
 
(0.011) (0.189) (0.190)  (0.031) (0.347)   (0.000) (0.000)  
INST 
  9.693    7.889    2.404 
 
  (0.018)    (0.022)    (0.038) 
CANADA -1.446  -1.446  0.283  0.283  -0.249  -0.249 
 
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.670)  (0.670)  (0.123)  (0.111) 
CHINA  -0.855 -0.855   0.012 0.012   -0.383 -0.383 
 
 (0.412) (0.412)   (0.959) (0.959)   (0.005) (0.005) 
ISRAEL  -0.250 -0.250   0.283 0.283   0.284 0.284 
 
 (0.718) (0.718)   (0.330) (0.330)   (0.364) (0.366) 
UK -1.166  -1.166  -0.030  -0.030  0.017  0.017 
 
(0.468)  (0.468)  (0.960)  (0.960)  (0.947)  (0.946) 
OWNER 0.737 3.232 -2.496  0.363 1.463 -1.100  -0.245 -0.221 -0.024 
 
(0.394) (0.254) (0.312)  (0.579) (0.300) (0.344)  (0.616) (0.472) (0.957) 
AUD 1.740 1.667 0.072  0.636 1.164 -0.528  0.592 0.233 0.359 
 
(0.079) (0.183) (0.934)  (0.524) (0.272) (0.552)  (0.067) (0.593) (0.296) 
IPO -0.764 -0.671 -0.094  -0.411 -0.047 -0.364  -0.037 -0.515 0.478 
 
(0.203) (0.318) (0.902)  (0.225) (0.873) (0.514)  (0.842) (0.057) (0.098) 
UW -0.355 -0.165 -0.189  -0.061 -0.051 -0.010  -0.141 -0.096 -0.044 
 
(0.053) (0.634) (0.475)  (0.677) (0.854) (0.967)  (0.001) (0.378) (0.600) 
SOX -0.021 -1.121 1.100  -0.310 -0.945 0.635  0.249 0.204 0.044 
 
(0.978) (0.024) (0.029)  (0.599) (0.048) (0.283)  (0.461) (0.147) (0.872) 
FSIZE -0.563 -0.188 -0.374  -0.498 -0.135 -0.363  -0.232 -0.115 -0.117 
 
(0.052) (0.068) (0.134)  (0.017) (0.021) (0.064)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.077) 
PROFIT -0.064 0.191 -0.254  0.211 0.204 0.007  0.104 0.137 -0.033 
 
(0.500) (0.345) (0.350)  (0.132) (0.146) (0.977)  (0.089) (0.120) (0.741) 
LEV 0.252 -0.336 0.589  -0.105 -0.505 0.400  -0.139 0.240 -0.379 
 
(0.763) (0.712) (0.572)  (0.641) (0.319) (0.422)  (0.493) (0.350) (0.260) 
CFO 1.464 -1.303 2.767  1.640 -0.028 1.669  0.683 -0.231 0.913 
 
(0.276) (0.247) (0.159)  (0.020) (0.934) (0.072)  (0.024) (0.668) (0.174) 
LIT -2.022 -0.115 -1.908  -1.185 0.132 -1.318  -0.154 0.663 -0.817 
 
(0.017) (0.864) (0.005)  (0.034) (0.814) (0.052)  (0.622) (0.039) (0.015) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.123 0.001 0.068  0.097 0.052 0.082  0.121 0.109 0.116 
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Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately for the 
strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column). The Difference column 
reports the difference between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions model described below. p-values appear below the estimated 
coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals 
within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
2. The interactions model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 2 3 4
5
  
* * * *
*
i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i
EMJ or EMJ INST CANADA CHINA ISRAEL OWNER AUD IPO
UW SOX FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST CANADA INST CHINA INST ISRAEL INST OWNER
INST AUD
                
                 
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
* * * *
* * * *
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i t
INST IPO INST UW INST SOX INST FSIZE
INST PROFIT INST LEV INST CFO INST LIT
              
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The results presented so far suggest that IPOs from countries with strong 
institutions manage earnings more than both their US equivalents and IPOs from 
countries with weak home institutions. Additionally, we provide evidence that 
earnings inflation at foreign IPOs from weak home institutions is similar to that of 
US IPOs. This is broadly consistent with the notion that the strong institutions 
sub-sample trade-down by offering shares in the US while the weak home 
institutions sub-sample trade up. Nevertheless, since we do not code strong vs. 
weak relative to the US, this interpretation may be questionable. We noted earlier 
that, according to our index, the US is placed within the weak home institutions 
sub-sample. This is also consistent with Spamann’s (2010) revised indices of the 
La Porta et al.’s (1998) and Djankov et al.’s (2008) indices. Specifically, the US 
scores 5 out of 5 in La Porta et al. (2008) and 3 out of 5 in Djankov et al. (2008). 
In contrast, it scores only 2 out of 6 in Spamann (2010). We have therefore re-
ranked foreign IPOs relative to the US resulting in 216 IPOs classified as coming 
from countries with strong institutions and 75 from weak home institutions. That 
is, we have reclassified into the strong home institutions 83 IPOs that in the main 
analyses were classified as coming from countries with weak institutions. In Table 
3.15 we present findings for models 3.9 and 3.10, replacing INST with INST_US. 
Once more, this table has two panels, A and B, corresponding to Tables 3.3 and 
3.4. Starting with Panel A, the intercepts in the “Weak” columns are now all 
insignificantly different from zero while the intercepts in the “Strong” columns 
remain positive and statistically significant. This suggests that foreign IPOs 
coming from countries with weaker institutions than US institutions report 
earnings that are as variable as earnings reported by their US equivalents. This is 
clearly not the case for foreign IPOs from countries with institutions stronger than 
the US. In addition, the evidence on the constraining effect of SOX on earnings 
management is now much weaker than in Table 3.8. 
Turning to Panel B, now there is less evidence of earnings inflation by IPOs 
from weaker home institutions. Nevertheless, the sign and significance of the 
intercept indicates that IPOs from stronger home institutions inflate earnings more 
than their US equivalents. However, we cannot rule out that IPOs from countries 
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with weaker institutions than the US inflate earnings less than IPOs from stronger 
home institutions, except in the case of EM3.  
One concern with regard to interpreting these results is that the weaker 
(relative to the US) home institutions sub-sample is now small, and hence the 
power of the tests is diminished. We cannot fully alleviate this concern. 
Consistent with that we note that the R2s in the “Weak” columns in Panel A are 
lower than their counterparts in Table 3.8. But the R2s in the “Weak” columns in 
Panel B are as good as, and slightly better, than in Table 3.9. We therefore 
conclude that this evidence is supportive of the notion of “trading up” and a 
greater force of bonding on part of IPOs coming from countries with institutions 
weaker than the US. For IPOs coming from stronger home institutions, the 
evidence is consistent with a “trading down” effect.  
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Table 3.15: Above and Below US 
Panel A: Absolute Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  |EM1|    |EM2|    |EM3|  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 7.253 -0.033   7.148 -0.270   3.355 0.450  
 (0.028) (0.983)   (0.006) (0.792)   (0.001) (0.697)  
INST_US   7.286    7.418    2.905 
 
  (0.051)    (0.007)    (0.069) 
OWNER 2.427 0.707 1.720  0.717 1.582 -0.865  0.796 0.793 0.003 
 
(0.106) (0.478) (0.205)  (0.380) (0.103) (0.243)  (0.000) (0.320) (0.997) 
AUD 2.025 0.512 1.513  0.481 0.491 -0.010  0.430 0.358 0.072 
 (0.030) (0.177) (0.145)  (0.510) (0.214) (0.990)  (0.041) (0.120) (0.821) 
IPO -1.009 0.436 -1.444  -0.223 0.725 -0.948  -0.192 0.246 -0.438 
 (0.063) (0.162) (0.040)  (0.378) (0.067) (0.021)  (0.338) (0.181) (0.033) 
UW -0.188 0.043 -0.231  -0.147 0.006 -0.154  -0.038 0.038 -0.076 
 
(0.492) (0.379) (0.392)  (0.336) (0.907) (0.342)  (0.530) (0.298) (0.283) 
SOX -0.911 -0.269 -0.642  -0.458 -0.094 -0.363  -0.194 -0.030 -0.164 
 (0.089) (0.201) (0.197)  (0.149) (0.641) (0.103)  (0.158) (0.833) (0.245) 
FSIZE -0.390 -0.039 -0.351  -0.297 -0.047 -0.250  -0.176 -0.075 -0.101 
 (0.007) (0.504) (0.021)  (0.004) (0.305) (0.014)  (0.000) (0.188) (0.137) 
PROFIT -0.080 -0.180 0.100  0.045 -0.086 0.131  0.027 -0.026 0.054 
 
(0.408) (0.312) (0.535)  (0.436) (0.526) (0.282)  (0.266) (0.668) (0.350) 
LEV 0.005 -0.041 0.046  -0.370 -0.171 -0.199  0.035 0.277 -0.242 
 
(0.994) (0.869) (0.944)  (0.193) (0.557) (0.604)  (0.883) (0.328) (0.516) 
CFO 0.400 -0.423 0.823  0.431 -0.314 0.745  0.494 -0.126 0.620 
 
(0.697) (0.198) (0.421)  (0.425) (0.127) (0.166)  (0.104) (0.701) (0.137) 
LIT -1.634 0.585 -2.219  -0.949 -0.132 -0.817  -0.112 0.600 -0.712 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.001)  (0.031) (0.379) (0.044)  (0.388) (0.037) (0.008) 
N 216 75 291  216 75 291  216 75 291 
Adj R2 0.108 0.121 0.096  0.111 0.122 0.105  0.190 0.123 0.177 
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Table 3.10: Above and Below US (continued) 
Panel B: Signed Abnormal Accruals of Foreign IPOs Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
  EM1    EM2    EM3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 7.474 2.099   6.567 0.033   4.460 0.092  
 (0.030) (0.333)   (0.040) (0.988)   (0.000) (0.924)  
INST_US 
  5.375    6.533    4.367 
 
  (0.173)    (0.095)    (0.001) 
OWNER 1.768 -0.874 2.642  0.752 1.399 -0.647  -0.383 -0.519 0.136 
 
(0.166) (0.245) (0.136)  (0.379) (0.212) (0.396)  (0.295) (0.428) (0.795) 
AUD 1.988 0.061 1.927  0.786 0.654 0.132  0.510 -0.414 0.924 
 (0.047) (0.723) (0.054)  (0.466) (0.119) (0.911)  (0.131) (0.019) (0.014) 
IPO -0.988 -0.142 -0.846  -0.445 0.684 -1.129  -0.323 -0.228 -0.095 
 (0.035) (0.554) (0.041)  (0.035) (0.146) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.497) (0.765) 
UW -0.218 -0.004 -0.214  -0.060 0.094 -0.155  -0.124 0.019 -0.143 
 
(0.445) (0.939) (0.462)  (0.794) (0.028) (0.496)  (0.133) (0.673) (0.144) 
SOX -0.898 -0.109 -0.788  -0.482 -0.651 0.169  0.105 0.284 -0.179 
 
(0.118) (0.374) (0.169)  (0.189) (0.043) (0.584)  (0.604) (0.106) (0.526) 
FSIZE -0.380 -0.074 -0.306  -0.351 -0.130 -0.222  -0.185 0.005 -0.189 
 (0.011) (0.402) (0.022)  (0.004) (0.119) (0.114)  (0.000) (0.926) (0.001) 
PROFIT -0.015 -0.502 0.487  0.174 -0.224 0.398  0.103 -0.121 0.223 
 
(0.864) (0.143) (0.147)  (0.082) (0.263) (0.055)  (0.055) (0.672) (0.423) 
LEV -0.113 0.858 -0.972  -0.361 0.440 -0.801  -0.060 0.770 -0.830 
 
(0.853) (0.039) (0.122)  (0.180) (0.293) (0.037)  (0.625) (0.122) (0.070) 
CFO 0.642 0.060 0.582  1.057 0.219 0.839  0.214 0.081 0.133 
 
(0.512) (0.897) (0.584)  (0.038) (0.528) (0.184)  (0.557) (0.824) (0.799) 
LIT -1.602 0.650 -2.252  -1.004 0.652 -1.656  0.072 0.766 -0.694 
 (0.017) (0.103) (0.001)  (0.011) (0.028) (0.000)  (0.804) (0.109) (0.179) 
N 216 75 291  216 75 291  216 75 291 
Adj R2 0.071 0.082 0.055  0.081 0.292 0.071  0.133 0.096 0.115 
Notes:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of absolute abnormal accruals (Panel A) and signed abnormal accruals (Panel B), separately 
for the strong home institutions sub-sample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions sub-sample (the Weak column) as classified 
with respect to the US institutions. The Difference column reports the difference between the two sub-sample coefficients using the interactions 
model described below. p-values appear below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold 
face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See 
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Appendix 3.A for variable definitions. 
2. The interactions model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4
5 6
  _
_ * _ * _ * _ *
_ * _ *
i i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i
EMJ or EMJ INST US OWNER AUD IPO UW SOX
FSIZE PROFIT LEV CFO LIT
INST US OWNER INST US AUD INST US IPO INST US UW
INST US SOX INST US FSIZE
              
               7 8
9 10
_ * _ *
_ * _ *
i i i i
i i i i t
INST US PROFIT INST US LEV
INST US CFO INST US LIT
      
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We also conducted a number of additional tests, for which we have not 
tabulated the results. These include examining whether the location of the auditor 
matters. Specifically, we coded a revised AUD variable with the following values. 
Zero when the auditor is not a US auditor from a non-Big auditor as zero, one 
when the auditor is not a US auditor but from a Big audit firm, and two when the 
Auditor is a US-based auditor from a Big audit firm. Our main results remain 
unchanged. We also included a measure of board independence, with no effect on 
our inferences. Controlling for CEO age or tenure has equally no effect.   
3.8 Summary and Conclusions 
Foreign firms that conduct their IPOs in the US may be regarded as any 
other US firm. Issuing shares for the first time in the US subjects these firms to 
the US regulation and enforcement while, arguably, escaping the effect of home 
institutions. Moreover, relative to mature cross-listed firms, foreign IPOs are 
exposed to a higher level of scrutiny by the SEC and other US market 
participants. Both arguments combined suggest that foreign IPOs are least 
expected to be influenced by their home institutions in making their reporting 
choices.   
In this paper we provide evidence pertaining to this prediction. Our findings 
indicate a higher level of earnings management in foreign IPOs in than US IPOs. 
We further find evidence of more extreme reporting (large positive or negative 
abnormal accruals), and of earnings inflation, in foreign IPOs. These findings are 
more pronounced for IPOs from countries with strong home legal institutions. 
This evidence is consistent with Licht’s (2003) “trading down” argument and that 
bonding is not the overriding motivating factor in the decision to list in the US. 
We also note the contrast between our findings and that of LRW. After employing 
a number of sensitivity tests we cannot rule out that the difference in findings 
likely relates to differences in reporting incentives, information asymmetry and 
regulatory oversight between foreign IPOs and mature cross-listed firms. Why 
this is the case warrants further research. 
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Furthermore, a number of caveats may apply to our research design. First, 
throughout this empirical chapter, US IPO data is merely used to generate the 
model of normal accruals against which foreign IPO abnormal accruals are 
assessed, even though these firms themselves might be different from seasoned 
non-IPO US firms. An alternative research design could have proceeded based 
upon a model of normal accruals derived from non-IPO firms listed on US stock 
exchanges, and then applied to all IPOs, whether foreign or domestic. However, at 
this point in time this alternative design is very challenging due to the limited 
information available in digital format. Nonetheless, with information becoming 
more publically available this may be possible and less costly in the near future 
and could be an interesting methodology to utilize in future research.  
Second, an alternative benchmark to assess the levels of normal accruals 
could have been made on mature domestic US firms. However, we believe that 
using domestic US IPOs as a benchmark is preferable due to the similarities 
between foreign IPOs and domestic IPOs in factors that are related firms’ life 
cycle, such as growth.  
Third, literature suggests various alternative measurements of earnings 
management and earnings quality. The empirical design of this empirical chapter 
uses three accruals models which are the most widely used in this literature but 
there are other models that we could have used as well. A possible extension of 
this study for future research would be to use alternative earnings quality 
measures. 
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Appendix 3. A: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
EM1 
Abnormal accruals  in foreign firms calculated 
according to the modified Jones measure of 
abnormal accruals in Dechow et al. (1995) 
COMPUSTAT 
and IPO 
Prospectus 
EM2 
Abnormal accruals  in foreign firms calculated 
following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
COMPUSTAT 
and IPO 
Prospectus 
EM3 
Abnormal accruals in foreign firms calculated 
according to the regression in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) 
COMPUSTAT 
and IPO 
Prospectus 
INST 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
product of law enforcement index  (the International 
Country Risk Guide – ICRG - Law and Order index)  
and the revised  anti-director index of La Porta et al. 
(1998) for the home country is above the sample 
median, 0 otherwise  
ICRG website 
and La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
OWNER 
The ratio of primary shares retained by insiders 
over all shares released and offered 
IPO Prospectus 
AUD 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
auditing firm is a Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990-
1997, 1998-2001 and 2002 onwards, respectively; 0 
otherwise 
IPO Prospectus 
IPO 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
foreign registrant issues shares directly on the US 
market, 0 otherwise (i.e., for ADRs IPO = 0) 
IPO Prospectus 
UW 
Underwriters Rank obtained from Jay Ritter’s 
website on 06/05/2011 
IPO Prospectus 
SOX 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
foreign IPO takes place on or after July 2002; 0 
otherwise 
 
FSIZE 
Natural logarithm of sales at the end of fiscal year 
preceding the IPO. The variable is indexed to 2005 
value of US dollars 
IPO Prospectus 
LEV 
The ratio of short and long term debt over total 
assets. 
IPO Prospectus 
PROFIT Net Income the year preceding IPO over total sales 
of the same year  
IPO Prospectus 
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CFO 
The ratio of cash from operating activities over 
total assets 
IPO Prospectus 
LIT 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm 
operates in a high-litigation industry and 0 otherwise 
where high litigation industries are industries with 
SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 
5200-5961, and 7370-7374 as defined in Ashbaugh 
et al. (2003).  
SDC Platinum 
and CRSP 
RECON 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm 
reports under other than US GAAP and provides 
reconciliation figures in notes.  issues shares directly 
on the US market, 0 otherwise  
IPO Prospectus 
MULTI 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
foreign registrant issues shares in more than one 
location, 0 otherwise 
IPO Prospectus 
CONTI 
The product of law enforcement index (the 
International Country Risk Guide – ICRG - Law and 
Order index) and the revised anti-director index of 
La Porta et al. (1998) for the home country.  
ICRG website 
and La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
NYSE 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
foreign registrant issues shares on the New York 
Stock Exchange 
IPO Prospectus 
NASDAQ An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the foreign registrant issues shares on NASDAQ 
IPO Prospectus 
AMEX 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the 
foreign registrant issues shares on the American 
Stock Exchange 
IPO Prospectus 
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 Chapter 4: 
Paper 2-The Effects of Home Country Institutions 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Underpricing of 
Foreign IPOs in the US  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Information asymmetry problems and their effects on market participants 
have been at the center of attention of legislating bodies over the last few decades 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Connelly et al., 2011). The increase in the number of 
foreign companies seeking new capital in the US has promoted interest in 
studying the specific characteristics of these companies (Bruner et al., 1999, 2004; 
Doidge et al., 2009). Heterogeneity in ownership patterns, private benefits of 
control, institutional environments, media coverage and enforcement mechanisms 
have been proposed as explanations as to why information asymmetry problems 
differ between US and foreign firms listed in US capital markets (Frost and 
Pownall, 1994; Doidge et al., 2009; Bruner et al., 1999, 2004; and Bell et al., 
2012). 
In the context of initial public offerings (IPOs), information asymmetry 
problems have been suggested as the primary determinant of the level of 
underpricing (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In a cross-country setting, Hopp and 
Dreher (2013) document a significant relation between country-specific legal and 
institutional factors and levels of underpricing. They attribute these findings 
largely to accounting transparency that influences the flow and understanding of 
information, and to legal and institutional environments that affect the 
effectiveness of firm level corporate governance mechanisms.  
As for foreign IPOs in the US, Bruner et al. (2004) find that, on a univariate 
basis, domestic firms experience a lower level of underpricing than foreign firms 
in the US during the period 1991-1999. They attribute their findings to the 
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observation that foreign firms are “larger in terms of assets and issue size relative 
to IPO issuers in their home markets” (pp. 39-40). They also argue that this 
evidence is consistent with Kim and Stulz (1988) and Marr et al. (1991) who 
assert that foreign IPOs in the US are of higher quality relative to their peers at 
home. These findings are in line with studies that are based on the “bonding 
hypothesis” and argue that firms can reduce or even avoid the negative effects of less 
developed institutions in their country of origin on their costs of capital by listing in 
overseas markets with more developed institutions. In doing so, they “bond” to the 
host country’s legal institutions (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999). In the extreme case, by 
issuing securities exclusively in the US, foreign firms may credibly commit to the US 
disclosure and enforcement rules. In terms of complying with reporting standards, 
this presumably makes them like any other US firm. Also, being seen as a local firm, 
foreign IPOs should be monitored and treated by US regulators and courts just as US 
IPOs. These arguments support the idea of irrelevance of home institutions for 
foreign IPOs’ reported numbers. 
However, more recent studies challenge the bonding hypothesis by casting 
doubts regarding the effectiveness of the enforcement and monitoring of regulations 
of foreign registrants in the US (Licht, 2000, 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Licht et al., 
2011). For example, Licht (2000, 2003) posits that shareholders of foreign firms in 
the US have weaker legal remedies compared to the ones that are available to 
shareholders of domestic US firms. He also argues that the motivations to list in the 
US are actually cheap finance and enhancement of firm visibility rather than 
commitment to better corporate governance standards. Thus, if home legal institutions 
do not influence costs of capital as expressed in underpricing levels of foreign IPOs, 
there should be no statistically significant association between underpricing levels 
and the strength of home institutions. In light of the mixed evidence regarding the 
motivations and outcomes of listing in the US, I investigate the effects of home 
country institutions on information asymmetry problems of foreign IPOs in the 
US with reference to changes in underpricing levels. 
In addition to the institutional environment at the country of origin, foreign 
firms may also be affected by changes in the legal environment at the targeted 
listing market; the US. The introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002 aimed to reduce cost of capital by attempting to mitigate information 
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asymmetry problems by improving the information environment in US capital 
markets. This was carried out by employing improved accounting and corporate 
governance mechanisms (Jain and Rezaee, 2006). For example, section 401 of the 
Act requires that all off-balance sheet transactions, obligations and other relevant 
information must be disclosed in the quarterly and annual reports. Furthermore, 
section 302(a) and its amendments in section 404 of the Act requires the chief 
executive officer, as well as the chief financial officer, of the reporting firm to 
certify each quarterly and annual reports. The executives ascertain and certify the 
veracity of the reports. As a result, management’s involvement, responsibilities 
and legal liabilities have significantly increased.  
The effects of SOX on information asymmetry problems have been 
extensively researched in recent years. This notwithstanding, not much is yet 
known with regard to the specific case of foreign issuers. The effect of SOX on 
foreign IPOs a-priori is unclear because these firms have been formed and 
developed outside the US and therefore predominantly they exist in very different 
institutional environments to the US. 
Thus, this study also investigates the effect of SOX on information 
asymmetry problems of foreign IPOs in the US with reference to changes in 
underpricing levels. The rationale for using these changes as a proxy for 
information asymmetry problems is as follows. First, underpricing is expected to 
decrease as information asymmetry among investors becomes less severe 
(Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Rock, 1986). Second, SOX is expected to reduce 
underpricing levels in foreign IPOs due to the improvement in the reporting 
quality and consequently reducing the information asymmetry between IPO firms 
and investors. (Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Johnston and Madura, 2009). 
Underpricing is also related to the ability of investors to resolve disputes with 
managers and the extent to which managers are held accountable (Drake and 
Vetsuypens, 1993). This is a function of the legal remedies available to investors 
and the protection they can expect from regulatory and enforcement bodies such 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the context of foreign 
IPOs, even though they commit to US institutions, this ability may still be a 
function of home institutions if not all disputes are resolved in accordance with 
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US rules and/or the enforcement of US law on foreign firms is weak. As I argue 
below, SOX may have reduced the effect of home legal institutions by setting 
tougher reporting and corporate governance requirements. Because institutions 
differ in their strengths across countries, any cross-country differential effect of 
SOX on underpricing of foreign IPOs may be a function of differences in the 
strength of home institutions.  
For my empirical investigation, I construct a dataset consisting of 320 
foreign IPOs in the US during the years 1990-2009. I compare the effect of SOX 
on underpricing while controlling for a number of factors previously identified in 
the literature as determinants of underpricing.  In addition, I examine the effect of 
the institutional environments of the country of origin on underpricing by using 
two measures of the quality and strength of legal and enforcement factors in the 
home country. Based on these, I identify foreign IPO firms in the sample that 
come from strong or weak home institutions. I subsequently examine whether 
underpricing varies between strong and weak home institutions, again controlling 
for known influencing factors.  
The empirical findings indicate significant lower levels of underpricing in 
the case of firms coming from strong institutional environments as opposed to 
those classified as weak. I find no evidence for a significant impact of SOX on the 
underpricing of foreign IPOs. There is also no evidence for a significant relation 
between home legal institutions and SOX with respect to underpricing. However, 
I find that in the post-SOX period the significant negative relation between 
auditors’ prestige and underpricing levels has increased in magnitude relative to 
the pre-SOX period. When controlling for accounting conservatism, I find that 
accounting conservatism is negatively related to underpricing in firms that are 
coming from strong institutional environments. This corresponds with findings by 
Aerts and Cheng (2012) that find that accounting conservatism helps to reduce 
information asymmetry and as such is negatively associated with underpricing.   
In addition to underpricing, I use an alternative measure of initial 
performance commonly referred to as investors’ premium (Certo et al., 2003; 
Welbourne and Andrews, 1996; Aerts and Cheng, 2102; and Lester et al. 2005). 
This measure represents the perceived potential value of a firm since it is 
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calculated by the offer price minus the net book value per share deflated by the 
offer price. Findings indicate that firms that come from strong institutional 
environments enjoy a higher premium from investors. However, the magnitude of 
this premium reduces with an increase in conservative reporting. Evidence also 
suggests a reduction in premium in the post-SOX period.     
This paper makes the following contributions. First, it adds to the existing 
body of literature on the effect of SOX on the reduction of agency problems (e.g., 
Johnston and Madura, 2009), in particular relating to the information asymmetry 
evidenced in the underpricing of foreign IPOs in the US. Second, it focuses 
specifically on the role played by the institutional differences at the country of 
origin before and after the enactment of SOX. Third, it sheds light on the 
differences in the role of the firm level governance mechanisms and their 
evolution subsequent to the enactment of SOX with respect to underpricing. These 
findings have direct implications for the ongoing debate about the competiveness 
of the US markets and the procedural costs associated with the Act and are of 
interest to both practitioners as well as policy makers. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 discusses background 
information relevant to establish the main hypotheses for this paper. Section 4.3 
presents the research design for the study. Section 4.4 describes the sample 
selection process and data collection. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the 
empirical results and Section 4.6 contains the concluding remarks.  
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Underpricing in IPOs is a well-documented phenomenon and is commonly 
defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the IPO’s 
offer price. It captures the magnitude of ‘leaving money on the table’ (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002) in a sense that a significant amount of the IPOs proceeds are 
forgone by the issuing owner-managers (Aggrawal et al., 2002). The first 
evidence goes back to the early 1970s with studies by Ibbotson (1975) and Logue 
(1973) that report significant underpricing in the US market. Ibbotson and Jaffe 
(1975) argue for a cyclical nature to the level of underpricing. Later, research 
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shows an apparent increase in the US underpricing levels throughout the years, 
from an average of 7.4% in the 1980s to about 65% in the late 1990s (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004). A more recent study by Engelen and Van Essen (2010) 
documents an average level of underpricing of 21.14% in the US during 2000-
2005. However, underpricing is not a US- specific phenomenon. Levis (1993) and 
Jenkinson (1990) report consistent underpricing in the UK market, Dawson 
(1987) documents significant levels of underpricing in Hong-Kong, Singapore and 
Malaysia. Other studies also document high levels of underpricing in China (Mok 
and Hui, 1998; Kimbro, 2005).   
Generally, in alignment with shareholders interest, management aims at 
maximizing the proceeds from the IPO process will try to minimize underpricing 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Thus, an understanding of the motivation to leave 
money on the table is needed to rationalize this documented global phenomenon. 
First, a positive relation between underpricing and after-issue trading volume 
suggests that underpricing attracts investors’ attention and therefore promotes the 
issuing firm (Welch, 1992; Demers and Lewellen, 2003). Second, several authors 
argue that underpricing protects management from legal liabilities and accusations 
originating from investors’ allegations of deceptive information in the listing 
documentation (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988). Third, other studies 
argue that underpricing assures a completion of sale of the underwriters’ stocks 
and thus maximizing remuneration (Gordon and Jin, 1993).  
Finally, one of the main motives for underpricing is commonly identified in 
the literature as asymmetric information among management and investors. Ritter 
and Welch (2002) suggest that when investors are less informed than the issuers, 
managers are encouraged to ‘leave money on the table’ in order to compensate 
uninformed investors for possible losses owing to information asymmetry; also 
known as the ‘lemons problem’ (Akerlof, 1970; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). In 
other words, IPOs are often subject to a high degree of private information, and 
thus, informed investors bid only on profitable issuers while uninformed investors 
have no comparative advantage when buying a stock of a new issuer. Moreover, 
these authors propose two scenarios for the case in which investors are more 
informed relative to the issuers about the market demand. In the first, investors are 
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equally informed and therefore buy only when price is below the true value. In the 
second and more realistic scenario, investors are not equally informed. Hence, the 
less informed investors are allocated both, high and low quality stocks. In 
contrast, informed investors are in a position to select the high quality stocks 
which are not overpriced. In order to mitigate the winner’s curse, where the 
winner of the auction pays an overvalued price for the stocks (Thaler, 1988) and 
therefore to ensure that the uninformed investors break even on low quality 
stocks, all stocks are expected to be underpriced (Rock 1986; Levis, 1990). In 
fact, this reasoning is similar to that presented in the case of issuers that are more 
informed than investors but in this instance the information asymmetry is between 
two types of investors. This rationale can be identified with a specific information 
asymmetry problem, namely, the adverse selection problem. 
Moreover, prior literature identifies two different occurrences of 
information asymmetry in the IPO process. Namely, information asymmetry can 
arise between the underwriters and issuers (Baron, 1982; Loughran and Ritter, 
2002, Ritter, 2011) and management and investors (Welch, 1989; Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989). In the latter case, information asymmetry problems can arise even 
in the early stages of an IPO i.e., the book-building process. 
To date, most of the literature on underpricing focuses on firm-specific and 
issue- specific characteristics and mostly neglects country-specific characteristics 
(Engelen and van Essen, 2010). However, the institutional environments in which 
firms form and operate affect the compliance and enforcement of law, and are 
therefore directly linked to the effectiveness of business practices. Engelen and 
van Essen (2010) find that a country’s legal framework and level of enforcement 
reduce the extent of underpricing. They argue that, in line with asymmetric 
information models on underpricing, the legal framework influences the ex-ante 
uncertainty with respect to post listing strategies and managerial decisions. This 
increases the uncertainty regarding the IPO valuation, which in turn, leads to 
higher underpricing levels. In addition, there is a higher uncertainty regarding 
investors’ returns, and consequently regarding firms’ cost of capital, in countries 
with weaker legal protection. This is attributed to the greater range of 
opportunities available for management and controlling shareholders to transfer 
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assets out of the firm at the minority shareholders’ expense. This potential of 
misappropriation of firm’s assets will increase the firm’s cost of capital. Literature 
on cross-listed firms suggests that in order to reduce these negative effects, firms 
from countries with weak legal institutions list in overseas markets with stronger 
legal institutions, typically the US market. By doing so, they effectively “bond” to 
the host country’s legal institutions and increase their liability with respect to 
minority shareholders’ interests (Coffee 1999; Stulz, 1999). In the extreme case, 
cross-listing may even eliminate the relevance of their home country institutions. 
However, other studies argue that the regulations and enforcement mechanisms 
with regard to foreign firms in the US are of limited effectiveness. For example, 
Siegle (2005) argues that the SEC does not scrutinize foreign registrants. He also 
finds that the effectiveness of private litigation on foreign firms is constrained. 
Licht (2000 and 2003) finds evidence for weaker remedies for disputes involving 
shareholders of foreign firms than those of domestic US firms. In this paper, I 
study the potential impact of home country institutions on underpricing in the 
context of foreign IPOs in the US. 
With regard to US markets, information asymmetry problems and their 
effects on market participants have been at the centre of attention of legislative 
organizations over the last few decades. Through the enactment of SOX in 2002, 
US regulators aimed to increase investor confidence in the US capital markets by 
reducing information asymmetry (Coates, 2007). This was to be accomplished 
through the implementation of stricter requirements, mostly auditing and reporting 
related, as well as new corporate governance mechanisms. For example, section 
302 of the Act requires management certification of quarterly and annual reports. 
Also, section 401 enhances the off-balance sheet and pro-forma disclosures. In 
addition, section 204 sets the required audit committee standards, and aims to 
strengthen the independence and responsibilities of the audit committee. The main 
mandates of the Act are therefore to enhance the auditing quality and 
independence, and at the same time to increase management legal liabilities with 
respect to financial reporting and conducts.  
As the introduction of the Act imposed substantial additional costs to both 
publicly listed firms (Carney, 2006) and companies in the process of going public 
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(Johnston and Madura, 2009), there has been an ongoing debate with regards to its 
effectiveness in recent years. In fact, evidence on the effect of SOX is 
controversial (Litvak, 2007; Coates, 2007; DeFond et al., 2005). One of the 
suggested impacts of the Act is a reduction in information asymmetry and its 
effects on the initial returns of new issuers in the US markets. Kaserer et al. 
(2008) conduct an empirical investigation into the effect of the SOX on 
underpricing of domestic IPOs in the US between 1990 and 2007. They find that 
in the post-SOX period, underpricing has decreased by about 5% compared with 
the pre-SOX period. They argue that most of the decrease can be explained by the 
reduction in the offer price adjustment that is taking place in the book-building 
process. The authors regard the decrease in underpricing as a direct evidence for 
reduction in information asymmetry in the post-SOX period. In addition, Johnston 
and Madura (2009) postulate that SOX affects the transparency of companies in 
the process of going public and therefore should have an impact on underpricing 
of IPOs. Thus, underpricing is assumed to be positively correlated to the level of 
asymmetric information (e.g., Baron, 1982; Loughran and Ritter, 2002, Ritter, 
2011).   
While the debate on the effectiveness of SOX has attracted a great deal of 
attention in literature ever since its enactment, it is of great interest to 
practitioners, policy-makers and regulators. Some argue that the substantial costs 
of the Act outweigh its benefits (Ribstein, 2002; Romano, 2005). This, together 
with the growing concern of a decline in the competitiveness of the US capital 
markets as a result of SOX, make the academic focus on the effects of the Act on 
issues such as underpricing of foreign IPOs very motivating and important for all 
parties involved. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to determine the effect of 
SOX information asymmetry of foreign IPOs in the US using underpricing as a 
proxy. To achieve this, a comparison of the level of underpricing for foreign IPOs 
in the US before and after the introduction of SOX is conducted.  
The first hypothesis is that foreign IPOs from strong legal institutions at 
their country of origin experience less underpricing relative to those who come 
from weak home legal institutions. The second hypothesis of this paper is that 
SOX has reduced the level of asymmetric information between the issuer and 
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investors not only for domestic US companies as shown in prior research, but for 
foreign IPOs by affecting their specific characteristics. Consequently, the level of 
underpricing is expected to be lower in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX. 
The third hypothesis focuses both on the country of origin of the issuers and SOX. 
It suggests a reduction in underpricing following SOX for IPOs from both strong 
and weak home legal institutions, with a greater magnitude for the latter set of 
firms. However, there is no clear expected direction for this effect.     
4.3 Research Design 
Underpricing is a commonly incorporated proxy for information asymmetry 
and commonly measured by the first day return on initial public offerings i.e. the 
percentage difference between the offer price and closing stock price at the first 
day of trading (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). The level of underpricing may be 
affected by a number of factors in relation to the offering firm, industry affiliation 
and market characteristics.  
I first study how differences between institutional environments in the 
country of firm origin are shown by the extent of underpricing and whether this 
relation had changed as a result of the structural adjustments following the 
enactment of SOX. To investigate this association, I employ two measurements 
which utilize widely recognized indices quantifying the rule of law, the protection 
of minority investors, and capital market characteristics of the home country 
institutions.  
The first measurement follows Bruno and Claessens (2007) and Durnev and 
Kim (2005). I construct an index for strength home country institutions by taking 
the product the La Porta et al.’s (1998) index of anti-director rights, (as adjusted 
by Spamann (2010)43) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Law and 
Order index. The anti-director rights index covers aspects of de-jure regulation by 
capturing six sub-indices indicating “the possibility of voting by mail and of 
depositing shares, aspects of cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre-emptive 
rights and the percentage of share capital to call a meeting” (Bruno and Claessens, 
                                                 
43
 Spamman (2010) shows that his revised index markedly differs from both La Porta et al.’s (1998) 
original index, as well as its later revision that is provided in Djankov et al. (2008).  
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2007, p. 15). On the other hand, the Law and Order index assesses the de-facto 
law and order traditions of a country as well as the legal system. I match the 
country and year specific scores with the year of the IPO. Thus, taken together, 
the first measurement for institutional environment used in this paper combines 
both de-jure and de-facto aspects of investor protection (Durnev and Kim, 2005; 
and Bruno and Claessens, 2007). Consistent with earlier studies, the sample is 
subsequently divided into above (below) the median groups and thus high (low) 
minority investor protection (Leuz et al. 2010 and Pinkowitz et al. 2006). 
To test whether there is a difference in underpricing levels between firms 
from different institutional environment before and after SOX, I start by 
estimating the following regression model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i
UP INST SOX AUD UW HOT
INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE
            
                 (4.1) 
 
Where UP i is a measure of underpricing level defined as the percentage 
difference between the offer price and closing stock price at the first day of 
trading. The variable INSTi indicates the institutional setting of the home country. 
SOXi serves as an indicator to pre- (post-) SOX listing and thus captures the effect 
of the Act. AUDi indicates the prestige of the auditors. Johnston and Madura 
(2009) argue that the high prestige auditor certification lowers IPOs’ initial 
returns and therefore that high quality auditors are associated with lower risk 
IPOs. UWi ranks the offering’s leading underwriter’s prestige which is obtained 
from Jar Ritter’s website. Underwriter prestige has been documented to have a 
positive impact on reducing information asymmetry in IPOs and even more 
specifically on underpricing (Balvers et al., 1988). The rationale behind this is that 
managers are willing to leave ‘money on the table’ in order to attract a prestigious 
underwriter with a highly influential analyst. This assures additional 
compensation for the underwriter in additional to the fixed fees as well as serving 
as an insurance instrument for underwriters against asymmetric information 
(Beatty and Welch, 1996). In contrast, Ritter (2011) argues that the stronger the 
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underwriter, the more the likelihood of them having an increased control over the 
level of the offer price. This compounded with the incentives to capture higher 
percentages of the “money left on the table” would lead to increased levels of 
underpricing. HOTi controls for potential autocorrelation between IPOs returns 
taking place in specific periods in which markets look favorably on IPOs. It 
captures the lagged return on the market index in the 30 trading days prior to listing. 
Typically, firms are more likely to list their shares during such periods due to a 
momentum of relative ease in placing shares (Johnston and Madura, 2009; 
Bradley and Jordan, 2002). INSIDERi measures the ratio of primary shares 
retained by insiders to all shares outstanding after offer (Kaserer et al., 2011; 
Johnston and Madura, 2009). Inside ownership has been found to be positively 
correlated with underpricing as management will be more willing to leave money 
on the table if it retains a high proportion of the equity. This is explained by the 
lockup period that suggest that benefits from underpricing such as media coverage 
can yield higher price at the end of the lockup periods and therefore in alignment 
with the interests of the firms insiders (Aggarwal et al., 2002). AGEi controls for 
the number of days between the firm establishment dates and the IPO date (Daily 
et al., 2005). The age of the firm is expected to increase the amount (and perhaps 
the quality) of information available to market participants, thus reducing the risk 
arising out of any uncertainty associated with the issue (Johnston and Madura, 
2009). HITECHi is an indicator for a high-tech industry membership as this 
industry is characterized by high information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2001) and 
may also be particularly exposed to litigations risk (Johnson et al., 2001). 
PROCEEDSi measures the gross proceeds on the issue. Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) argue for a positive relationship between offering size and market scrutiny. 
Also, a large offering is expected to experience a higher demand on the initial day 
of the offering. ASSETSi controls for the firm’s size and is defined as the logarithm 
of assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the issuing (Loughran and Ritter, 
2004). SALESi is defined as the log of sales at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
the issuing and is commonly used as a measure of risk compositing (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004). LEVi is measured by total debt over total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the issuing. It has been documented to have negative relation 
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between leverage and underpricing due to its monitoring role (Jensen, 1986; 
Leone et al., 2007). BUBBLEi controls for the abnormal returns documented 
during the internet bubble period (Ritter, 2011). A more detailed description of 
these variables is presented in Appendix 4.A.  
In the regression Model 4.1, the coefficient on INST captures the 
incremental effect of the strength of home institutions on the intercept. For 
example, a positive sign implies that new issuers coming from strong institutional 
environments experience higher underpricing relative to IPOs from countries with 
weak institutions. However, if by listing in the US firms circumvent the influence 
of their home institutions regardless of their strength, the coefficient on INST is 
not expected to be statistically significant. In addition, in regression Model 4.1, a 
positive (negative) statistically significant coefficient on any of the vector 
variables implies a positive (negative) relation to underpricing.  
One limitation of Model 4.1 is that it assumes that all the coefficients apart 
from INST are the same for foreign IPOs from both weak and strong legal 
environments. However, these issuers may be different according to their country 
of origin. In such cases, the restriction may not be economically justified. In order 
to test for differences between first time issues with respect to their institutional 
environment of the country of origin, I run Model 4.1 separately for the two 
subsamples and report the differences in the coefficients using interactions of 
INST with all of the vector variables. To the extent that underpricing is not 
affected by the IPOs home environment when listing in the US, the results for the 
two subsamples should not differ.  
Finally, to test for the effects of SOX on underpricing, I run Model 4.1 
separately for the pre- and post- SOX subsamples and report the differences in the 
coefficients using interactions of SOX with all of the explanatory variables. To the 
extent that SOX has no impact on underpricing in the case of foreign IPOs in the 
US, the results for the two subsamples should not differ.  
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4.4 Data, Sample Selection  
There are numerous challenges in the suggested sample selection process. 
First, all foreign firms that made their initial public offering to the US between 
1990 and 2009 are to be identified. According to the Security Data Corporation 
(SDC) New Issues database classification, foreign firms are firms that were 
incorporated and whose primary executive offices are located outside of the US.  
Second, consistent with Bruner et al. (2006) the sample excludes equity 
listing that originated from spin-offs from publically-listed companies or from 
mergers and acquisitions. The sample selection eliminates any warrants, units and 
rights offerings. In addition, I exclude IPOs from financial institutions (4-digit 
SIC codes 6000-6999) and public utilities (4-digit SIC codes 4900-4949) due to 
the different structure of their financial statements and the different regulatory 
environments they operate in. Furthermore, firms that are based in the Bahamas, 
the Cayman Islands, and Bermuda were also removed from the selected sample. 
This is due to the fact that these companies are typically US or European firms 
within the financial services industry that are registered in these geographical 
locations for tax purposes and although they comply with the definition of foreign 
companies, they do not correspond to the conceptual framework of this research.  
Third, IPO prospectuses are used to obtain the accounting and corporate 
governance variables needed for the empirical investigation. The primary sources 
for the prospectuses are the Edgar database provided by the SEC and the Perfect 
Filing database. Fourth, I obtain issue data manually from the prospectuses when 
non-U.S dollar figures are transformed to US dollar figures based on the exchange 
rates disclosed in prospectuses. Thereafter I index the US figures to 2005 US 
value based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund44. Fifth, I obtain data on the NASDAQ value weighted index from 
Bloomberg. Finally, I compute the first day return or underpricing by deducting 
the offer price collected from the prospectuses from the first stock closing price 
reported by the CRSP database after the IPO (Carter et al., 1998) where this is not 
more than two days following the offering. I also match the figure reported by 
                                                 
44
 Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#data on April 2011 
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CRSP reported figure with that reported by SDC Platinum, and when the two do 
not match these were crossed checked with other public sources to obtain the most 
accurate first day closing price.   
As reported in Panel A of Table 4.1, the final IPO sample comprises 320 
listings. Panel B presents the industry composition of the sample according to the 
Fama-French (FF) 12-industry classification. This Panel shows that the largest 
group of IPOs in the sample is in the Business Equipment industry (FF6), 
followed by the Telephone and Television Transmission (FF7), and 
Manufacturing (FF3). Out of the overall sample, 215 are pre-SOX issues and 105 
are post-SOX. 
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports the distributions of IPOs according the country 
of origin in each four year window between 1990 and 2009. Consistent with other 
studies on foreign issuers in the US, the largest number of IPOs is from China 
(61), followed by Israel (54) and UK (31). Most of the IPOs come from the years 
before 2001, reflecting the burst of internet and dot.com bubble of 2001 and its 
effect on the high-tech sector which generates many IPOs (about 30% of the total 
sample).  
Table 4.2 reports the Pearson’s’ pair-wise correlation coefficients of the 
variables contained in Model 4.1 as well as the ones used for the sensitivity 
analysis in subsection 4.3. There is no significant correlation between UP  and 
INST, suggesting no effect of home institutions on underpricing in the univariate 
analysis. In contrast, SOX, AGE and ASSETS are negatively correlated with 
underpricing in this table. Finally, HOT and BUBBLE are positively correlated 
with underpricing. In the next section, I examine the effect of the above 
mentioned factors on underpricing with both with respect to home institutions and 
the enactment of SOX.   
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Development  
 Number of Firms 
 
All SDC Platinum new US Foreign listings in years 1990-2009 677 
Excluding observations: 
 
For which prospectus not available  196 
With offering other than common/ordinary stock 118 
For financial services firms and utilities 17 
With insufficient financial data necessary for our analyses 16 
  
Final Sample 320 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Selection by Industry Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total 
FF1 Consumer Non-Durables 9 2 11 
FF2 Consumer Durables 5 1 6 
FF3 Manufacturing 20 4 24 
FF4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 3 1 4 
FF5 Chemicals and Allied Products 5 2 7 
FF6 Business Equipment 88 43 131 
FF7 Telephone and Television Transmission 37 9 46 
FF8 Utilities - - - 
FF9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 5 3 8 
FF10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 14 13 27 
FF11 Finance - - - 
FF12 Other 29 27 56 
    
 
Total 
 
215 105 320 
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Panel C: Country of Origin by Period 
Country 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 Total 
Argentina 0 0 2 0 1 3 
Austria 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Australia 0 3 0 0 0 2 
Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Canada 0 8 14 3 4 29 
Chile 1 2 0 0 0 3 
China 0 1 5 15 40 61 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 1 0 0 0 1 
France 1 6 5 0 0 11 
Germany 0 3 4 0 0 7 
Greece 0 0 3 5 5 13 
Hong-Kong 1 8 4 3 1 17 
Indonesia 0 1 0 0 0 1 
India 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Ireland 0 2 4 0 2 8 
Israel 3 21 17 5 8 54 
Italy 1 3 1 1 0 6 
Japan 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Jordan 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Luxemburg 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Mexico 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 1 13 9 0 2 24 
New-Zealand 1 3 0 0 0 4 
Norway 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Poland 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Singapore 0 2 2 0 2 6 
South-Africa 0 0 0 1 0 1 
South-Korea 0 1 3 3 1 8 
Spain 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Sweden 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Switzerland 0 3 4 1 0 7 
Taiwan 0 0 1 1 1 3 
UK 0 18 11 2 0 31 
Total 13 107 96 41 67 320 
Note: The table presents the sample selection process (Panel A), composition by industry (Panel B), and 
composition by country and period industry (Panel C). 
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Table 4.2: Selected Correlations 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 
Panel A: Main Analysis                       
1 UP                         
2 INST 0.04                        
3 SOX -0.14 -0.37                       
4 AUD -0.04 0.01 0.12                      
5 UW -0.03 0.06 0.09 0.48                     
6 HOT 0.28 0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.15                    
7 INSIDER 0.10 -0.15 0.09 0.00 0.06 -0.04                   
8 AGE -0.12 0.10 -0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.13                  
9 HITECH 0.10 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.22 -0.24                 
10 PROCEEDS 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.59 -0.10 -0.08 0.11 0.07                
11 ASSETS -0.13 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.33 -0.12 -0.02 0.38 -0.11 0.74               
12 SALES -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.41 -0.06 0.50 0.71              
13 LEV -0.07 0.12 -0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.11             
14 BUBBLE 0.32 0.07 -0.37 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.11 -0.23 0.15 0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.04            
 Panel B: Additional Analysis 
                   
 
 
15 UP_ADJ 1.00 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 0.27 0.10 -0.13 0.11 0.02 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 0.32           
16 UP_3 0.87 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.24 0.10 -0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.24 0.87          
17 INST_L 0.06 0.21 -0.27 -0.15 -0.23 0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.20 -0.30 -0.32 -0.29 -0.01 0.13 0.06 -0.02         
18 INST_EU -0.01 0.74 -0.40 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.20 0.21 -0.09 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.09 -0.01 -0.09 0.18        
19 CHINA -0.01 -0.43 0.62 0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.14 -0.23 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.18 -0.19 -0.01 0.07 -0.49 -0.49       
20 NYSE -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.17 0.23 -0.09 -0.06 0.32 -0.26 0.52 0.62 0.48 0.06 -0.23 -0.08 -0.02 -0.30 0.00 0.12      
21 AMEX 0.04 -0.06 0.07 -0.19 -0.37 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.29 -0.13 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.11     
22 NASDAQ 0.06 0.07 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.31 0.29 -0.40 -0.56 -0.44 -0.07 0.24 0.07 -0.02 0.29 0.00 -0.14 -0.94 -0.24    
23 PREMIUM 0.19 -0.08 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.30 -0.33 0.19 -0.08 -0.36 -0.23 -0.10 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.09 -0.17 0.33 -0.21 -0.03 0.22   
24 CONSRV -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.03  
25 UP_US 0.36 0.16 -0.42 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.05 -0.24 0.32 0.05 -0.17 -0.09 -0.04 0.83 0.36 0.27 0.20 0.12 -0.21 -0.22 -0.07 0.24 0.03 0.10 
Note: Table 4.2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for variables used in the main analysis (Panel A) and in the additional analysis (Panel B). Correlations above 0.11 and below -0.11 
are significant at the 0.05 level. See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
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4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The section presents the findings of the empirical investigations described 
above. The results are sub-divided into the findings from the univariate analysis 
which is used for indicative purposes, followed by the primary regression analysis 
with subsequent variations and interaction terms. Thereafter, the results conclude 
with additional analyses aimed at strengthening the primary findings.  
4.5.1  Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Panel A presents summary statistics for each variable in the pooled 
sample. As is evident from this panel, about 32.8% of the observations are post-
SOX, insiders retain about 71.5% of the shares, there are about 52.8% firm with 
high-tech industry membership, and 23.4% of the IPOs took place during the 
internet bubble period. In addition, the sample is divided into two groups: 
underpricing (UP>0) and overpricing (UP<0) with 210 and 75 firms respectively. 
Furthermore, I indicate the results of univariate tests on the difference in means (t-
test) and medians (Wilcoxon rank-test). The mean of SOX changes from 0.290 to 
0.493 (significant at 0.10 level) suggesting that more of the overpriced IPOs occur 
in the post-SOX era. The mean (median) of HOT decreases from 0.030 (0.029) to 
0.006 (0.010) when comparing between underpriced and overpriced subsamples 
(significant at 0.05 level)45 indicating that underpriced IPOs are more frequent in 
hot issue markets; when market returns are high in the month preceding the 
offering. The mean of INSIDER decreases from 0.724 to 0.693 (significant at 0.10 
level) suggesting that underpriced IPOs tend to leave a larger percentage of the 
equity with inside investors.  
Panel B presents summary statistics for each of model variables in both the 
pre- and post-SOX periods. I show the results of univariate tests on the difference 
in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon rank-test). The mean (median) level of 
underpricing (UP) significantly decreases from 0.238 (0.086) in the pre-SOX 
                                                 
45
 For the remaining of the study, significant refers to =0.05 unless expressly stated.  
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period to 0.139 (0.028) in the post-SOX period. Likewise, there are more IPOs 
coming from weak institutional environments after the enactment of SOX as 
evident from the significant decrease of the mean and median of INST. Also, there 
is a significant decline in the mean and median of AGE between the pre- and post- 
SOX periods.      
Panel B also presents summary statistics for each of model variables in the 
strong and weak home country institutions subsamples. As before, I show the 
results of univariate tests on the difference in means (t-test) and medians 
(Wilcoxon rank-test). The mean (median) of SOX show significant differences 
between the weak and strong subsamples suggesting different allocation in issuing 
in the US between periods. This implies that companies from weak institutional 
environments are almost equally likely to list in the pre- or post- SOX periods, 
whilst IPOs from companies from strong institutional environments are more 
likely to list in the pre-SOX era. Weak is almost evenly allocated but Strong falls 
sharply after SOX. The mean of INSIDER decreases from 0.708 to 0.693 
(significant at 0.10 level) suggesting that offerings in the strong institutional 
environment subsample leave a smaller percentage of equity for insiders. In 
addition, IPOs from weak institutional environments seem to be longer 
established and larger in size as indicated but the significant increase in mean for 
AGE and ASSETS, respectively. Furthermore, IPOs from companies from stronger 
institutional environments are significantly larger in size as demonstrated by the 
higher mean and median of PROCEEDS. The next section reports and discusses 
the results obtained in the pooled cross-sectional regression analysis. 
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Table 4.3: Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and Overpricing/Underpricing Subsamples 
Full Sample 
N=320 
 Underpricing (UP) 
Variable  Underpricing (UP>0) N=210  Overpricing (UP<0) N=75 
Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Main Analysis             
UP 0.206 0.382 0.000 0.053 0.256  0.338 0.411 0.063 0.187 0.429  -0.070*** 0.060 -0.094 -0.056*** -0.021 
INST 0.431 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.414 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.387 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SOX 0.328 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.290 0.455 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.493*** 0.503 0.000 0.000*** 1.000 
AUD 0.872 0.335 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.871 0.336 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.893 0.311 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UW 7.823 2.123 8.000 9.000 9.000  7.733 2.250 8.000 9.000 9.000  7.967 1.950 8.000 9.000 9.000 
HOT 0.022 0.078 -0.025 0.020 0.065  0.030 0.082 -0.018 0.029 0.076  0.006** 0.075 -0.038 0.010** 0.049 
INSIDER 0.715 0.156 0.683 0.752 0.801  0.724 0.141 0.686 0.755 0.801  0.693 0.180 0.667 0.750 0.799 
AGE 2.341 0.931 1.705 2.197 2.773  2.340 0.927 1.735 2.197 2.773  2.297 0.949 1.609 2.179 2.708 
HITECH 0.528 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.529 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.493 0.503 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PROCEEDS 18.489 1.436 17.746 18.463 19.240  18.500 1.487 17.819 18.490 19.271  18.636 1.462 17.706 18.569 19.521 
ASSETS 18.181 2.227 16.728 17.798 19.581  18.126 2.209 16.736 17.656 19.428  18.410 2.417 16.724 17.997 19.728 
SALES 17.430 3.613 16.470 17.621 18.911  17.359 3.579 16.469 17.579 18.875  17.629 3.877 16.394 17.422 19.270 
LEV 0.336 0.386 0.035 0.222 0.514  0.338 0.389 0.034 0.231 0.519  0.342 0.406 0.059 0.194 0.499 
BUBBLE 0.234 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.243 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.227 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Additional Analysis             
UP_ADJ 0.206 0.384 -0.010 0.056 0.280  0.339 0.414 0.059 0.186 0.444  -0.068*** 0.068 -0.093 -0.054*** -0.025 
UP_3 0.194 0.404 -0.009 0.049 0.250  0.324 0.444 0.048 0.155 0.400  -0.076*** 0.079 -0.122 -0.054*** -0.013 
INST_L 0.494 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.495 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.467 0.502 0.000 0.000 1.000 
INST_EU 83.968 12.583 72.600 85.600 96.900  83.615 13.091 72.600 85.600 96.900  83.864 11.245 72.600 84.300 96.900 
CHINA 0.188 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.190 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.200 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NYSE 0.288 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.286 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.293 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AMEX 0.031 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.038 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.027 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NASDAQ 0.681 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.676 0.469 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.680 0.470 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PREMIUM 0.921 0.054 0.900 0.932 0.950  0.921 0.060 0.909 0.934 0.952  0.927 0.039 0.900 0.929 0.948 
CONSRV -0.111 0.848 -0.299 -0.120 0.044  -0.106 0.912 -0.311 -0.130 0.049  -0.100 0.798 -0.321 -0.108 0.052 
UP_US 0.247 0.193 0.103 0.196 0.319  0.261 0.201 0.107 0.210 0.372  0.201* 0.158 0.075 0.164* 0.278 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Post/Pre-SOX and Strong/Weak Institutional Environments 
(1) effects of SOX  (2) effects of home institutions (INST) 
Variable Pre-SOX N=215  Post-SOX N=105  Weak N=182  Strong N=138 
Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Main Analysis                   
UP 0.238 0.417 0.000 0.086 0.293  0.139** 0.289 -0.025 0.028** 0.187  0.190 0.360 0.000 0.059 0.250  0.226 0.410 0.000 0.048 0.293 
INST 0.553 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.181*** 0.387 0.000 0.000*** 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.000*** 0.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
SOX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.000*** 0.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000  0.473 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.138*** 0.346 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
AUD 0.851 0.357 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.914 0.281 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.863 0.345 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.884 0.321 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UW 7.760 2.147 8.000 9.000 9.000  7.952 2.077 8.000 9.000* 9.000  7.682 2.236 8.000 9.000 9.000  8.010 1.956 8.000 9.000 9.000 
HOT 0.025 0.090 -0.030 0.019 0.091  0.017 0.047 -0.014 0.021 0.050  0.021 0.078 -0.025 0.020 0.067  0.023 0.080 -0.022 0.020 0.064 
INSIDER 0.708 0.161 0.667 0.754 0.803  0.728 0.143 0.693 0.750 0.793  0.730 0.136 0.692 0.756 0.800  0.694** 0.177 0.645 0.743 0.803 
AGE 2.451 0.984 1.768 2.234 2.944  2.115*** 0.769 1.705 2.079** 2.565  2.262 0.889 1.609 2.197 2.708  2.444* 0.978 1.792 2.268 2.890 
HITECH 0.544 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.495 0.502 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.516 0.501 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.543 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PROCEEDS 18.502 1.528 17.617 18.372 19.418  18.461 1.232 18.069 18.507 19.082  18.349 1.453 17.630 18.324 19.008  18.673** 1.398 17.894 18.592** 19.557 
ASSETS 18.149 2.470 16.526 17.548 19.782  18.247 1.629 17.194 17.989 18.928  18.001 2.118 16.683 17.668 19.163  18.418* 2.350 16.769 18.329 20.016 
SALES 17.516 3.559 16.087 17.517 19.095  17.254 3.732 16.918 17.733 18.553  17.321 3.574 16.469 17.442 18.707  17.574 3.672 16.471 17.775 19.227 
LEV 0.367 0.408 0.049 0.258 0.558  0.271** 0.328 0.021 0.164 0.421  0.306 0.352 0.021 0.195 0.463  0.376 0.424 0.053 0.248 0.567 
BUBBLE 0.349 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000  0.203 0.404 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.275 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Additional Analysis                   
UP_ADJ 0.239 0.419 0.003 0.084 0.293  0.140** 0.289 -0.028 0.023** 0.192  0.191 0.359 -0.005 0.059 0.263  0.227 0.415 -0.011 0.049 0.293 
UP_3 0.209 0.409 0.000 0.063 0.262  0.165 0.394 -0.029 0.023 0.216  0.196 0.426 -0.013 0.043 0.243  0.192 0.376 -0.001 0.053 0.250 
INST_L 0.581 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.314*** 0.466 0.000 0.000*** 1.000  0.412 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.601*** 0.491 0.000 1.000*** 1.000 
INST_EU 87.333 12.454 72.600 95.200 96.900  76.97*** 9.666 71.500 71.50*** 79.600  75.842 10.266 71.500 72.600 79.600  94.88*** 4.625 95.200 96.90*** 97.100 
CHINA 0.028 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.514*** 0.502 0.000 1.000*** 1.000  0.330 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
NYSE 0.251 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.362** 0.483 0.000 0.000** 1.000  0.302 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.268 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AMEX 0.019 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.057* 0.233 0.000 0.000* 0.000  0.038 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.022 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NASDAQ 0.730 0.445 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.581*** 0.496 0.000 1.000*** 1.000  0.659 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.710 0.455 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PREMIUM 0.927 0.054 0.906 0.934 0.958  0.911** 0.053 0.900 0.929*** 0.939  0.916 0.054 0.899 0.928 0.944  0.929** 0.053 0.913 0.938*** 0.956 
CONSRV -0.116 0.887 -0.321 -0.127 0.049  -0.101 0.764 -0.281 -0.095 0.041  -0.100 0.792 -0.290 -0.111 0.042  -0.126 0.919 -0.326 -0.126 0.058 
UP_US 0.304 0.208 0.118 0.269 0.453  0.131*** 0.073 0.066 0.117*** 0.208  0.218 0.177 0.088 0.171 0.269  0.284*** 0.208 0.107 0.219*** 0.441 
Note: Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as for distinguishing between overpricing (UP> 0) and underpricing (UP< 0) as shown in Panel A. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for 
Pre- and Post- SOX and between strong home legal institutions (INST = 1) and weak home legal institutions (INST = 0). Panel A and B also report the results of tests for the differences in the means and medians (the 
latter using Wilcoxon rank-test) under the Weak Home Institutions block. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
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4.5.2  Regression Analysis 
As stated in Section 4.3, a limitation of Model 4.1 is that it uses only 
indicators for INST and SOX and therefore assumes that all coefficients apart from 
INST are the same for foreign IPOs from both weak and strong legal 
environments. This may not be true if these IPOs are affected differently by some 
of the factors as the univariate analysis in subsection 4.1 suggests. Table 4.4 
presents the results for estimating Model 4.1 separately for the two strong and 
weak institutions subsamples and reports the differences in the coefficients using 
interactions of INST with all of the variables (denoted as Model 4.1.a with the full 
model specifications presented in the notes of Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 is separated into three columns; the first two columns on left hand 
side show the results for Model 4.1 (excluding the INST variable) estimated for 
subsamples from strong and weak institutional environments respectively. The 
third column to the left reports the coefficients for the interactions terms from 
model 1.a. Thus, the reported coefficients are the differences between the 
coefficients observed in the strong and weak subsamples, except for INST which 
is the difference between the intercepts of the strong and weak home institutions 
regressions. The INST coefficient for the difference between the subsample is 
negative and significant. This indicates lower underpricing on average in IPOs 
from companies with stronger home country institutions. HOT is positive and 
significant for the two subsamples with no evidence of a significant difference. 
This is in line with Loughran and Ritter (2002) who argue that the positive 
relation between underpricing and higher market return in the month preceding 
the IPO is due to an increase in the anticipated wealth by the issuers that lowers 
their incentives to bargain hard for an offer price increase which should be 
relatively unaffected by the country of origin of the listing company. The age of 
the company (AGE) has the opposite effect on underpricing between the two 
groups. There is evidence for a higher underpricing for more mature firms from 
strong legal environments and a negative relation between AGE and underpricing 
for the IPOs coming from weaker environment. Also, the difference is positive 
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and significant suggesting different motivations for underpricing for the two types 
of firms; i.e. younger firms have more information asymmetry and so tend to 
underprice the IPO more to compensate investors for the risk (Johnson and 
Madura, 2009; Daily et al., 2005), while mature firms from countries with strong 
legal institutions underpricing may desire the higher press visibility that comes 
from first-day returns or simply have more money to leave on the table (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002).  
Findings from the examination of firm specific control variables show that 
the positive association between offer’s size (PROCEEDS) and the level of 
underpricing (UP) as well as the negative relation between firm size (ASSETS) 
and sales to the level of underpricing are likely to be phenomena of IPOs from 
strong institutional backgrounds. No statistically significant effects are observed 
for IPOs coming from weak institutions. In the case of SALES, findings show 
opposite effects on both subgroups with positive (negative) association for firms 
coming from strong (weak) institutional environments (significant at 0.10 level). 
Negative relation between sales and underpricing is a well-documented 
phenomenon in IPOs (Brennan and Franks, 1997) and the difference between the 
two groups of firms suggests that investors consider firms that are coming from 
countries with strong legal institutions closer to domestic US firms relative to 
IPOs from environments with weak legal institutions. Leverage and association 
with the high-tech industry are significant for strong legal institution firms but do 
not show a significant difference between the two subsamples. Also, BUBBLE is 
significantly positive and different between the two subgroups.   
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Table 4.4: Underpricing Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
 Underpricing (UP) 
 Strong Weak Difference  
INTERCEPT -1.416*** -0.143   
 (0.001) (0.805)   
INST 
  -1.273**  
 
  (0.024)  
SOX -0.065 -0.047 -0.018  
 (0.308) (0.190) (0.826)  
AUD 0.033 -0.059 0.091  
 (0.681) (0.388) (0.358)  
UW -0.031 -0.021 -0.010  
 (0.262) (0.128) (0.786)  
HOT 1.685*** 1.135*** 0.549  
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.231)  
INSIDER 0.138 0.683** -0.546  
 (0.595) (0.047) (0.169)  
AGE 0.076** -0.079** 0.155***  
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.004)  
HITECH 0.059* -0.009 0.068  
 (0.092) (0.896) (0.408)  
PROCEEDS 0.153*** 0.017 0.136***  
 (0.000) (0.611) (0.002)  
ASSETS -0.051*** -0.014 -0.037*  
 (0.000) (0.343) (0.094)  
SALES -0.023* 0.010* -0.033**  
 (0.072) (0.081) (0.021)  
LEV -0.175*** -0.060 -0.115  
 (0.002) (0.163) (0.163)  
BUBBLE 0.255*** 0.112 0.142**  
 (0.000) (0.125) (0.044)  
N 138 182 320  
Adj R2 0.233 0.189 0.211  
Notes: 
1. Table 4.4 presents results of the regression model of underpricing (UP) separately for the strong 
home institutions subsample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions subsample (the 
Weak column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two subsample 
coefficients using the interactions model described below. I report p-values below the estimated 
coefficients. *,**,***  denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, 
respectively. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters 
using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The regression model encompasses model 4.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with INST is: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
* * *
* * * *
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i i i
UP INST SOX AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE INST SOX INST AUD INST UW
INST HOT INST INSIDER INST AGE INST H
                  
                   8
9 10 11 12
*
* * * *
i i
i i i i i
ITECH INST SIZE
INST ASSETS INST SALES INST LEV INST BUBBLE
        
  (4.1.a) 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,12} coefficients, their p-values as 
well as the adjusted R2 for this regression. 
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In Table 4.5 I repeat the analysis in Model 4.1 separately for the pre- and 
post-SOX subsamples and report the differences in the coefficients using 
interactions of SOX with all of the variables (denoted as Model 4.1.b with the full 
model specifications presented in the notes of Table 4.5). As with Table 4.4, 
Table 4.5 is separated into three columns; the first two left hand-side columns 
show the results for Model 4.1 (excluding SOX variable) for the pre-SOX and 
post-SOX subsamples respectively while the third column to the left reports the 
coefficients for the interaction terms in model 1.b. Thus, the reported coefficients 
are the difference between the coefficients observed in the two periods’ 
subsamples except for SOX which is the difference between the intercepts. The 
SOX coefficient is positive but insignificant. This indicates that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the level of underpricing as a result of the 
enactment of SOX. This evidence rejects the hypothesis that there has been a 
reduction in underpricing resulting from the assumed better information 
environment post SOX. When looking at the univariate results with relation to 
SOX, the clear difference in the level of underpricing (UP) between the two 
periods becomes insignificant in the multivariate analysis due to the difference in 
explanatory variables between the two periods. Consistent with Johnson and 
Madura (2009), reputable auditors are constraining underpricing more in the post-
SOX period with a significantly negative coefficient on difference. Also, the 
relation between HOT and UP  is significantly lower though still positive in the 
post-SOX period. INSIDER and AGE have positive and negative effects 
respectively only in the post-SOX period, whilst HITECH, PROCEEDS, ASSETS 
and LEV are only statistically significant variables in the pre-SOX period. Finally, 
the dot-com bubble (BUBBLE) is a statistically significant factor in the level of 
underpricing in the pre-SOX era.  
The overall findings for underpricing in IPOs are mixed in relation to the 
hypothesizes postulated in this paper. IPOs of companies that come from home 
countries with strong institutional environments at their home country experience 
lower underpricing on average than those which come from a countries with 
weaker institutional environments. However, these findings do not support the 
hypothesis that there has been a change in the level of underpricing as a result of 
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an improvement in the informational environment following SOX. First, both the 
strong and weak home institution subgroups do not show a statistically significant 
change in levels of underpricing as a result of SOX. Second, when splitting the 
sample to pre- and post- SOX periods, there is no significant difference in the 
magnitude of intercepts.  The next subsection presents additional analyses and 
sensitivity tests to further strengthen the findings.  
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Table 4.5: Underpricing Analyzed between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods 
 Underpricing (UP) 
 Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 0.527 -0.750  
 (0.378) (0.170)  
SOX 
  1.276 
 
  (0.108) 
INST 0.017 0.038 -0.021 
 (0.803) (0.307) (0.786) 
AUD -0.318* 0.059 -0.377** 
 (0.064) (0.437) (0.037) 
UW -0.029 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.165) (0.244) (0.540) 
HOT 0.632** 1.416*** -0.784* 
 (0.049) (0.005) (0.067) 
INSIDER 0.490*** 0.195 0.296 
 (0.002) (0.437) (0.289) 
AGE -0.042** 0.001 -0.043 
 (0.048) (0.969) (0.237) 
HITECH 0.002 0.053** -0.051 
 (0.978) (0.040) (0.554) 
PROCEEDS 0.004 0.083** -0.078 
 (0.935) (0.038) (0.189) 
ASSETS -0.005 -0.041*** 0.036 
 (0.810) (0.001) (0.134) 
SALES -0.007 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.372) (0.926) (0.469) 
LEV -0.096 -0.131*** 0.035 
 (0.198) (0.000) (0.676) 
BUBBLE 
 0.181***  
 
 (0.000)  
N 105 215 320 
Adj R2 0.248 0.197 0.210 
Notes: 
1. The table presents results of the regression model of underpricing (UP) separately for 
the pre-SOX subsample (the Pre-SOX column) and the post-SOX subsample (the Post-
SOX column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two subsample 
coefficients using the interactions model described below. I report p-values below the 
estimated coefficients. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control for possible correlation of the 
residuals within industry clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See 
Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The model encompasses  Model 4.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with SOX: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
* * *
* * * *
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
UP SOX INST AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE SOX INST SOX AUD SOX UW
SOX HOT SOX INSIDER SOX AGE SOX H
                  
                   8
9 10 11 12
*
* * * *
i i i
i i i i i i i i i
ITECH SOX SIZE
SOX ASSETS SOX SALES SOX LEV SOX BUBBLE
        
   (4.1.b) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,12} coefficients, 
their p-values as well as the adjusted R2 for this regression. 
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4.6  Additional Analysis 
In order to augment my primary findings, additional analysis of the data has 
been carried out as discussed below.  
4.6.1 Investors’ Premium 
In addition to using the level of underpricing, the literature on IPOs suggests 
using investors’ premium as an alternative measure of initial performance (for 
example, Certo et al., 2003; Welbourne and Andrews, 1996; Aerts and Cheng, 
2012; Lester et al., 2006). This captures the excess value that investors place on 
firm’s net assets. The investors’ premium is most commonly calculated as the IPO 
offer price per share minus the book value of equity per share after the offering, as 
a portion of the offer price, or: 
 
Investors’ Premium (PREMIUM) = (offer price – book value per share)/offer value 
 (4.2) 
 
 Welbourne and Andrews (1996) argue that the advantage of using this 
measure as opposed to measures that rely on stock price (as is the case with 
underpricing), is that it only takes into account the value of the stock price that is 
above the book value of the firm. They also claim that the investor’s premium 
measure represents a more robust estimate to the perceived value of the firm as 
compared to underpricing alone.  The summary statistics of this alternative 
performance measure are presented in Panel B of Table 4.2. To test the relation 
between investors’ premium and explanatory variables in question, I perform the 
same analysis as described above and presented in Table 4.4 but with PREMIUM 
replacing UP  as the dependent variable in the pooled regression. The coefficients 
of the regressors for each subsample (separately) and the interaction terms of the 
regressors with INST in Model 4.2.a are presented in the motes of Table 4.6.  
The positive and significant coefficient of INST in the interactions 
regression indicates that IPOs of companies from home countries with strong 
institutions are more highly valued by investors. These findings are persistent 
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despite controlling for other factors. Results also show a significant negative 
relation between PREMIUM and SOX for IPOs of companies coming from both 
weak and strong institutional environments. Furthermore, findings show that both 
subsamples experience higher investors’ valuation when the IPO’s underwriter is 
of higher prestige, as found in (Aggrawal et al., 2009), with no significant 
differences between the two. The control variables PROCEEDS and LEV are 
significantly positive and lower in IPOs coming from countries with weak 
institutions in comparison with IPOs from strong ones. These results suggest that 
visibility (as expressed by the offer size) and the indication of quality by the 
leverage provider are read positively by investors in IPOs of companies from 
weak institutional backgrounds. Firm size (ASSETS) is negatively associated with 
PREMIUM in the weak subsample with a positive and significant coefficient of 
the difference. Hence, larger firms from companies from weak institutions enjoy a 
smaller premium relative to firms from countries with stronger institutions.  
In Panel B of Table 4.6 I repeat the analysis in Panel A of Table 4.6 
separately again for the pre- and post-SOX two subsamples and report the 
differences in the coefficients using interactions of SOX with all of the vector 
variables (denoted as Model 4.2.b with the full model specifications presented in 
the notes of Table 4.6). Results show a statistically significant decrease in 
investors’ premium in the post-SOX period. However, there is no significant 
effect of SOX in relation to the institutional environments at the country of origin 
and investors’ premium. AUD is positive in the post-SOX period (significant at 
0.10 level) with a significant and positive coefficient of the difference between the 
two periods. Thus, in line with increased auditor’s enhanced liability after the 
introduction of SOX, investors’ valuation is positively associated with auditors’ 
prestige in the post-SOX period. UW however, is only significant and positive in 
the pre-SOX period when liabilities of auditors and management were relatively 
smaller. This contributes to literature which suggests that underwriters with a 
higher reputation certify the quality of offering to potential investors (for example, 
Helou and Park, 2001), or alternatively reduce the offer price which in turn 
increases the premium (Ritter, 2011). AGE, PROCEEDS, ASSETS and LEV all 
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report differences in the magnitude of association with PREMIUM in both periods 
as expressed by the statistically significant coefficients of differences. 
Finally, I conduct these tests using first day closing price instead of offer 
price to control for potential underpricing (Aerts and Cheng, 2012). The results 
from this analysis are not materially different from those described above and 
therefore have not been reported. 
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Table 4.6: Testing for Investors’ Premium 
Panel A: Underpricing Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries 
 
 Investors’ premium (PREMIUM) 
 Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 0.708*** 0.555***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
INST 
  0.152** 
 
  (0.033) 
SOX -0.018** -0.015*** -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.682) 
AUD 0.002 0.015 -0.013 
 (0.845) (0.261) (0.527) 
UW 0.007** 0.006*** 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.740) 
HOT 0.006 -0.016 0.022 
 (0.942) (0.643) (0.754) 
INSIDER 0.008 -0.026 0.033 
 (0.596) (0.514) (0.448) 
AGE -0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.187) (0.738) (0.354) 
HITECH -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.152) (0.649) (0.312) 
PROCEEDS 0.011 0.022*** -0.012** 
 (0.144) (0.001) (0.013) 
ASSETS -0.000 -0.006** 0.005* 
 (0.900) (0.039) (0.058) 
SALES 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.786) (0.637) (0.885) 
LEV -0.025 0.014** -0.040** 
 (0.139) (0.044) (0.024) 
BUBBLE -0.020** 0.000 -0.020* 
 (0.029) (0.992) (0.057) 
N 135 177 312 
Adj R2 0.183 0.517 0.384 
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Panel B: Underpricing Analyzed between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods 
 Investors’ premium (PREMIUM) 
 Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 0.395*** 0.669***  
 (0.003) (0.000)  
SOX 
  -0.274* 
 
  (0.062) 
INST 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.237) (0.722) (0.815) 
AUD 0.037* 0.004 0.033* 
 (0.082) (0.686) (0.098) 
UW 0.001 0.006*** -0.005 
 (0.618) (0.009) (0.234) 
HOT -0.013 0.004 -0.017 
 (0.779) (0.949) (0.792) 
INSIDER -0.031 0.003 -0.034 
 (0.330) (0.874) (0.462) 
AGE 0.010*** -0.004 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.153) (0.004) 
HITECH -0.002 -0.009* 0.007 
 (0.553) (0.089) (0.157) 
PROCEEDS 0.034*** 0.012** 0.022** 
 (0.003) (0.030) (0.049) 
ASSETS -0.009** 0.000 -0.009** 
 (0.019) (0.945) (0.022) 
SALES 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.207) (0.698) (0.250) 
LEV 0.009* -0.014 0.022* 
 (0.072) (0.232) (0.080) 
BUBBLE 
 -0.011*  
 
 (0.074)  
N 104 208 312 
Adj R2 0.518 0.225 0.391 
Notes: 
 
1. Panel A of Table 4.7 presents results of the regression model of investors’ premium 
(PREMIUM) separately for the strong home institutions subsample (the Strong column) 
and the weak home institutions subsample (the Weak column). The Difference column 
reports the difference between the two subsample coefficients using the interactions model 
described below. I report p-values below the estimated coefficients. *,**,***  denote 
differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All 
regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters using 
Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The regression model encompasses Model 4.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with 
INST is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
* * *
* * *
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i i i
PREMIUM INST SOX AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE INST SOX INST AUD INST UW
INST HOT INST INSIDER INST AGE I
                  
                   8
9 10 11 12
* *
* * * *
i i
i i i i i
NST HITECH INST SIZE
INST ASSETS INST SALES INST LEV INST BUBBLE
        
(4
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The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,12} coefficients, their 
p-values as well as the adjusted R2 for this regression. 
 
3. Panel B of Table 4.7 presents results of the regression model of investors’ premium 
(PREMIUM) separately for the pre-SOX subsample (the Pre-SOX column) and the post-
SOX subsample (the Post-SOX column). The Difference column reports the difference 
between the two subsample coefficients using the interactions model described below. I 
report p-values below the estimated coefficients. *,**,*** denote differences that are 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control for 
possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters using Rogers standard errors 
(Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
 
4. The model encompasses Model 4.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with SOX: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
* * *
* * *
i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
PREMIUM SOX INST AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE SOX INST SOX AUD SOX UW
SOX HOT SOX INSIDER SOX AGE S
                  
                   8
9 10 11 12
* *
* * * *
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
OX HITECH SOX SIZE
SOX ASSETS SOX SALES SOX LEV SOX BUBBLE
        
   (4.2.b) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,12} coefficients, their 
p-values as well as the adjusted R2 for this regression. 
 
4.6.2 Accounting conservatism and underpricing 
In a recent study, Lin and Tian (2012) investigate the relation between 
accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing. They argue that since information 
asymmetry theories are regarded as central to explaining underpricing, the 
recognition criteria of firm’s financial reporting should matter. More specifically, 
they find a negative relation between accounting conservatism and underpricing 
levels which increases with the degree of information asymmetry. In the 
formation of the theoretical framework for a relationship between underpricing 
and conservatism is primarily based on Basu (1997) and Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006). They argue that accounting conservatism implies asymmetry in gains and 
losses recognition where the latter require less verification and thus constrain 
managers from following opportunistic objectives by overstating earnings and 
understating losses. As a result, under conservative accounting information 
asymmetry between issuers and other stakeholders of IPO firms is expected to be 
relatively lower and this should result in lower levels of IPO underpricing (Lin 
and Tian, 2012).   
I test for the potential effect of accounting conservatism on the level of 
underpricing with respect to the country of the origin of the foreign IPOs by 
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introducing the variable CONSRV into the main tests. Following Lin and Tian 
(2012), I use the total accrual-base measure of conservatism which is based on 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) and is calculated as follows: 
 
, , , , , 1( 1)*( ) /i t i t i t i t i tCONSRV NI DEP CFO TA    
 
 
where conservatism (CONSRV) is defined as the firm’s net income before 
extraordinary items (NI) plus depreciation and amortization (DEP) minus 
operating cash flows (CFO) (all at the end of the fiscal year preceding the IPO 
date and multiplied by minus one), divided by the lagged total assets of the firm 
(TAt-1).  
 The univariate analysis presented in Panel B of Table 4.3 show no 
statistical significant differences in means and medians between the pre- and post- 
SOX or the weak and strong legal institutions subsamples. This contradicts to 
other studies that find an increase in the accrual-base measure of conservatism in 
the post-SOX period (Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). This may be 
attributable to other factors in the IPOs going to the US, and therefore should be 
analyzed by allowing for these factors in a multivariate framework. 
The relation between underpricing and accounting conservatism is tested 
after allowing for the factors in question presented in Panel A of Table 4.7. I run 
Model 4.1 (with UP  being the dependent variable) with the inclusion of CONSRV 
(denoted as Model 4.3.a). The full model specification is presented in the notes of 
Table 4.7. I report the differences in the coefficients, using the following methods; 
(a) interactions of INST with all of the variables, and (b) interactions of SOX with 
all the variables. The results regarding the differences between IPOs coming from 
weak and strong legal institution countries remain statistically significant and 
negative, indicating lower underpricing in IPOs of companies coming from 
country of origin with strong legal institutions. There are also no statistically 
significant differences in underpricing between the pre- and post- SOX periods. In 
relation to conservatism, results show a negative and significant relation between 
conservatism and underpricing for IPOs coming from countries with strong legal 
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institutions with marginal significance on the difference between the weak and the 
strong subsamples.  
 In Panel B of Table 4.7, I repeat the analysis of Model 4.1 again with 
PREMIUM replacing UP  as a dependent variable for the two subsamples 
separately (denoted as Model 4.3.b with the full model specification presented in 
the notes of Table 4.7). As in the case of underpricing, results show a negative 
relation between investors’ premium and conservatism levels. These results 
indicate that investors price firms from strong institution countries that report 
more conservatively lower than those that are relatively less conservative in their 
reporting. This effect is even stronger after SOX. 
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Table 4.7: The Association between Accounting Conservatism (CONSRV) and Underpricing (UP) and Investors’ Premium (PREMIUM) 
Panel A: Underpricing Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries and between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods 
 Underpricing (UP) 
 INST  SOX 
 Strong Weak Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT -1.565** -0.289   0.128 -0.865  
 
(0.012) (0.651)   (0.802) (0.225)  
INST   -1.276**  0.011 -0.002** 0.013 
 
  (0.015)  (0.294) (0.041) (0.189) 
SOX -0.087 -0.071* -0.016    0.993 
 
(0.201) (0.090) (0.850)    (0.335) 
CONSERV -0.003** 0.002 -0.005  -0.017 0.026 -0.043 
 
(0.026) (0.411) (0.107)  (0.855) (0.529) (0.666) 
Controls Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 133 174 307  98 209 307 
Adj R2 0.222 0.186 0.203  0.176 0.184 0.187 
   
  
  
 
Panel B: Investors’ Premium Analyzed between Strong and Weak Legal Institutions Countries and between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods 
 
Investors’ premium (PREMIUM) 
 INST  SOX 
 
Strong Weak Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 0.680*** 0.558***   0.409*** 0.643***  
 
(0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  
INST   0.122  0.003 0.001 0.002 
 
  (0.108)  (0.471) (0.827) (0.797) 
SOX -0.015 -0.015*** -0.001    -0.234*** 
 
(0.110) (0.007) (0.935)    (0.009) 
CONSRV -0.000** 0.001 -0.001*  -0.003** -0.000 -0.002** 
 
(0.020) (0.117) (0.067)  (0.023) (0.313) (0.024) 
Controls Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 130 170 300  97 203 300 
Adj R2 0.162 0.474 0.342  0.540 0.230 0.336 
Notes: 
1. The table presents results for estimating equations 4.3.a and 4.3.b in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The ‘Difference’ columns report the difference between the two 
subsample coefficients using the interactions with the INST and SOX variables. The dependent variables are UP and PREMIUM, as explained in Table 4.4 and Table 
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4.5.  
2. Additional coefficients i, i={4,5,…,14} identified in the table  as Controls are not tabulated for parsimonious reasons. 
3. The regressions models are: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
UP INST SOX CONSRV AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE
                            
      (4.3.a) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
PREMIUM INST SOX CONSRV AUD UW HOT INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
ASSETS SALES LEV BUBBLE
                            
       (4.3.b) 
 
 
 
4. I report p-values below the estimated coefficients. *,**,***  denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control 
for possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 4.A for variable definitions. 
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4.6.3   Underpricing adjusted to market performance 
Since first day performance may be sensitive to market performance on the 
same day, I use the methodology from Carter et al. (1998) to compute the market-
adjusted initial returns (UP_ADJ) and repeat the analysis above. See Panel B of 
Table 4.2 for summary statistics. This procedure results in no material changes in 
the estimated coefficients and therefore is not reported in the paper.   
4.6.4 Three days aftermarket return 
Schultz and Zaman (1994) find that the first days of trading of an IPO can 
be influenced by the underwriters and their aim to maximize their income from 
the offering. As such, it is likely that the first day return do not fully reflect the 
dynamics of the pricing mechanism of the market. To pre-empt this potential 
shortcoming, I redefine underpricing as the aftermarket return at the end of the 
first three trading days (UP_3) and repeat the analysis above. See Panel B of 
Table 4.2 for summary statistics. Similar to adjusting for market performance, this 
procedure results in no material changes in the estimated coefficients and 
therefore is not reported in the paper. 
4.6.5 Alternative Indices for Institutional Environment 
To test the sensitivity of the returns to the definition of the ranking of the 
home country institutional environment, I redefine the INST variable according to 
two different indices proposed by Leuz (2010) and Bruner at al. (2004). Leuz 
(2010) divides a list of 49 countries into three clusters according to their 
regulatory and institutional differences. For the purpose of this paper when 
defining the variable INST_L, I identify Cluster 1 as Strong (INST_L=1) and 
Clusters 2 and 3 are combined to reflect weak institutional environments 
(INST_L=0). Finally, though China is not present in Leuz (2010), I categorize 
IPOs coming from China as part of the weak home institutions subgroup in line 
Chapter 4. Paper 2- Underpricing of Foreign IPOs in the US 
 
- 156 - 
 
with Allen et al., (2005) that find that neither the legal nor the financial system in 
China is well developed.  
Alternatively, Bruner at al. (2004) uses the Country Risk Rating index as 
published in Euromoney’s annual surveys to score the home institutions of firms 
listing in the US. They assign a country’s score based on the year of the first IPO 
from each country. I use Bruner at al. (2004) scoring to calculate the INST_EU 
variable when a country with a score of below or equal to (above) the median is 
identified as having a weak (strong) institutional environment.  
However, using the above mentioned alternative indices to redefine results 
in no material changes in the estimated coefficients and therefore are not reported 
in the paper. Furthermore, it is important to note that these indices do not exhibit 
temporal variations and thus do not reflect changes in regulatory and institutional 
environments at the country of origin. The relevance of this limitation is that it 
increases in time and with the sample size. 
4.6.6 Domestic US IPOs 
To control for the general underpricing levels of domestic US IPOs, I 
introduce the variable UP_US and repeat the analysis. The variable is calculated 
by matching the average the first day underpricing of all US domestic IPOs in the 
same industry and same year to each of the foreign IPOs in the sample. See Panel 
B of Table 4.2 for summary statistics. Results of the main tests do not change in 
any material way with the inclusion of UP_US and are therefore not reported in 
this paper. However, it is important to note that the underpricing of domestic IPOs 
in the US positively affects the underpricing of foreign IPOs from weak 
institutional environments and (to a lesser extent) the IPOs from environments 
with strong legal institutions. The coefficient of the difference is negative and 
significant. This is evidence to suggest once again that firms from weak 
institutional environments in their country of origin leave more money on the 
table also compared to domestic US IPOs. 
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4.6.7 China indicator  
IPOs coming from China became dominant in the years following the 
enactment of SOX and constitute 50.9% of the post-SOX sample. Moreover, 
previous studies also document high levels of underpricing of IPOs in China (Mok 
and Hui, 1998; Kimbro, 2005; and Ritter, 2011). To control for specific potential 
effects originating from Chinese IPOs I included a China indicator to Model 4.1 
which equals 1 when an IPO is coming from China and 0 otherwise. Once again, 
this procedure results in no material changes in the estimated coefficients and 
therefore is not reported in the paper. 
4.6.8 Exchange membership 
To test for potential stock exchange membership effects, I rerun Model 4.1 
with the inclusion of three new indicator variables: NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX 
which each gets the value 1 if the US market of issuing is New York Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ or the American Stock Exchange respectively, and 
otherwise are set to 0. This procedure results in no material changes in the 
estimated coefficients and therefore the results are not reported in the paper. 
4.7 Conclusion  
This paper investigates some unresolved questions regarding the impact of 
institutional changes on information asymmetry in foreign IPOs in the US. Using 
a unique dataset of foreign IPOs in US capital markets in the years 1990-2009, I 
investigate whether the negative association between underpricing (as a proxy for 
the adverse selection problem) and the legal environment of the country of origin 
have weakened following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the 
special case of foreign firms listing in the US. I further investigate whether the 
structural changes introduced by SOX have had a different impact on foreign 
firms coming from weak and strong institutional environments. 
This is an important focus since the Act introduced higher costs for listed 
firms in the form of new reporting requirements, corporate governance and 
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accounting mechanisms, and information disclosure requirements. All were 
created with the aim of increasing investors’ confidence and eventually decreasing 
costs of capital for listed companies (Coates, 2007). Although strongly debated 
and subsequently contested, these changes were imposed on both domestic and 
foreign firms listed on US capital markets.  
To date, much of the academic debate regarding the Act has focused on 
whether it has proven to be effective in reducing the costs of capital and its effects 
of the competitiveness position of US capital markets. However, to my 
knowledge, no study has investigated the specific effects of SOX on foreign 
issuers in terms of asymmetric information problems in the initial offering stage 
originating from the firm’s specific home country institutional environment and 
the effects of the latter on the first day market performance. 
I focus on the level of underpricing of an IPO as a proxy for the level of 
adverse selection between management, investors and other stakeholders of the 
IPO firms (Lin and Tian, 2013). Theory predicts that, if SOX has been effective in 
reducing information asymmetry, a reduction in underpricing levels should be 
evident for IPOs in the period following the Act’s enactment (Kaserer et al., 2008 
and 2011). Also, when focusing on institutional environment of the home country 
for foreign IPOs, there should be no differences in reaction to SOX between those 
coming from countries with strong or weak institutions. I also test for the 
differences in the role of corporate governance mechanisms in IPOs coming from 
different institutional environments and for a potential change in this role as a 
result of the enactment of SOX.  
The empirical findings are only partly consistent with these theoretical 
predictions. First, IPOs of companies coming from a strong institutional 
environment are less underpriced. However, there is no statistically significant 
evidence for a change in underpricing in the post- SOX period. In addition, 
consistent with prior studies suggesting that voluntary governance tools can be 
used as a substitution for to regulations (Bruno and Claessens, 2010), I find some 
evidence that IPOs with prestigious underwriters underprice less. Furthermore, 
my findings show that a public offering with a prestigious auditor is underpriced 
less in the post-SOX period. I also find that accounting conservatism is negatively 
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associated with underpricing in the case of firms coming from countries with 
strong institutions. In addition, I use an alternative measure of initial performance 
which is commonly used in the literature and one that captures the premium that 
investors’ assign to firm value above the net book value. My findings show that 
IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions benefit from a higher initial 
premium from investors. This premium is negatively related to their level of 
accounting conservatism. I show a decrease in premium in the post-SOX period. 
Collectively, the results of this study stress the difference between the two sets of 
groups, namely strong and weak home institutions but are unable to provide 
conclusive evidence towards the effectiveness of SOX, especially in achieving its 
primary objective of reducing the cost of capital in foreign IPOs.  
Nevertheless, a number of limitations apply to my research design. First, 
there is no control for a self-selection bias. Thus, SOX could change the nature of 
foreign firms coming to the US. This could have an impact on the findings. 
Second, although it is widely used, underpricing may not be a clear proxy for 
adverse selection problems as there may be other motivations behind underpricing 
such as increasing investors awareness of the firm by media coverage and 
protection from legal considerations. Why I have addressed these issues to the 
best of my ability in this thesis, their challenges call for some considerations in 
future research. 
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Appendix 4. A: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
Panel A: Variables Used in Main Analysis 
UP 
The percentage difference between the offer price and closing stock 
price at the first day of trading 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
INST 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the product of law 
enforcement index (the International Country Risk Guide – ICRG – 
Law and Order index) and the revised anti-director index of La 
Porta et al. (1998) for the home country is above the sample 
median, 0 otherwise 
ICRG website 
and 
Spamann (2010) 
SOX An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the foreign registrant 
issues shares in the post-SOX period (2002 onwards). 
 
AUD 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditing firm is a 
Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990-1997, 1998-2001 and 2002 onwards, 
respectively; 0 otherwise 
IPO Prospectus 
UW 
Underwriters Rank obtained from Jay Ritter’s website on 
06/05/2011 
IPO Prospectus 
and Jay Ritter’s 
website 
HOT 
A variable that captures the lagged return on the NASDAQ 
Composite index in the 30 trading days prior to listing 
Bloomberg 
INSIDER 
The percentage of shares retained in the firm after the offering to 
total shares outstanding after the offering 
IPO Prospectus 
AGE 
First I calculate Year of IPO minus founding year. Then I take the 
natural logarithm of (1+Age) 
IPO Prospectus 
HITECH 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm operates in a 
high-tech industry and 0 otherwise, as defined in Tech America 
Foundation46 
SDC Platinum 
and 
CRSP 
PROCEEDS Natural logarithm of offer proceeds. The variable is indexed to 
2005 value of US dollars 
IPO Prospectus 
ASSETS Natural logarithm of assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
the issuing. The variable is indexed to 2005 value of US dollars 
IPO Prospectus 
SALES 
Natural logarithm of sales at the end of fiscal year preceding the 
IPO. 
The variable is indexed to 2005 value of US dollars 
IPO Prospectus 
LEV The ratio of short and long term debt over total assets IPO Prospectus 
BUBBLE An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the initial public 
offering took place in the year 1999-2000 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
46
 See http://www.techamerica.org/sic-definition. Retrieved on 02/08/2011 
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Panel B: Variables Used in Additional Analysis 
UP_ADJ 
The percentage difference between the offer price and closing stock 
price at the first day of trading adjusted to market returns 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
UP_3 
The percentage difference between the offer price and closing stock 
price at the third day of trading 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
INST_L An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the county of origin of 
the IPO is listed in Leuz (2010) in Cluster 1, 0 otherwise 
Leuz (2010) 
INST_EU 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the Euromoney index 
ranking as presented in Bruner et al. (2004) for the home country is 
above the sample median, 0 otherwise 
Bruner, 
Chaplinsky, and 
Ramchand, 
2004 
CHINA An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the home country is 
China, 0 otherwise 
IPO Prospectus 
NYSE  
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the stock market of the 
issuing is New York Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
AMEX 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the stock market of the 
issuing is American Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
NASDAQ 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the stock market of the 
issuing is NASDAQ, 0 otherwise 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
PREMIUM 
The IPO offer price per share minus the book value of equity per 
share after the offering, and the difference is divided by the offer 
price 
IPO prospectus 
and CRSP 
database 
CONSRV 
Minus one multiplied by net income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and amortization minus operating cash flows 
deflated by total asset at the beginning of the fiscal year. All figures 
correspond to the fiscal year preceding the IPO date 
IPO prospectus 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECTS OF HOME COUNTRY 
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Chapter 5: 
Paper 3- The Effects of Home Country Institutions on 
the aftermarket stock performance of Foreign IPOs in 
the US  
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates information problems associated with aftermarket 
performance of foreign IPOs in the US. More specifically, it examines the relation 
between the legal institutions at the country of origin and the long-term 
performance of foreign IPOs. This relation is suggested to have a considerable 
influence on management behavior, investors’ confidence and information 
quality. The focus in this unique setting addresses some of the questions regarding 
the relation between long-term performance and institutions and the effectiveness 
of listing in foreign markets in mitigating them. The paper also studies the nature 
and magnitudes in which the accounting and governance legislations passed in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have affected the aftermarket performance of the 
foreign IPOs as a proxy for information asymmetry problems. Moreover, it 
accounts for additional governance and reporting factors that are related to the 
country-of-origin. By doing so, it offers additional inputs to the ongoing debate 
with regard to the effects of SOX on the cost of capital of firms, and in this 
specific case, foreign IPOs.     
The main motivations for the focus of the paper are the following. First, 
over the last three decades, many firms have been bypassing their home capital 
markets raising equity capital in foreign markets (Blass and Yafeh, 2001; Foerster 
and Karloyi, 2000; Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008). The main targeted markets 
have traditionally been the US markets. However, with the launching of the 
Alternative Investment Markets (AIM) in London in 1995 many foreign firms 
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have chosen to list in the UK47. The large increase in foreign listing is to a large 
extent due to the attractiveness of AIM to smaller firms (Doidge et al., 2009). 
Recently, the leading targeted market for foreign firms in the Hong-Kong Stock 
Exchange (SEHK)48. Thus, studying the aftermarket performance of these firms is 
essential in understanding the recent global trend of listing in foreign markets. 
Second, long-term performance has been researched widely in the 
accounting and finance literature. In relation to domestic US IPOs, empirical 
evidence indicates significant underperformance of IPOs throughout the first 
years of listing relative to US mature firms benchmarks (Ritter, 1991; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Nevertheless, long-term 
underperformance of new listings is not limited to US IPOs. For example, Levis 
(1993) finds similar evidence for UK first time issues. However, most studies 
exclude foreign IPOs from their sample and not much has been done to explore 
this unique set of firms. I argue that this specific group of firms is different in 
nature and thus should be studied independently of the IPOs at their country of 
origin or domestic IPOs in US capital markets. For example, Blass and Yafeh 
(2001) examine the long-term performance of Israeli IPOs in the US from 1990-
1996 and compares this group of companies to their US peers and to IPOs at their 
home country. The authors find that the Israeli firms that are listed in the US are 
of higher quality relative to Israeli IPOs that remain at their home capital market 
though still underperforming in the long-run. Thus, the results of this study 
suggest that firms that chose to list in the U.S may be different relative to their 
market peers as well as their US peers. Therefore, I argue that it is not plausible to 
simply infer about the long-term performance of foreign IPOs by studying the 
long-term performance at the country of origin or by focusing on the long-term 
performance of domestic IPOs in the US. In other words, not much is yet known 
about the long-term performance of this under-researched group of companies. 
                                                 
47
 See Arcot, black and Owen (2007) “From Local to global. The Raise of AIM as a Stock Market 
for growing Companies”. Retrieved on 14 March from  
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full%20text/black/121107FINALA
IMshortreport.pdf on 18 March 2013. 
48
 See Paul J Davies “HK moves to make foreign listing easier”, The Financial Times 
November, 2012. He reports that the Hong Kong stock market and regulators are even considering 
further changes to make this market even more attractive to foreign companies. Retrieved from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eb4d88cc-3549-11e2-bf77-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RTkVxTHU on 
24 April, 2013. 
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Furthermore, most of the studies on foreign firms in the US focus on SEO listing 
in the form of cross-listing or prior listings of foreign firms in the form of 
American Deposit Receipts (ADRs). Thus, most studies ignore foreign firms that 
choose to list common equity directly in the US without any prior listing or 
through the ADR programs (e.g. Bruner et al., 2004; Diro Ejara and Ghosh, 2004, 
Foerster and Karloyi, 2000; Hostak et al. 2009). 
Third, prior research on foreign firms in the US generally ignores the effects 
of the legal institutions at the country of origin on the performance and behavior 
while mostly examines the foreign firm as a homogenous group (e.g. Coffee, 
1999, 2002; Hostak et al., 2009; Hursti and Maula, 2007). The “bonding” 
hypothesis (Coffee, 1999) suggests that by listing in overseas capital markets; say 
the US, firms that are coming from less developed home legal institutions can 
“bond” themselves to the host country legal institutions. Consequently, listing in a 
country with stronger legal institutions may lead to a reduction in foreign firm’s 
cost of capital. In the extreme case, it is plausible that by listing exclusively in the 
US, foreign IPOs credibly commit to US disclosure and enforcement rules. This is 
due to the fact that by being listed exclusively in the US, these foreign firms are 
scrutinized by US regulatory and enforcement institutions in a similar fashion to 
the domestic US IPOs. Thus, this argument supports the notion of irrelevance of 
home legal institutions for foreign IPOs’ performance. However, there are some 
opposing arguments and findings to this view that listing in the US necessitates an 
assurance to higher reporting standards and performance. Licht (2003), Siegel 
(2005), and Licht et al. (2011) argue that shareholders of foreign firms in the US 
and the SEC have been ineffective in monitoring and scrutinizing foreign 
registrants. These papers suggest an alternative motivation to the “bonding” 
Hypothesis for listing in the US. According to their view, firms may seek an 
overseas listing because it provides access to cheap finance and enhancing 
issuers’ visibility, not because they want to commit to higher corporate 
governance standards. Thus, by studying the differences in long-term performance 
within this heterogeneous group of firms this paper suggests further insights into 
the nature, motivations and behaviors of foreign IPOs in the US, as well as the 
impact of home country institutions.  
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Fourth, this paper also examines the effects of the changes in the 
institutional environment at the host country (the US) as a result of the enactment 
of SOX in 2002. The Act has improved the internal control mechanisms, the 
disclosure requirements and the reporting quality of both listed companies and 
firms in the process of going public in US capital markets. Therefore, it has been 
suggested to positively affect information asymmetry issues between management 
and investors related to the pre- and post- listing period. Consequently, the 
enactment of the Act should have an effect on the long-term performance of IPOs 
(Johnston and Madura, 2009). In the foreign IPOs setting, the changes in the 
information and legal environment in the US as a result of SOX could imply a 
common effect on foreign firms’ but could also have different magnitudes of 
effects with respect to the foreign registrants’ countries of origin. For example, 
firms coming from strong home legal institutions could show a stronger or weaker 
improvement in the long-term performance relative to IPOs that are coming from 
weak home legal institutions.  
Fifth, using hand-collected data from IPO prospectuses, this study also 
investigates the governance, reporting and early performance factors which have 
been documented to have an effect on long-term performance in various settings 
but have not been utilized yet in studies of foreign IPOs which are traded on US 
capital markets (e.g. Hostak et al., 2007; Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008). For 
example, firms coming from different home legal environments can set in place 
different governance mechanisms to mitigate agency problems which are 
associated with their home institutional environment. Thus, using the information 
from the prospectuses allows a deeper understanding to the role that governance 
mechanisms play in the long-term performance of IPOs. 
I collected a sample of 291 foreign IPOs from 35 countries from 1990-2009. 
I measure the long-term performance over up to three years of these IPOs as the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and compare them to three different 
benchmarks (i.e., CRSP value weighted market index, matching firm and 
domestic US IPOs). I then separate the sample of the foreign IPOs into two 
subsamples, namely strong and weak, based on the strengths of the home legal 
institutions of these IPOs. My main findings are as follows. First, I provide 
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evidence that foreign IPOs experience positive abnormal long-term performance 
throughout all the time periods tested in this paper, namely, over the first, second 
and third years of listing. These findings are robust to all benchmarks used. 
Second, I find that foreign IPOs from countries with weak home institutions 
experience higher long-term performance with respect to both mature domestic 
US firms and domestic US IPOs. Third, there is no indication for an effect of 
SOX on foreign IPOs as a homogenous group. However, SOX did improve the 
long-term performance of foreign IPOs with weak home institutions. In other 
words, results show that the post-SOX long-term performance of IPOs that are 
coming from weak home institutions is higher than the returns of this subgroup of 
IPOs in the pre-SOX period. This is consistent with Piotroski and Srinivasan 
(2008) who argue that the bonding-related benefits of a US listing has been 
increased after SOX in the case of foreign firms with weaker governance 
characteristics from US exchanges.  
 In addition to the main findings described above, results of the 
multivariate regression tests offer evidence for the controlling variable used. First, 
underpricing in the first day of issue is negatively associated with long-term 
performance. This is evident for both IPOs that are coming from strong and from 
weak home legal institutions. However, there is a significant difference in the 
magnitude of this relation. Specifically, the negative association between 
underpricing and the long-term performance is stronger in the case of IPOs that 
are coming from weak home legal institutions. Second, evidence suggests that 
offerings with stronger underwriters experience higher long-term returns for IPOs 
that are coming from strong home legal institutions. Furthermore, larger offerings 
are associated with lower long-term returns. In addition, foreign IPOs which are 
coming from weak legal institutions and operate in the Hi-Tech industry 
experience higher aftermarket performance relative. Overall, the above discussed 
results are consistent with the notion that foreign first time registrant’s home 
countries security laws matter at least as much as the US laws (e.g., Siegel, 2005). 
 I contribute to the growing literature on the impact of legal institutions on 
the behavior and economic consequences of firms operating in foreign markets in 
several ways. First, there are only a limited number of studies that examine the 
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effect of home institutions and performance of foreign IPOs in the US or 
elsewhere. I argue that this group of firms is important to understand due to the 
fact that foreign IPOs are an increasing global and sizable phenomenon. Also, it is 
important to note that since the issuance processes across counties are different 
due to the institutional factors, it is difficult to conduct a cross-country 
comparison (Foerster and Karloyi, 2000). However, the focus on the home legal 
institutions of foreign IPOs as a unique set of firms sheds new light on the 
literature addressing the extent to which institutions affect firm performance 
(Doidge et al., 2007; Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Hail and Leuz, 2006).    
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 I 
review related literature. In Section 5.3 I outline the research design. The sample 
is described in Section 5.4. The findings are reported in Section 5.5.  Section 5.6 
reports additional tests for robustness of the main findings, and Section 5.7 
concludes. 
5.2 Related Literature 
The long-run performance of IPOs has been widely investigated in prior 
literature. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that there should be a 
similarity between returns of mature firms and the long-run returns of IPOs. Thus, 
with the completion of the issuing process an IPO “is just like any other stock and 
thus the aftermarket stock price should reflect the shares’ intrinsic value” (Ritter 
and Welch, 2002, p. 1816). However, prior research documents large variations in 
price over the first few years after the IPO can be explained by price correction 
relative to the early prices in the initial period (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
Miller (1977) argues that this correction is resulting from the fact that initial 
prices are mostly set by over optimistic investors due to the constraints in sorting 
IPOs and heterogeneous expectations regarding the valuation of a firms. This 
rationale is in line with Teoh et al. (1998) that find a positive relation between 
earnings management, or “optimistic” accounting, early in the life of the firm. 
Thus, over the first months of listing more information is revealed to the market 
and the prices adjust to the real value of the firm. In other words, these studies 
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suggest that long-run performance of IPOs is resulting from mispricing at the 
initial stage of listing due to limited information.  
Other studies argue that the aftermarket stock performance of IPOs is 
strongly related to information asymmetry and agency conflicts. The underlying 
rationale is that an IPO is regarded as the first ‘liquidity event’ in the life cycle of 
a fast-growing company (Burton et al. 2010). As such, it facilitates a number of 
potential agency conflicts. For example, Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that an 
IPO introduces a potential adverse selection problem between managements and 
investors since management is limited in the accuracy of information it can 
credibly reveal to investors while investors are limited in their ability to produce 
an accurate valuation due to the little operating history. In addition, the incentives 
and objectives of the early stage investors may not be aligned with those of the 
public market investors (Burton et al. 2010). Over time, with more information 
that is revealed to the market, prices adjust to better reflect the real value of the 
firm which accounts to potential agency problems.   
Empirical evidence on the aftermarket stock performance of IPOs over the 
last few decades has typically indicated underperformance (Ritter, 1991; 
Aggrawal et al., 1993; Boulton et al. 2011). This evidence is not restricted to 
domestic US IPOs alone and has been documented across nations (Ritter, 1991). 
For example, Levis (1993) find negative long-term performance for UK IPOs. 
Ljungqvist (1997) finds similar results for German IPOs and McGuinness (1993) 
reports -18.26% a decrease in the market adjusted price of domestic IPOs in 
Hong-Kong.  
In the foreign firms setting, Foester and Karloyi (2000) find a significant 
underperformance over three years of 333 ADRs issues in the US relative to the 
market index. Callaghan et al. (2000) study the long-term performance of 66 
ADRs, with both IPOs and SEOs, traded on the NYSE between the years 1986-
1993. They report a 19.6% decline in the value during the first trading year 
relative to the market index. They further document an outperformance of firms 
from emerging markets relative to those which are coming from developed 
countries. More recently, Schaub (2013) documents similar evidence with relation 
to the long-run performance of ADRs traded on US capital markets. According to 
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these studies, the theoretical explanation of the outperformance of ADRs in these 
studies is grounded in the diversification objectives of domestic US investors. 
Specifically, by investing in ADRs, US investors can diversify their portfolio at 
low costs. However, these studies do not separate initial offerings from seasonal 
offerings and do not include firms that are doing a direct listing and do not list 
through the ADR programs. Also, there is only limited evidence for an 
institutional factors influence in foreign firms traded on US markets as a whole 
and IPOs specifically.  
In addition, prior research suggests that long-run stock performance is 
linked to national institutional environments. For example, Burton et al. (2010) 
document significant differences in the relation between ownership concentration 
and IPO performance based on the legal system (common law vs. civil law) at the 
country of issuing. They also show that the role of VC backing in IPOs 
performance varies between these legal systems. Finally, they also document 
evidence that the retained ownership of initial investors has a different impact on 
IPOs performance between the two legal systems. Thus, studying all foreign first 
time issues by focusing on their home institutions may enhance the prior findings 
further especially with respect to the question of whether global listing helps to 
mitigate or maybe even eliminate the effects of home country institutions.   
Besides cross-country institutional differences that may affect long-term 
performance, SOX may have altered the institutional environment in the US and 
possibly also the long-term performance of stocks which are listed on US capital 
markets. This is due to the changes that SOX has imposed on internal control 
mechanisms, and, accordingly, the expected costs of internal control and reporting 
for both listed companies and firms in the process of going public. As a result of 
the Act, IPOs are required to have ‘audit committees and internal controls in place 
at least one year prior to going public’ (Johnston and Madura, 2009, p. 296). For 
example, SOX is suggested to alleviate information asymmetry issues related to 
the pre-listing period between management and investors, and, consequently, 
should have an effect on IPOs pricing as measured by the level of underpricing 
(Webb, 2008).  
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However, the effect of SOX is not limited only to the short-run or initial 
returns but can also influence the long-term performance of IPOs (Johnston and 
Madura, 2009). For example, there is evidence that when initial returns are high, 
firms experience a lower long-run performance as a result of over optimistic 
expectations of uninformed investors at the issuing time (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
1990). The rationale behind this argument is that once the IPO process is 
completed and stocks are issued on the market, the firm must comply with stricter 
reporting and disclosure requirements. As a result, more information is revealed to 
the market and with time the stock price converges to its real value based on the 
higher degree of information available (Ritter, 1991; Carter et al. 1998).  
Moreover, the introduction of SOX increases information disclosure. 
Therefore, overly optimistic expectations of investors are expected to be lower 
with comparison to the pre-SOX era, yielding lower initial returns. Consequently, 
there should be a decrease in the occurrences of aftermarket corrections. In other 
words, long-run performance of IPOs should be more positive after SOX 
(Johnston and Madura, 2009). In the case of foreign companies, the introduction 
of SOX suggests that companies must disclose substantially more information in 
post-SOX period (Chang and Sun, 2009).  
Furthermore, among the key alterations introduced by SOX stands the 
increase in managerial accountability to reports. This, together with the increasing 
level of information disclosure is expected to reduce moral hazard problems. To 
this date, no study has focused on the effects of SOX on potential moral hazard 
problems in foreign IPOs. These are expected to be different in comparison with 
domestic public firms in the US due to the following specific characteristics 
(Chang and Sun, 2009).  
Firstly, the enhancement in accounting and reporting disclosures suggests 
higher financing costs when firms are operating in centralized economies with 
weak institutional environment. Thus, firms in financial distress can get an easy 
and relatively cheap access to funds when these are not subject to strict 
regulations and reporting (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In that respect, the 
introduction of SOX and the increasing requirements suggest lower long-term 
returns. However, Hostak et al. (2009) argue that the introduction of SOX harmed 
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the attractiveness of the US capital markets for such firms and even hold strong 
incentives to delist from major exchanges or to ‘go dark’ (Marosi and Massoud, 
2007). Hostak et al. (2009) argue that the foreign companies that remained listed 
after the introduction of SOX are the ones with better corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, this problem is related to the selection biased and will not 
be explored in this paper. 
Secondly, since the SOX increased management accountability (Johnston 
and Madura, 2009), the institutional and legal framework of the home country is 
likely to have a significant impact on moral hazard problems. Thus, in the pre-
SOX period, management accountability was lower, which can explain the 
motivation of managements to engage in opportunistic behavior after the listing. 
Thus misconducts are captured in the long-run performance. In fact, the suggested 
relationship between insiders’ trading and long-term performance has been in the 
centre of attention in recent years. One hypothesis proposes that when there is a 
significant information asymmetry between management and investors, a buy or 
sell action of an insider will reveal information to the market regarding the true 
value of the company. For example, when an insider buys stocks, market 
participants can translate the action as a signal of underpriced stocks and visa-
versa (Kyle 1985).  
Thus, the long-run performance of foreign IPOs is expected to be higher 
than in the pre-SOX period since there should be less information asymmetry, due 
to more accountability, audit independence and reporting quality. Furthermore, 
the reduction in information asymmetry is suggested to have two effects. First, it 
will attract higher quality firms that are less reluctant to reveal information and 
therefore are willing to list in US markets. Cohen et al. (2008) document a 
significant decline in earnings management in the initial stage of filing in the post-
SOX period. Therefore, this development suggests less information asymmetry 
between management and investors. Thus, SOX serves as screening mechanism 
for firms going public and hence “firms that are more willing to be transparent 
would still pursue an IPO, while some firms that have something to hide can 
avoid the SOX provisions by remaining private” (Johnston and Madura, 2009, p. 
296). In the case of foreign companies this effect will be even stronger as 
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companies face the possibility to peruse an IPO at their home capital market and 
or to go public in another global market instead of the US, which is proven to 
have a strong investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). Secondly, there will be 
less need for price correction originated by overoptimistic uninformed investors 
(Aggarwal and Rivoli 1990; Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  
As mentioned above, the motivation of focusing on foreign companies 
traded exclusively in the US is originated from various factors. First, the 
introduction of SOX in 2002 initiated a dramatic change in the flow of 
international companies to US capital markets. Moreover, many firms that were 
already traded in the US for a number of years found the new requirements too 
costly in terms of both compliance expenses and loss of managerial rents (Hostak 
et al., 2009). Second, research suggests that the characteristics of the domestic 
IPOs and the foreign IPOs are different and as a result may have different 
information asymmetry problems. To date, not much has been done to explore 
these interesting issues and to test how the requirements of SOX affected agency 
conflicts tensions between managements and investors evident in the long-term 
performance of foreign IPOs. In fact, differences in country-of-origin, institutional 
frameworks and specific investor and foreign management information problems 
imply different considerations for foreign companies.   
To conclude, this paper contributes to existing literature by focusing on the 
effect home legal institutions and of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on information 
asymmetry problems in the case of foreign companies using long-term 
performance as a proxy for information quality and agency problems. To measure 
the long-run performance of US IPOs, I examine the first one-two- and three- 
years abnormal returns of IPOs occurring before and after SOX. The next section 
provides a detailed description of the research design. 
5.3    Research Design 
In order to test the potential effects of the country of origin on the 
aftermarket performance of foreign IPOs in the US, I use the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR) for the one, two and three years following the IPO date.   
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With accordance to Johnston and Madura (2009), aftermarket returns are 
calculated from the first day after the offer date, i.e. from the second day of 
trading, to the end of the first, second and third years of listing  using the buy-and-
hold abnormal returns as represented by Equation 5.1.    
 
Equation 5.1 
, ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
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i i t b t
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Where J={1,2,3} for the first, second and third year BHAR, respectively. 
,i tR stands for returns (in decimal form) of the IPO firm i on a trading day t, 
and 
,b tR represents the CRSP value-weighted market index (in decimal form) over 
the same period. Since Cowan and Segeant (2001) establish that winsorized 
abnormal returns produce more powerful test statistics, the abnormal returns are 
winsorized at 1% to decrease the influence of outliers.  
To test for a potential difference in long term performance between firms 
from different institutional environment and whether long-term performance is 
different after SOX, I estimate the following regression model with BHAR1-
BHAR3 being used as the dependent variables: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 8 9
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
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VC INSIDER AGE HITECH SIZE
                          (5.1) 
 
Where J={1,2,3} for the first, second and third year BHAR, respectively. 
BHARJ i is a measure of the aftermarket performance of the IPO as defined 
in Equation 5.1. The variable INSTi indicates the institutional setting of the home 
country. It is based on the product of two underlying measures. The first is the La 
Porta et al.’s (1998) index of anti-director rights, as adjusted by Spamann 
(2010).49 The second measure is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Law and Order index50. I use the product of these two measures because the anti-
director rights index covers only aspects of de-jure regulation by capturing six 
                                                 
49
 Spamman (2010) shows that his revised index markedly differs from both La Porta et al. (1998) 
as well as its later revision that is provided in Djankov et al. (2008).  
50
 Collected from http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx. 
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sub-indices indicating the letter of the law, not its enforcement in practice 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). On the other hand, the Law 
and Order index assesses the de-facto law and order traditions, such as 
enforcement, of a country as well as the legal system. To each foreign IPO we 
assign the specific country-year score according to the year of the IPO and its 
home country to capture both de-jure and de-facto aspects of investors protection 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005; and Bruno and Claessens, 2010). Consistent with earlier 
studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2006), I next divide the sample into 
strong (weak) home institutions according to whether the country’s score falls 
above (below or at) the sample median of the product of these two measures. The 
indicator INSTi is set equal to one if the country’s score is above the sample 
median, and zero otherwise.51  
Model 5.1 includes control variables as follows. The variable UP i is a 
measure of underpricing level defined as the percentage difference between the 
offer price and closing stock price at the first day of trading. I include this variable 
to account for the relationship between underpricing and long-term performance 
as documented in many studies across time (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002). SOXi 
serves as an indicator to post-SOX listing and thus captures the effect of the Act. 
It is included to control for (and assess the extent to which) the stricter regulatory 
has influenced long-term performance in foreign IPOs. EMi is a measure of signed 
discretionary accruals follows Ball and Shivakumar (2008) who investigate the 
magnitude of earnings management around initial public offerings in the UK. This 
measure modifies the Jones (1991) model by incorporating conservative asymmetric 
accruals. The measure is included to capture the extent to which management is 
contributing to the optimistic valuation of the IPO by investors. This has been 
documented to impact long-term stock performance (Teoh et al., 1998). AUDi 
indicates the prestige of the auditors. It is an indicator variable that is set equal to 
1 if the auditing firm is a Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990-1997, 1998-2001 and 
2002 onwards, respectively; 0 otherwise. It is included since auditors influence 
the quality of reported numbers, especially in the context of issuing shares (Fan 
                                                 
51
 An alternative approach is to calculate the median score for each year and so INST is set to one 
if the country’s score in a particular year is above that year’s median. However, country scores are 
very stable, and there is not much difference in the value assigned to INSTi under the alternative 
way. 
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and Wong, 1996; Beatty 1989) and thus may also affect the valuation results of 
investors which in turn after the long-term abnormal return levels. UWi ranks the 
offering’s leading underwriter’s prestige, as per Jay Ritter’s website. Underwriter 
prestige has been documented to have a positive impact on reducing information 
asymmetry in IPOs (Balvers et al. 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter et al., 
1998). In addition, Carter et al. (1998) IPOs with high quality underwriters 
perform better in the long-run relative to those with less reputable underwrites. 
INSIDERi measures the ratio of primary shares retained by insiders over all shares 
outstanding after offer (Kaserer et al., 2011; Johnston and Madura, 2009). I 
include this variable because ownership structures vary globally and are correlated 
with both institutions and stock performance (e.g., Burton et al., 2010). AGEi this 
variable controls for the number of days between the issuing and the firm 
establishment dates (Daily et al., 2005). The age of the firm is expected to 
increase the amount (and perhaps the quality) of information available to market 
participants thus reducing mitigating their risk arising out of any uncertainty 
associated with the issue (Johnston and Madura, 2009). HITECHi is an indicator 
for a high-tech industry membership. This is due to the fact that this industry is 
characterized by high information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2001) and may also be 
particularly exposed to litigations risk (Johnson et al., 2001). PROCEEDSi 
indicates the gross proceeds on the issue. Michaely and Shaw (1994) argue for a 
positive relationship between offering size and market scrutiny. Also, a large 
offering is expected to initiate a higher demand on the initial day of the offering. 
This combined with investors over optimistic valuation of firms may revert with 
time and result in lower long-term stock performance. A more detailed description 
of these variables is presented in Appendix 5.A.  
In the regression Model 5.1, the coefficient on INST captures the 
incremental effect of the strength of home institutions on the intercept. For 
example, a positive sign implies that new issuers coming from strong institutional 
environments experience higher aftermarket performance relative to IPOs from 
countries with weak institutions. However, if by listing in the US firms 
circumvent the influence of their home institutions regardless of their strength, the 
coefficient on INST is expected to be statistically insignificant. In addition, in 
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regression Model 5.1, a positive (negative) statistically significant coefficient on 
any of the vector variables implies a positive (negative) relation to long-term 
stock performance.  
One limitation of Model 5.1 is that it assumes that all coefficients apart from 
INST are assumed to be the same for foreign IPOs from both weak and strong 
legal environments. However, these issuers may be different according to their 
country of origin. In such cases, the restriction may not be economically justified 
and a test that allows coefficients to play different roles in each of the two 
subsamples should be employed. Thus, in order to test for differences between 
first time issues with respect to their institutional environment at the country of 
origin, I run Model 5.1 separately for the two subsamples and report the 
differences in the coefficients using interactions of INST with all of the vector 
variables. To the extent that long-term performance is not affected by the IPOs 
home environment when listing in the US, the results for the two subsamples 
should not differ.  
Finally, to test for the effects of SOX on long-term stock performance, I run 
Model 5.1 separately for the pre- and post- SOX subsamples and report the 
differences in the coefficients using interactions of SOX with all of the 
explanatory variables. To the extent SOX has no impact on long-term 
performance in the case of foreign IPOs listing in the US, the results for the two 
subsamples should not differ.  
5.4 Data and Sample Selection  
There are numerous challenges in the sample selection process. First, all 
foreign firms that made their initial public offering to the US between 1993 and 
2009 are to be identified. I used Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues 
database classification in which foreign firms are firms that were incorporated and 
whose primary executive offices are located outside of the US.  
Second, consistent with Bruner et al. (2006) the sample excludes equity 
listing that originated from spin-offs of publically-listed companies or from 
mergers and acquisitions. The sample selection eliminates any warrants, units and 
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rights offerings. In addition, I exclude IPOs from financial institutions (4-digit 
SIC codes 6000-6999) and public utilities (4-digit SIC codes 4900-4949) due to 
the different structure of their financial statements and regulatory environment. 
Furthermore, firms that are based in that Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda 
are also removed from the selected sample. This is owing to the fact that those are 
typically US or European firms within the financial services industry that are 
registered in these geographical locations for tax consideration and although they 
comply with the definition of foreign companies, they do not correspond to the 
conceptual framework of this research.  
Third, IPO prospectuses are used to obtain accounting and corporate 
governance variables needed for the empirical investigation. The primary sources 
for the prospectuses are the Edgar database provided by the SEC and the Perfect 
Filing database. Fourth, I obtain issue data manually from prospectuses when non-
US dollar figures are transformed to US dollar figures based on the exchange rates 
disclosed in prospectuses. Thereafter I index the US figures to 2005 US value 
based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund52. Fifth, I obtained data on the NASDAQ value weighted index 
from Bloomberg. In addition, I computed the first day return or underpricing by 
deducting the offer price collected from the prospectuses from the first CRSP-
reported trading of the IPO stock closing price (Carter et al., 1998) where this is 
not larger than two days following the offering. I also match the figure reported 
by CRSP reported figure with that reported by SDC Platinum and when the two 
do not match these were crossed checked with other public sources to obtain the 
most accurate first day closing price. Finally, the aftermarket returns are 
calculated using stock prices, market returns and other adjusted factors from 
CRSP.  
As reported in Panel A of Table 5.1, the final IPO sample compromises of 
291 listings. Panel B also presents the industry composition of the sample 
according to the Fama-French (FF) 12-industry classification. This Panel shows 
that the largest group of IPOs in the sample is in the Business Equipment industry 
(FF6), followed by the Telephone and Television Transmission (FF7), and 
                                                 
52
 Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#data on April 2011 
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Manufacturing (FF3). Out of the overall sample, 202 are pre-SOX issues and 89 
are Post-SOX as Panel B indicates. 
Panel C of Table 5.1 reports the distributions of IPOs according the country 
of origin in a four year window from 1990-2009. Consistent with other studies on 
foreign issuers in the US, the largest number of IPOs is from China (51), followed 
by Israel (48) and UK (29). Most of the IPOs come from the years before 2001, 
reflecting the burst of internet and dot.com bubble of 2001 and its effect on the 
high-tech sector which generates many IPOs (about 30% of the total sample).  
Chapter 5. Paper 3- Aftermarket Stock Performance of Foreign IPOs in the US 
 
- 180 - 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Development  
 Number of Firms 
All SDC Platinum new US Foreign listings in years 1990-2009 677 
Excluding observations:  
For which prospectus not available  196 
With offering other than common/ordinary stock 117 
For financial services firms and utilities 10 
With insufficient financial data necessary for our analyses 38 
With less than 10 observations for year and industry matching 1 
  
Final Sample 291 
 
Panel B: Sample Selection by Fama-French 12 Industry Classification  
FF1 Consumer Non-Durables 9 
FF2 Consumer Durables 7 
FF3 Manufacturing 22 
FF4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 3 
FF5 Chemicals and Allied Products 7 
FF6 Business Equipment 118 
FF7 Telephone and Television Transmission 45 
FF8 Utilities - 
FF9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 7 
FF10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 27 
FF11 Finance - 
FF12 Other 46 
   
Total  291 
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Panel C: Country of Origin by Period 
Country 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 Total 
Avg. ICRG 
Index 
Argentina 0 0 1 0 1 2 11.25 
Austria 0 0 1 0 0 1 24.00 
Australia 0 2 0 0 0 2 20.00 
Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 1 10.00 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 0 1 15.00 
Canada 0 8 14 2 3 27 24.00 
Chile 1 2 0 0 0 3 23.33 
China 0 0 6 12 33 51 13.36 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 24.00 
Finland 0 1 0 0 0 1 24.00 
France 1 6 5 0 0 13 27.08 
Germany 0 2 4 0 0 6 22.67 
Greece 0 0 3 2 2 7 12.00 
Hong-Kong 1 9 3 3 0 16 20.50 
Indonesia 0 1 0 0 0 1 8.00 
India 0 0 2 0 0 2 16.00 
Ireland 0 3 4 0 2 9 24.00 
Israel 3 17 16 5 7 48 16.25 
Italy 2 3 1 1 0 7 11.71 
Japan 0 0 2 0 0 2 25.00 
Jordan 0 1 0 0 0 1 12.00 
Luxemburg 1 0 1 0 0 2 12.00 
Mexico 2 0 0 1 0 3 7.00 
Netherlands 1 13 6 0 1 21 24.00 
New-Zealand 1 3 0 0 0 4 24.00 
Norway 0 0 1 0 0 1 24.00 
Poland 0 1 0 0 0 1 24.00 
Singapore 0 2 2 0 2 6 22.67 
South-Africa 0 0 0 1 0 1 12.50 
South-Korea 0 1 3 3 1 8 23.50 
Spain 0 0 1 0 0 1 30.00 
Sweden 0 3 0 0 0 3 24.00 
Switzerland 0 3 3 1 0 7 17.14 
Taiwan 0 0 0 1 1 2 25.00 
UK 0 18 9 2 0 29 24.24 
Total 14 100 87 35 54 291 19.38 
 
Table 5.2 reports the Pearson’s’ pair-wise correlation coefficients of the 
variables contained in Model 5.1 as well as the ones used for the sensitivity 
analysis in subsection 5.3. There is a significant correlation between BHAR1 and 
BHAR2 with INST, suggesting a negative relation between home institutions on 
the long-run stock performance in the first two years of listing in the univariate 
analysis. In contrast, UP , SOX, EM, AUD, UW, VC, INSIDER, AGE and HITECH 
are not correlated with the different period’s measurements of BHAR. Finally, 
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PROCEEDS negatively correlated with BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3. In the next 
section, I examine the effect of the above mentioned factors on underpricing with 
both with respect to home institutions and the enactment of SOX.  
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Table 5.2: Selected Correlations 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 BHAR1              
2 BHAR2 0.62             
3 BHAR3 0.55 0.72            
4 INST -0.13 -0.12 -0.06           
5 UP -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.01          
6 SOX 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.35 -0.13         
7 EM 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.05        
8 AUD -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.12 -0.01       
9 UW -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.18 0.53      
10 VC -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.09 0.33 -0.02 0.23 0.18     
11 INSIDER 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.11    
12 AGE -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.02 0.04 -0.22 -0.10   
13 HITECH 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.20 -0.24  
14 PROCEEDS -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.41 0.59 -0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.09 
  
             
Note:  
Table 5.2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for variables used in the main analysis (Panel A) and in the additional analysis (Panel B). Correlations above 
0.11 and below -0.11 are significant at the 0.05 level. See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
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5.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The section presents the findings of empirical investigations following on 
from the methodology and theoretical formulations. The results are further sub-
divided into the findings from the univariate analysis which used for indicative 
purposes, followed by the primary regression analysis with subsequent variations 
and interaction terms. Thereafter, the results conclude with additional analyses 
aimed at strengthening the primary findings.  
5.5.1  Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.3 reports and the means and the difference in means of returns 
between the IPO sample and difference comparable benchmarks. The first 
benchmark is the CRSP value-weighted market index over the same period, the 
second benchmark is a portfolio of domestic US IPOs matched by industry and 
issuing year to each foreign IPO sample. The third benchmark is a portfolio of 
matching domestic US mature firms when each foreign IPO sample is matched to 
a firm that has the minimum sum of differences of the book-to-market ratio and 
market size53. Panel A reports the means and differences in means for the full 
sample, Panel B reports the same for the Strong subsample and Panel C does the 
same for the Weak subsample. The p-value columns report the significant levels 
of the difference in means. The results in the table suggest that the foreign IPO 
sample as a whole experiences significantly higher long-run returns in all time 
periods and across all benchmarks except for the matching firms benchmark in the 
third year of listing. In the latter case, results are still positive but not significant. 
Thus, these results support the notion that the foreign firms that list in the US are 
of higher quality comparing to their US IPO peers as suggested by Blass and 
Yafeh (2001) and Bruner et al. (2006). Furthermore, when dividing the foreign 
IPOs sample by the home legal institutions I find no significant evidence for 
higher abnormal returns for the Strong subsample in most periods and most 
                                                 
53
 The merits and problems of each benchmark are discussed in the Additional Analysis section.  
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benchmarks. This is in contrast to the evidence from the weak subsample that 
shows a clear and significant higher performance of this group of IPOs across all 
benchmarks and all periods, except for the matching firms benchmark in the third 
year of listing. This is in line with Bruner et al. (2004) that find that foreign firms 
that come from emerging markets are of higher quality comparing to their US and 
foreign peers. 
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Table 5.3: Differences in the Means of Long-Term Performance Between the Foreign IPOs and Benchmarks 
 
Means  Difference in Means 
 I II III IV   I-II   I-III   I-IV  
 
Foreign 
IPOs 
Index 
Benchmark 
US-IPOs 
Benchmark 
Matching 
Firms 
Benchmark 
 
Difference p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value 
Panel A: Full Sample          
BHR1 1.599 1.31 1.207 0.792  0.289 (0.023) 0.393 (0.000) 0.806  (0.000) 
BHR2 1.753 1.13 0.97 1.325  0.622 (0.007) 0.783 (0.000) 0.427  (0.078) 
BHR3 1.721 1.33 1.375 1.499  0.390 (0.002) 0.346 (0.056) 0.222  (0.811) 
Panel B: Strong Subsample          
BHR1 1.302 1.222 0.763 0.929  0.080 (0.143) 0.539 (0.000) 0.373 (0.081) 
BHR2 1.442 1.265 0.397 1.364  0.177 (0.118) 1.025 (0.001) 0.077 (0.860) 
BHR3 1.446 1.225 1.142 1.403  0.221 (0.126) 0.304 (0.289) 0.043 (0.905) 
Panel C: Weak Subsample          
BHR1 1.845 1.383 1.646 0.678  0.462 (0.002) 0.199 (0.023) 1.168 (0.000) 
BHR2 2.021 1.034 1.552 1.293  0.987 (0.011) 0.465 (0.000) 0.719 (0.087) 
BHR3 1.951 1.423 1.552 1.580  0.528 (0.015) 0.399 (0.028) 0.371 (0.357) 
Note:  
Table 5.3 presents the means of the returns of the foreign IPO sample and the indices used to adjust returns. BHR1, BHR2 and BHR3 are the buy-and-hold returns for the first, 
second and third years of listing, respectively, for each of the portfolios. Panel A presents the means, the difference in means and the p-value for test on differences for all foreign 
IPO sample. Thus, the Difference column reports the difference between two subsample means. The p-value shows the significant level of the test for differences. Panel B does the 
same for the strong home institutions subsample (Strong) and Panel C repeats for the weak home institutions subsample (Weak).  
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Table 5.4 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Panel A presents summary statistics for each variable in the pooled 
sample. As is evident from this panel, about 31% of the observations are post-
SOX, insiders retain about 72% of the shares, and there are about 55% firm with 
High-Tech industry membership. The means of the returns adjusted to market are 
positive and significant for all time periods (BHAR1, BHAR2, and BHAR3). Thus, 
foreign IPOs outperform the market in all three periods. Panel B presents 
summary statistics for each of model variables in both the pre- and post-SOX 
periods. I show the results of univariate tests on the difference in means (t-test) 
and medians (Wilcoxon rank-test). The means and medians of the variables 
BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3 show no significant differences between the pre- and 
the post-SOX periods. Likewise, there is no significant change in the levels of EM 
between the two periods. On the other hand, there are significantly more IPOs 
coming from weak institutional environments after the enactment of SOX as 
evident from the significant decrease of the mean (from 56.6% to 19.3%) and 
median of INST. Furthermore, underpricing (UP) is significantly lower in the 
post-SOX period. Also, there is a significant decline in the mean and median of 
AGE in the pre- and post- SOX periods.      
Panel B also presents summary statistics for each of model variables in each 
of the strong and weak home legal institutions subsamples. As before, I show the 
results of univariate tests on the difference in means (t-test) and medians 
(Wilcoxon rank-test). Mean (Median) of SOX show significant differences 
between the weak and strong subsamples indicating different distribution of 
issuers between periods; when weak is almost evenly allocated across time but the 
listings of firms that are coming from strong home institutions fall sharply after 
SOX. The mean of INSIDER decreases from 71% to 69% (significant at 0.10 
level) suggesting that offerings associated with stronger institutions leave less 
percentage of equity to insiders and are more overpriced. In addition, IPOs from 
weak institutional environments seem to be longer in business and larger in size as 
indicated but the significant increase in mean for AGE and ASSETS, respectively. 
Furthermore, issues from stronger institutions are significantly larger in size as 
demonstrated by the higher mean and median of PROCEEDS. The next section 
Chapter 5. Paper 3- Aftermarket Stock Performance of Foreign IPOs in the US 
 
- 188 - 
 
reports and discusses the results obtained in the cross-sectional regression 
analysis. 
Table 5.4: Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample  
Full Sample 
 
N=291 Variable 
Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Main Analysis 
BHAR1 0.289** 1.423 -0.364 -0.018 0.375 
BHAR2 0.622*** 3.377 -0.654 -0.137 0.547 
BHAR3 0.390*** 2.752 -0.821 -0.420 0.384 
INST 0.451 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
UP 0.195 0.364 0.000 0.053 0.247 
SOX 0.310 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EM 0.140 1.200 -0.208 0.023 0.373 
AUD 0.873 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UW 7.981 1.949 8.000 9.000 9.000 
VC 0.335 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
INSIDER 0.718 0.152 0.683 0.753 0.801 
AGE 2.428 0.902 1.792 2.269 2.785 
HITECH 0.542 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PROCEEDS 18.521 1.430 17.802 18.446 19.224 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Post/Pre-SOX and Strong/Weak Institutional Environments 
(1) effects of SOX  (2) effects of home institutions (INST) 
Variable 
Pre-SOX 
N=215 
 Post-SOX 
N=105 
 Weak 
N=181 
 Strong 
N=138 
Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
 
 
     
 
     
 
     
BHAR1 0.235 1.525 -0.469 -0.113 0.274  0.410 1.163 -0.259 0.092** 0.652  0.462 1.714 -0.343 0.022 0.437  0.080** 0.920 -0.456 -0.066** 0.267 
BHAR2 0.610 3.534 -0.654 -0.188 0.436  0.649 3.018 -0.661 -0.100 0.577  0.987 4.364 -0.683 -0.171 0.665  0.177** 1.346 -0.620 -0.129** 0.385 
BHAR3 0.420 2.509 -0.788 -0.432 0.515  0.323 3.242 -0.937 -0.329 0.338  0.528 3.335 -0.886 -0.489 0.437  0.221** 1.801 -0.707 -0.305** 0.361 
INST 0.566 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.193*** 0.397 0.000 0.000*** 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
UP 0.227 0.403 0.000 0.081 0.275  0.123** 0.246 -0.024 0.035** 0.168  0.190 0.356 0.000 0.067 0.244  0.220** 0.376 0.000 0.027 0.252 
SOX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  1.000*** 0.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000  0.455 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.133*** 0.341 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
EM 0.099 1.282 -0.290 -0.004 0.352  0.230 0.992 -0.082 0.063* 0.460  0.090 1.175 -0.175 0.059 0.378  0.201 1.232 -0.260 -0.018 0.343 
AUD 0.847 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.932** 0.254 1.000 1.000** 1.000  0.865 0.342 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.883 0.323 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UW 7.856 2.053 8.000 9.000 9.000  8.260 1.671 8.000 9.000** 9.000  7.925 2.017 8.000 9.000 9.000  8.050 1.868 8.000 9.000 9.000 
VC 0.230 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.568*** 0.498 0.000 1.000*** 1.000  0.391 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.266** 0.443 0.000 0.000** 1.000 
INSIDER 0.709 0.160 0.667 0.754 0.802  0.738 0.132 0.701 0.753 0.797  0.739 0.120 0.697 0.759 0.801  0.693** 0.181 0.644 0.744* 0.802 
AGE 2.509 0.960 1.792 2.303 2.970  2.248** 0.730 1.778 2.197* 2.584  2.352 0.850 1.780 2.224 2.773  2.521 0.957 1.792 2.303 2.917 
HITECH 0.551 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.523 0.502 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.532 0.501 0.000 1.000 1.000  0.555 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PROCEEDS 18.539 1.530 17.639 18.372 19.427  18.482 1.188 18.039 18.480 19.013  18.388 1.457 17.675 18.294 18.969  18.683* 1.386 17.896 18.560** 19.553 
Note:  
Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample as shown in Panel A. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for Pre- and Post- SOX and between strong home legal institutions (INST = 1) 
and weak home legal institutions (INST = 0). Panel B also report the results of tests for the differences in the means and medians (the latter using Wilcoxon rank-test) under the Weak Home 
Institutions block. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
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5.5.2  Regression Analysis 
As stated in Section 3, a limitation of Model 5.1 which uses only indicators 
for INST and SOX and assumes that all coefficients apart from INST are the same 
for foreign IPOs from both weak and strong legal environments which may not be 
the case if these populations are affected differently by some of the factors as the 
univariate analysis in substation 5.1 suggests. Thus, Table 5.5 presents the results 
for estimating Model 5.1 separately for the two strong and weak institutions 
subsamples and reports the differences in the coefficients using interactions of 
INST with all of the vector variables (denoted as Model 5.1.a with the full model 
specifications presented in the notes of Table 5.5). 
Table 5.4 is separated by two sections; the first two left hand side columns 
show the results for Model 5.1 for strong and weak institutional environments 
respectively while the third column to the left reports the coefficients for the 
interactions Model 5.1.a. Thus, the reported coefficients are the differences 
between the coefficients observed in the strong and weak subsamples except for 
INST which is the difference between the intercepts of the strong and weak home 
institutions regressions. The INST coefficient for the difference between the 
subsample is negative and significant for BHAR2 and BHAR3. These indicate 
lower aftermarket performance on average for IPOs from stronger home 
institutions. BHAR1 however, suggest no differences between the two subgroups 
in the first year of listing. UP  is negative in all three time periods (BHAR1-
BHAR3) in for IPOs which are coming from weak home legal institutions with a 
positive difference coefficient for the two subsamples for BHAR2 and BHAR3. In 
other words, underpricing is negatively related to long-term performance in IPOs 
from weak institutions with a significant difference in magnitude between the 
weak and strong home legal institutions subsamples. This contradicts prior studies 
that document a positive relation between underpricing and long-term 
performance and overrule the notion that underpricing is a signal for firm quality. 
The negative relation between underpricing of foreign IPOs from weak home 
legal institutions and significant difference between the two institutions subgroups 
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may suggest that the signal is weaker in the case of firms which are coming from 
weak home legal institutions. A potential explanation is that IPOs from weak 
home institutions are expected to underprice for other reasons than quality 
signaling. Francis et al. (2010) find that signaling determines IPO underpricing 
especially in the case of firms that are domiciled in countries with segmented 
markets. This is due to the higher information asymmetry and limited admission 
to foreign capital markets. 
The coefficient of the SOX variable is not significant in the first two models 
and only significant in the three year buy-and-hold period for the IPOs which are 
coming from weak legal institutions. In the same model, there is also a significant 
and positive difference between the two subsamples. This indicates no significant 
difference in the effect of SOX on each of the two subsamples except for the three 
year period. A potential explanation is that listing in the US markets is more 
attractive in terms of signaling for IPOs from weak home institutions after SOX 
but the Act did not impact the quality of the issuers. EM is positively associated 
with long-run performance in the first two periods and for firms coming from 
strong home legal institutions. However, this evidence disappears in the when a 
three years period is considered.   
In term of external parties, results do not support the notion that auditors’ 
prestige (AUD) affects the long-term performance of each of the group. A 
potential explanation could be that these auditors are the ones which are signed on 
the prospectuses prior the IPO and may be quite different than the ones which are 
auditing the firm after listing. The underwriters of the IPO, however, are 
positively related to the second and third year’s aftermarket performance of the 
IPOs which are coming from strong legal. 
Findings from the examining of firm specific control variables show that the 
negative association between offer’s size (PROCEEDS) mostly in the case of 
IPOs coming from strong home legal institutions. Also, the association to Hi-Tech 
industry positively related to long-term performance of IPOs from weak home 
legal institutions with a significant difference in the first two years of listing to 
those coming from strong home legal institutions. Thus, Hi-Tech firms from weak 
home legal institutions are suggested to be of a higher quality relative to their 
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peers at coming from strong home legal institutions due to the barriers of listing in 
the US (Bruner et al., 2006).  
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Table 5.5: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Strong and Weak Home Legal Institutions benchmarked to CRSP value-weighted market index 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 1.353 3.551***   0.073 9.478***   -0.336 7.392**  
 
(0.214) (0.007)   (0.960) (0.001)   (0.864) (0.013)  
INST   -2.199    -9.405**    -7.728* 
 
  (0.243)    (0.017)    (0.080) 
UP -0.159* -0.458** 0.299  -0.116 -1.090*** 0.974**  -0.092 -1.098** 1.007** 
 (0.098) (0.027) (0.134)  (0.512) (0.009) (0.021)  (0.669) (0.015) (0.020) 
SOX 0.278 0.035 0.244  0.127 -0.312 0.440  0.331 -0.698** 1.029** 
 
(0.223) (0.797) (0.377)  (0.687) (0.267) (0.247)  (0.469) (0.028) (0.012) 
EM 0.160** 0.048 0.113  0.438** 0.031 0.407  0.236 0.105 0.131 
 (0.026) (0.631) (0.357)  (0.024) (0.850) (0.161)  (0.150) (0.434) (0.573) 
AUD -0.328 0.355 -0.683*  -0.438 0.847 -1.285  -0.466 1.051 -1.517* 
 
(0.345) (0.363) (0.096)  (0.244) (0.333) (0.147)  (0.218) (0.173) (0.065) 
UW 0.089 -0.024 0.113  0.204* -0.090 0.294  0.139* -0.236 0.374** 
 
(0.189) (0.735) (0.249)  (0.071) (0.663) (0.257)  (0.097) (0.125) (0.024) 
VC 0.032 -0.268 0.300  -0.110 -0.243 0.133  0.447 -0.211 0.658 
 
(0.779) (0.520) (0.407)  (0.551) (0.785) (0.881)  (0.178) (0.795) (0.422) 
INSIDER 0.055 0.268 -0.213  0.224 -0.347 0.571  -0.187 0.456 -0.643 
 
(0.869) (0.602) (0.769)  (0.568) (0.759) (0.686)  (0.789) (0.712) (0.666) 
AGE 0.007 -0.026 0.032  0.142 -0.115 0.257  0.197 -0.188 0.385** 
 
(0.940) (0.758) (0.796)  (0.161) (0.473) (0.139)  (0.173) (0.136) (0.016) 
HITECH -0.159 0.516*** -0.675**  -0.081 0.946** -1.028**  0.093 0.874** -0.782 
 
(0.290) (0.008) (0.021)  (0.675) (0.043) (0.049)  (0.774) (0.044) (0.149) 
PROCEED -0.092** -0.189** 0.098  -0.089 -0.447*** 0.358  -0.040 -0.312** 0.271 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.305)  (0.455) (0.004) (0.109)  (0.784) (0.032) (0.279) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.091 0.071 0.092  0.171 0.077 0.102  0.055 0.109 0.099 
Note:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of BHARJ (where J={1,2 and 3}). These are reported in Table 5.5 separately for the strong home institutions 
subsample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions subsample (the Weak column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two 
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subsample coefficients using the interactions model described below. In the BHAR1-BHAR3 columns the dependent variable is the long-term stock abnormal 
returns for the first, second third years of listing respectively, as explained in Table 5.5. We report p-values below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for 
which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers 
standard errors (Petersen, 2009). *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 5.A for variable 
definitions. 
 
2. The regression model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with INST is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8
* * * *
* * *
*
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
INST UP INST SOX INST EM INST AUD
INST UW INST VC INST INSIDER
INST AGE
               
                9 9* *i i i tINST HITECH INST PROCEED     
     (5.1.a) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the Ȗi, i = {1,2,..,10} coefficients, their p-values, as well as the adjusted-R2 for this regression. 
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In Table 5.6 I repeat the analysis in Model 5.1 separately for the two 
subsamples and report the differences in the coefficients using interactions of SOX 
with all of the variables (denoted as Model 5.1.b with the full model specifications 
presented in the notes of Table 5.6). As a result, Table 5.5 is separated by two 
sections; the first two left hand-side columns show the results for Model 5.1 for 
pre-SOX and post-SOX respectively while the third column to the left reports the 
coefficients for the interaction Model 5.1.b. Thus, the reported coefficients are the 
difference between the coefficients observed in the two periods’ subsamples 
except for SOX which is the difference between the intercepts. The SOX 
coefficient is positive but insignificant. This indicates no difference in long-term 
performance as a result of the enactment of SOX. Thus, this evidence rejects the 
likelihood of a reduction in long-term performance resulting from the assumed 
better information environment. When looking at the univariate results with 
relation to SOX, the clear difference in BHAR between the two periods becomes 
insignificant in the multivariate analysis due to the difference in explanatory 
variables between the two periods. INST is negative and significant in the pre-
SOX period indicating higher long-term performance of IPOs coming from weak 
home domestic institutions across all time periods (BHAR1-BHAR3). This 
evidence is reverting in the third time window where IPOs from strong home legal 
institutions experience higher returns in the post-SOX period with a significant 
difference with respect to the pre-SOX period. Furthermore, underpricing is 
negatively and significantly associated with aftermarket performance in the pre-
SOX periods across all the time windows examined (BHAR1-BHAR3). In 
addition, there is no evidence that well reputable auditors are affecting the 
aftermarket performance in the post-SOX period. Also, there is some evidence 
that EM is positively related to long-run stock performance in the first and second 
year of listing but only in the post-SOX period. The retained ownership after the 
IPO has a negative result on aftermarket performance in the second and third year 
of listing in the post-SOX period. The differences between the post- and pre-SOX 
periods are significantly different.  
Lastly, the relation between offer size (PROCEED) and the long-run 
performance is significantly negative in the pre-SOX period. There is some 
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evidence that the performance of IPOs in the Hi-Tech industry is positively 
associated with higher first and second year stock returns in the post-SOX period.   
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Table 5.6: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods benchmarked to CRSP value-weighted market index 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 1.550 3.294***   2.662 6.442***   2.422 5.279***  
 
(0.607) (0.006)   (0.579) (0.001)   (0.585) (0.001)  
SOX   -1.745    -3.780    -2.857 
 
  (0.551)    (0.414)    (0.501) 
INST -0.028 -0.367* 0.339  -0.183 -0.769*** 0.587  0.662* -0.555* 1.217*** 
 
(0.916) (0.072) (0.275)  (0.670) (0.003) (0.195)  (0.066) (0.053) (0.005) 
UP 0.419 -0.324** 0.743  0.689 -0.622** 1.311  0.532 -0.565* 1.098 
 
(0.517) (0.033) (0.224)  (0.596) (0.014) (0.282)  (0.609) (0.064) (0.273) 
EM 0.402* 0.039 0.363*  0.494 0.155** 0.339  0.264 0.130 0.134 
 (0.084) (0.317) (0.073)  (0.150) (0.022) (0.261)  (0.373) (0.275) (0.643) 
AUD 0.318 0.038 0.280  1.577 0.116 1.460  1.146 0.412 0.734 
 
(0.712) (0.887) (0.736)  (0.553) (0.808) (0.553)  (0.640) (0.189) (0.745) 
UW -0.080 0.034 -0.114  -0.330 0.093 -0.422  -0.315 -0.048 -0.267 
 
(0.642) (0.532) (0.495)  (0.539) (0.322) (0.397)  (0.512) (0.611) (0.548) 
VC 0.056 -0.224 0.280  0.250 -0.312 0.562  0.631 -0.182 0.813 
 
(0.897) (0.529) (0.599)  (0.801) (0.626) (0.613)  (0.406) (0.800) (0.412) 
INSIDER -0.341 -0.050 -0.290  -1.569** -0.432 -1.137*  -2.038*** -0.150 -1.888** 
 
(0.312) (0.876) (0.517)  (0.029) (0.251) (0.090)  (0.004) (0.809) (0.021) 
AGE 0.031 -0.005 0.036  0.376 -0.027 0.403  0.479* -0.032 0.511* 
 
(0.743) (0.947) (0.759)  (0.184) (0.819) (0.145)  (0.099) (0.763) (0.063) 
HITECH 0.634* 0.154 0.480  0.775 0.560* 0.215  0.735 0.599 0.136 
 (0.057) (0.161) (0.103)  (0.359) (0.089) (0.792)  (0.268) (0.127) (0.843) 
PROCEED -0.059 -0.167** 0.107  -0.064 -0.328*** 0.264  -0.068 -0.243*** 0.175 
 
(0.768) (0.016) (0.579)  (0.857) (0.002) (0.440)  (0.818) (0.003) (0.532) 
N 89 202 291  89 202 291  89 202 291 
Adj R2 0.165 0.062 0.092  0.077 0.083 0.081  0.072 0.066 0.069 
Notes: 
1. The table presents results of the regression model of underpricing (UP) separately for the pre-SOX subsample (the Pre-SOX column) and the post-SOX subsample (the Post-
SOX column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two subsample coefficients using the interactions model described below. I report p-values below 
the estimated coefficients. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control for possible correlation of the 
residuals within industry clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with SOX: 
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1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8 9
* * * *
* * *
* *
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
SOX UP SOX SOX SOX EM SOX AUD
SOX UW SOX VC SOX INSIDER
SOX AGE SOX
                
                 9 *i i tHITECH SOX PROCEED   
     (5.1.b) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,10} coefficients, their p-values as well as the adjusted-R2 for this regression. 
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Overall, the findings for long-term performance are mixed in relation to 
home institutions and SOX. First, IPOs that are coming from strong institutional 
environments at their home country experience lower long-term performance with 
respect to the IPOs that are coming from weaker home legal environment. 
However, these findings offer only limited support to the assumption of a change 
in the long-term performance of foreign IPOs in the US as a result of a suggested 
improvement in the information environment following SOX. More specifically, 
there is no significant evidence that foreign firms, as a whole, experience different 
long-term performance in the pre- and post-SOX period. However, there is when 
splitting the sample to pre- and post- SOX periods, there is no significant 
difference in the magnitude of intercepts. However, there is some evidence that 
both firms from stronger home legal institutions experience lower long-term 
returns in the pre-SOX period relative to the post-SOX one. Together, results 
suggest that home legal intuitions matter for the performance of foreign IPOs in 
the US. They also suggest that SOX has changed the magnitude for these 
subsamples separately even if not to the group of the foreign IPOs as a whole. The 
next subsection presents additional analyses and sensitivity tests to further 
strengthen the findings. 
5.6 Additional Analysis 
In order to augment and possibly enhance our primary findings, a selection 
additional analysis has been carried out as discussed below.  
5.6.1  Long-Run Performance Adjusted to Domestic US IPO 
The main analysis presented follows the methodology used by Johnston and 
Madura (2009) for aftermarket returns. That is, the buy-and-hold returns of the 
IPOs adjusted to the CRSP value-weighted market index over the same period. 
However, Barber and Lyon (1996, 1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) argue for 
significant biases when long-term returns are benchmarked on indexes. Thus, to 
ensure robust results, I therefore compute BHAR using two additional approaches: 
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5.6.1.1 A Matching-Firm Approach 
In this approach my estimate of BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3 follows the 
match-sample approach. Similarly to Chang et al. (2010) the selection of 
matching firms was based on their industry, book-to-market ratio and market 
value of equity. I first identify the non-issuing US domestic firms. Thus, the firms 
must be public for more than three years prior the matched IPO date. I then chose 
a firm from the same industry that has the closest sum of differences with relation 
to the market-to-book value and capitalization size of that of the IPO sample firm. 
I then verify that none of the original matched firm drops out before the IPO 
sample. However, in cases when the IPO sample drops, both the sample firms and 
the matching firm are signed zero returns for the reminder period. The BHAR1, 
BHAR2 and BHAR3 are the buy-and-hold returns of sample IPO minus the buy-
and-hold returns of the matching firms in the first, second and third year of 
trading, excluding the first issue day, respectively. I then replace the BHAR1, 
BHAR2 and BHAR3 measures of the original tests and apply the same models to 
the long-term measures calculated using the matched-firms approach. The 
findings in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are mostly consistent with the result of the main test 
in which IPO sample returns are benchmarked to the CRSP value-weighted 
market index over the same period as reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Thus, there 
is significant evidence that IPOs from weak home legal institutions experience 
higher abnormal stock returns. In additional, there is no significant evidence for 
the effect of SOX on long-term returns of foreign IPOs. Overall, finding of the 
matched firm approach support the notion that home legal institutional differences 
matter for the long-run differences in stock performance of foreign IPOs in the 
US. They also provide evidence that SOX did not impact the long-run 
performance of these firms.  
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Table 5.7: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Strong and Weak Home Legal Institutions benchmarked to matching firms 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 0.364 7.416***   -4.246* 3.788**   -0.988 8.379  
 
(0.873) (0.003)   (0.091) (0.033)   (0.719) (0.176)  
INST   -7.053**    -8.035**    -9.367 
 
  (0.021)    (0.011)    (0.226) 
UP -1.061** -0.723 -0.338  -0.891 -1.623** 0.732  -0.903 -1.922** 1.019 
 (0.043) (0.215) (0.446)  (0.171) (0.044) (0.125)  (0.281) (0.024) (0.146) 
SOX 0.901*** -0.037 0.938*  0.008 0.490** -0.481  -0.585 0.647 -1.233 
 (0.010) (0.868) (0.071)  (0.990) (0.046) (0.549)  (0.657) (0.250) (0.484) 
EM -0.035 -0.135 0.100  0.052 0.061 -0.009  0.265 0.179* 0.087 
 
(0.929) (0.368) (0.828)  (0.906) (0.239) (0.986)  (0.404) (0.054) (0.794) 
AUD -0.410 0.298 -0.707  -0.470 0.347 -0.818  -0.578 1.663 -2.241 
 
(0.204) (0.659) (0.362)  (0.278) (0.708) (0.441)  (0.369) (0.200) (0.125) 
UW -0.234 -0.212 -0.021  -0.155 -0.592* 0.437  -0.029 -0.744*** 0.716** 
 
(0.157) (0.228) (0.945)  (0.280) (0.081) (0.303)  (0.864) (0.004) (0.040) 
VC 0.216 -0.206 0.422  1.310** -0.454 1.764***  1.276 0.071 1.204 
 
(0.771) (0.645) (0.562)  (0.038) (0.320) (0.007)  (0.157) (0.928) (0.278) 
INSIDER -0.581 -0.648 0.067  0.284 1.416 -1.132  0.797 0.371 0.426 
 
(0.596) (0.304) (0.958)  (0.877) (0.128) (0.553)  (0.542) (0.846) (0.817) 
AGE 0.579 -0.082 0.661**  0.668 -0.045 0.713**  0.599** 0.105 0.495 
 
(0.184) (0.718) (0.041)  (0.126) (0.805) (0.040)  (0.039) (0.592) (0.161) 
HITECH 0.756 -0.066 0.822  0.617 0.464 0.153  0.126 1.026 -0.900 
 
(0.304) (0.812) (0.162)  (0.359) (0.333) (0.815)  (0.745) (0.154) (0.239) 
PROCEED 0.045 -0.216* 0.261  0.204 0.022 0.182  -0.021 -0.254 0.233 
 
(0.707) (0.073) (0.214)  (0.123) (0.884) (0.415)  (0.904) (0.478) (0.620) 
N 133 154 287  133 154 287  133 154 287 
Adj R2 0.096 0.059 0.089  0.072 0.092 0.089  0.068 0.141 0.119 
Note:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of BHARJ (where J={1,2 and 3}). These are reported in Table 5.5 separately for the strong 
home institutions subsample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions subsample (the Weak column). The Difference column reports 
the difference between the two subsample coefficients using the interactions model described below. In the BHAR1-BHAR3 columns the 
dependent variable is the long-term stock abnormal returns for the first, second third years of listing respectively, as explained in Table 5.5. We 
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report p-values below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All regressions control 
for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). *,**,*** denote differences that are 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The regression model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with INST is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8
* * * *
* * *
*
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
INST UP INST SOX INST EM INST AUD
INST UW INST VC INST INSIDER
INST AGE
               
                9 9* *i i i tINST HITECH INST PROCEED     
     (5.1.a) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the Ȗi, i = {1,2,..,10} coefficients, their p-values, as well as the adjusted-R2 for this regression. 
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Table 5.8: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods benchmarked to matching firms 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 3.098 4.594**   0.960 1.496   -4.238 6.835**  
 
(0.534) (0.032)   (0.868) (0.404)   (0.446) (0.047)  
SOX   -1.496    -0.536    -11.073* 
 
  (0.814)    (0.936)    (0.099) 
INST 0.486 -0.757*** 1.243  -0.027 -0.274 0.247  -0.527 0.251 -0.778 
 
(0.550) (0.006) (0.132)  (0.979) (0.384) (0.825)  (0.702) (0.800) (0.724) 
UP 1.644*** -1.197** 2.841***  0.514 -1.304* 1.818***  -0.485 -1.362* 0.877 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.000)  (0.398) (0.053) (0.006)  (0.582) (0.080) (0.542) 
EM 0.305 -0.189 0.494  0.052 0.052 0.001  0.363 0.177*** 0.186 
 
(0.514) (0.214) (0.189)  (0.931) (0.655) (0.990)  (0.517) (0.007) (0.728) 
AUD 0.454 0.144 0.310  0.413 0.226 0.187  0.030 1.132 -1.102 
 
(0.792) (0.543) (0.850)  (0.859) (0.550) (0.938)  (0.989) (0.115) (0.591) 
UW -0.327 -0.206* -0.120  -0.553 -0.381 -0.172  -0.727* -0.425** -0.302 
 
(0.234) (0.051) (0.672)  (0.168) (0.152) (0.704)  (0.089) (0.027) (0.474) 
VC 0.777* -0.386 1.162**  1.275 -0.211 1.485  1.479 0.098 1.382 
 (0.062) (0.371) (0.016)  (0.153) (0.524) (0.143)  (0.151) (0.863) (0.159) 
INSIDER -1.317 -0.728 -0.590  -0.793 0.589 -1.382  0.509 0.052 0.457 
 
(0.572) (0.471) (0.835)  (0.560) (0.734) (0.532)  (0.767) (0.971) (0.734) 
AGE 0.827*** 0.134 0.693***  0.938*** 0.226 0.712***  0.923* 0.325* 0.599 
 (0.007) (0.640) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.387) (0.000)  (0.074) (0.060) (0.240) 
HITECH 0.370 0.527 -0.157  0.833* 0.582 0.251  1.138** 0.701 0.437 
 
(0.255) (0.335) (0.847)  (0.084) (0.241) (0.689)  (0.027) (0.182) (0.316) 
PROCEED -0.091 -0.094 0.003  0.068 0.051 0.017  0.374 -0.294* 0.668* 
 
(0.754) (0.143) (0.993)  (0.857) (0.507) (0.965)  (0.276) (0.085) (0.054) 
N 88 199 287  88 199 287  88 199 287 
Adj R2 0.105 0.094 0.101  0.083 0.059 0.067  0.107 0.086 0.093 
Notes: 
1. The table presents results of the regression model of underpricing (UP) separately for the pre-SOX subsample (the Pre-SOX column) and the 
post-SOX subsample (the Post-SOX column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two subsample coefficients using 
the interactions model described below. I report p-values below the estimated coefficients. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at 
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the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters using 
Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with SOX: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8 9
* * * *
* * *
* *
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
SOX UP SOX SOX SOX EM SOX AUD
SOX UW SOX VC SOX INSIDER
SOX AGE SOX
                
                 9 *i i tHITECH SOX PROCEED   
     (5.1.b) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,10} coefficients, their p-values as well as the adjusted-R2 for this 
regression. 
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5.6.1.2 US IPOs Benchmark 
This approach uses the BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3 of domestic US IPOs 
from a similar industry in a similar year as the foreign IPOs. I first identify and 
match domestic US IPOs with the sample IPOs based on their two digits industry 
association and the year of the IPO. I then calculated the BHAR of each domestic 
IPO. Aftermarket returns are calculated from the first day after the offer date, i.e. 
from the second day of trading, to the end of the first, second and third years of 
listing (J=1,2 and 3, respectively) using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns as 
represented by Equation 5.2.   
 
Equation 5.2 
, ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
T T
d d t b t
t t
BHARJ R R     
 
Where J={1,2,3} for the first, second and third year BHAR, respectively. 
Where 
,d tR stands for returns (in decimal form) of domestic IPO firm d on a 
trading day t, and 
,b tR  represents the CRSP value-weighted market index (in 
decimal form) over the same period. Since Cowan and Segeant (2001) establish 
that winsorized abnormal returns produce more powerful test statistics, the 
abnormal returns are winsorized at 1% to decrease the influence of outliers.  
 Next, to estimate the aftermarket performance of the foreign IPOs sample, 
I repeat the calculations done in the main test for BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3. 
Thus, aftermarket returns are calculated from the first day after the offer date, i.e. 
from the second day of trading, to the end of the first, second and third years of 
listing (J=1,2 and 3, respectively) using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns as 
represented by Equation 5.3.    
 
Equation 5.3 
, ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
T T
i i t b t
t t
BHARJ R R     
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Where 
,i tR stands for returns (in decimal form) of the IPO firm i on a 
trading day t, and 
,b tR represents the CRSP value-weighted market index (in 
decimal form) over the same period. Since Cowan and Segeant (2001) establish 
that winsorized abnormal returns produce more powerful test statistics, the 
abnormal returns are winsorized at 1% to decrease the influence of outliers. 
Finally, I measure BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3 as the difference between BHARJ i 
and BHARJd where J={1,2,3}.  
The findings in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 are mostly consistent with the result of 
the main test in which IPO sample returns are benchmarked to the CRSP value-
weighted market index over the same period as reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. 
Overall, finding of the matched firm approach support the hypothesis that home 
legal institutional differences matter for the long-run difference of foreign IPOs in 
the US. They also provide evidence that SOX did not impact the long-run 
performance of the foreign IPOs as a whole while evidence suggest that foreign 
IPOs from Strong legal institutions are underperforming the Weak ones in the pre-
SOX period across all time windows (one, two and three years after listing). 
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Table 5.9: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Strong and Weak Home Legal Institutions benchmarked to US IPOs 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference  Strong Weak Difference 
INTERCEPT 1.384 3.597***   0.933 10.801***   1.136 7.264***  
 
(0.276) (0.006)   (0.622) (0.000)   (0.651) (0.006)  
INST   -2.212    -9.869**    -6.127 
 
  (0.321)    (0.013)    (0.162) 
UP -0.225* -0.512** 0.287  -0.053 -1.003** 0.950**  0.227 -0.883** 1.109*** 
 (0.076) (0.024) (0.113)  (0.662) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.501) (0.025) (0.005) 
SOX 0.341 0.001 0.339  0.062 -0.378 0.440  0.326 -0.799* 1.125** 
 
(0.128) (0.995) (0.225)  (0.834) (0.309) (0.256)  (0.509) (0.069) (0.025) 
EM 0.128* 0.066 0.063  0.426** 0.017 0.409  0.206 0.050 0.156 
 (0.067) (0.538) (0.629)  (0.019) (0.920) (0.164)  (0.215) (0.752) (0.526) 
AUD -0.392 0.299 -0.691  -0.490 0.985 -1.474  -0.076 1.121 -1.197 
 
(0.348) (0.503) (0.170)  (0.306) (0.319) (0.168)  (0.928) (0.211) (0.323) 
UW 0.091 -0.021 0.112  0.225 -0.058 0.283  0.120 -0.197 0.317 
 
(0.228) (0.785) (0.327)  (0.140) (0.788) (0.343)  (0.407) (0.210) (0.103) 
VC 0.142 -0.265 0.407  -0.107 -0.345 0.238  0.538 -0.506 1.045 
 
(0.306) (0.541) (0.331)  (0.385) (0.711) (0.798)  (0.121) (0.551) (0.257) 
INSIDER 0.169 0.647 -0.478  0.326 -0.255 0.581  -0.470 0.439 -0.909 
 
(0.611) (0.335) (0.582)  (0.458) (0.836) (0.688)  (0.556) (0.776) (0.606) 
AGE 0.031 -0.041 0.072  0.219** -0.090 0.309**  0.326* -0.036 0.362 
 
(0.789) (0.627) (0.600)  (0.049) (0.495) (0.031)  (0.052) (0.820) (0.103) 
HITECH -0.236 0.531** -0.768***  -0.258 0.969** -1.227**  -0.168 0.946** -1.114* 
 
(0.164) (0.014) (0.005)  (0.345) (0.024) (0.027)  (0.714) (0.017) (0.067) 
PROCEED -0.091* -0.195** 0.104  -0.139 -0.533*** 0.394*  -0.127 -0.333** 0.206 
 (0.067) (0.042) (0.349)  (0.359) (0.001) (0.096)  (0.496) (0.024) (0.436) 
N 133 158 291  133 158 291  133 158 291 
Adj R2 0.090 0.075 0.082  0.180 0.083 0.106  0.064 0.106 0.097 
Note:  
1. The table presents results of the regression models of BHARJ (where J={1,2 and 3}). These are reported in Table 5.5 separately for the strong 
home institutions subsample (the Strong column) and the weak home institutions subsample (the Weak column). The Difference column 
reports the difference between the two subsample coefficients using the interactions model described below. In the BHAR1-BHAR3 columns 
the dependent variable is the long-term stock abnormal returns for the first, second third years of listing respectively, as explained in Table 
5.5. We report p-values below the estimated coefficients. Coefficients for which the p-value is 10% or better appear in bold face. All 
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regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within time clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009). *,**,*** 
denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
 
2. The regression model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with INST is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8
* * * *
* * *
*
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
INST UP INST SOX INST EM INST AUD
INST UW INST VC INST INSIDER
INST AGE
               
                9 9* *i i i tINST HITECH INST PROCEED     
     (5.1.a) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the Ȗi, i = {1,2,..,10} coefficients, their p-values, as well as the adjusted-R2 for this regression. 
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Table 5.10: Long-Term Performance Analyzed between Post-SOX and Pre-SOX periods benchmarked to US IPOs 
  BHAR1    BHAR2    BHAR3  
 Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference  Post-SOX Pre-SOX Difference 
INTERCEPT 1.550 3.294***   2.662 6.442***   2.422 5.279***  
 
(0.607) (0.006)   (0.579) (0.001)   (0.585) (0.001)  
SOX   -1.745    -3.780    -2.857 
 
  (0.551)    (0.414)    (0.501) 
INST -0.028 -0.367* 0.339  -0.183 -0.769*** 0.587  0.662* -0.555* 1.217*** 
 
(0.916) (0.072) (0.275)  (0.670) (0.003) (0.195)  (0.066) (0.053) (0.005) 
UP 0.419 -0.324** 0.743  0.689 -0.622** 1.311  0.532 -0.565* 1.098 
 
(0.517) (0.033) (0.224)  (0.596) (0.014) (0.282)  (0.609) (0.064) (0.273) 
EM 0.402* 0.039 0.363*  0.494 0.155** 0.339  0.264 0.130 0.134 
 (0.084) (0.317) (0.073)  (0.150) (0.022) (0.261)  (0.373) (0.275) (0.643) 
AUD 0.318 0.038 0.280  1.577 0.116 1.460  1.146 0.412 0.734 
 
(0.712) (0.887) (0.736)  (0.553) (0.808) (0.553)  (0.640) (0.189) (0.745) 
UW -0.080 0.034 -0.114  -0.330 0.093 -0.422  -0.315 -0.048 -0.267 
 
(0.642) (0.532) (0.495)  (0.539) (0.322) (0.397)  (0.512) (0.611) (0.548) 
VC 0.056 -0.224 0.280  0.250 -0.312 0.562  0.631 -0.182 0.813 
 
(0.897) (0.529) (0.599)  (0.801) (0.626) (0.613)  (0.406) (0.800) (0.412) 
INSIDER -0.341 -0.050 -0.290  -1.569** -0.432 -1.137*  -2.038*** -0.150 -1.888** 
 
(0.312) (0.876) (0.517)  (0.029) (0.251) (0.090)  (0.004) (0.809) (0.021) 
AGE 0.031 -0.005 0.036  0.376 -0.027 0.403  0.479* -0.032 0.511* 
 
(0.743) (0.947) (0.759)  (0.184) (0.819) (0.145)  (0.099) (0.763) (0.063) 
HITECH 0.634* 0.154 0.480  0.775 0.560* 0.215  0.735 0.599 0.136 
 (0.057) (0.161) (0.103)  (0.359) (0.089) (0.792)  (0.268) (0.127) (0.843) 
PROCEED -0.059 -0.167** 0.107  -0.064 -0.328*** 0.264  -0.068 -0.243*** 0.175 
 
(0.768) (0.016) (0.579)  (0.857) (0.002) (0.440)  (0.818) (0.003) (0.532) 
N 89 202 291  89 202 291  89 202 291 
Adj R2 0.105 0.062 0.092  0.077 0.083 0.081  0.072 0.066 0.069 
Notes: 
1. The table presents results of the regression model of underpricing (UP) separately for the pre-SOX subsample (the Pre-SOX column) and the post-
SOX subsample (the Post-SOX column). The Difference column reports the difference between the two subsample coefficients using the 
interactions model described below. I report p-values below the estimated coefficients. *,**,*** denote differences that are significant at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. All regressions control for possible correlation of the residuals within industry clusters using Rogers standard 
errors (Petersen, 2009). See Appendix 5.A for variable definitions. 
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2. The model encompasses Model 5.1 and extends it to allow for interactions with SOX: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 10
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8 9
* * * *
* * *
* *
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
BHARJ INST UP SOX EM AUD UW
VC INSIDER AGE HITECH PROCEEDS
SOX UP SOX SOX SOX EM SOX AUD
SOX UW SOX VC SOX INSIDER
SOX AGE SOX
                
                 9 *i i tHITECH SOX PROCEED   
     (5.1.b) 
 
The “Difference” column reports the value of the of the i, i={1,2,…,10} coefficients, their p-values as well as the adjusted-R2 for this regression. 
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5.6.2  Alternative Indices for Institutional Environment 
In search for additional home institutional ranking, I redefine the INST 
variable according to two different indices proposed by Leuz (2010) and Bruner at 
al. (2004). Leuz (2010) divides a list of 49 countries into three clusters according 
to their regulatory and institutional differences. For the purpose of this paper 
when defining the variable INST_L, I identify Cluster 1 as Strong (INST_L=1) and 
Clusters 2 and 3 are combined to reflect weak institutional environments 
(INST_L=0). Finally, though China is not present in Leuz (2010), I categorize 
IPOs coming from China as part of the weak home institutions subgroup. 
Alternatively, Bruner at al. (2004) uses the Country Risk Rating index as 
published in Euromoney’s annual surveys to score the home institutions of firms 
going to the US. They assign country scoring based on the year of the first IPO 
from each country. I use their scoring to calculate the INST_EU variable when a 
country with a score of below or equal to (above) the median is identified as 
having a weak (strong) institutional environment.  
However, using the above mentioned alternative indices results in no 
material changes in the estimated coefficients and therefore are not reported in the 
paper. Furthermore, it is important to note that these indices do not exhibit 
temporal variations and thus do not reflect changes in regulatory and institutional 
environments at the country of origin. The relevance of this limitation is that it 
increases in time and with the sample size. 
5.6.3  Underwriters Prestige and Earnings-Management  
Chang et al. (2010) argue that the prestigious underwriters limit any 
potential earnings manipulation in order to protect their reputation. And thus they 
claim that IPOs with more prestigious underwrites exhibit substantially less-
aggressive earnings management. They document a negative relationship between 
earnings management and post-offer stock performance of IPOs which are 
associated with less prestigious underwriters. Thus, to control for the interaction 
between earnings management and underwriter’s reputation I included an 
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interaction variable UW_EM that is an interaction variable between EM and UW. I 
run the regressions first with the exclusion of EM and UW and a second time with 
both the interacted variable UW_EM and the individual variables UW and EM. In 
all regression results the main results remain while no significant results for 
UW_EM come up. Since this procedure results in no material changes in the 
estimated coefficients and therefore is not reported in the paper. 
5.6.4  China Indicator  
IPOs coming from China become dominant in the years following the 
enactment of SOX and constitute 50.9% of the post-SOX sample. Moreover, 
previous studies also document a significant level of long-run underperformance 
of A-level IPO in China relative to a size and boot-to-market match portfolios 
(Chan et al., 2004). Thus, to control for specific potential effects originating from 
Chinese IPOs I include the dummy variable CHINA to Model 5.1 which equals 1 
when an IPO is coming from China and 0 otherwise. Once again, this procedure 
results in no material changes in the estimated coefficients and therefore is not 
reported in the paper. 
5.6.5  Exchange Membership 
To test for potential stock exchange membership effects, I run Model 5.1 
with the inclusion of three indicators: NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX when each gets 
the value 1 if the US market of issuing is New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ 
or the American Stock Exchange, respectively and otherwise the value is set to 0. 
This procedure results in no material changes in the estimated coefficients and 
therefore is not reported in the paper. 
5.7 Conclusion  
By making an initial public offering in the US, foreign firms become subject 
to the US regulation and enforcement while, arguably, escaping the effect of home 
legal institutions. Prior research on foreign listing to date has mostly focused on 
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cross-listing of mature firms and not pure IPO listing. However, by listing directly 
on US capital markets and bypassing their home markets, foreign IPOs are 
exposed to a higher level of scrutiny by the SEC and other US market 
participants. Both arguments combined suggest that foreign IPOs are least 
expected to be influenced by their home institutions in making their reporting 
choices and consequently in their aftermarket stock performance. Using a unique 
dataset of foreign IPOs listing on US capital markets in the years 1990-2009, I 
investigate whether aftermarket performance of foreign IPOs is subject to their 
home legal institutions. I further investigate whether the structural changes 
introduced by SOX have had a different impact on foreign firms coming from 
weak and strong institutional environments. To date, much of the debate regarding 
the Act has focused on whether it has proven to be effective in reducing the costs 
of capital and its effects of the competitiveness position of US capital markets. 
However, to my knowledge, no study has investigated the specific effects of SOX 
on foreign issuers in terms of asymmetric information problems related to the 
aftermarket performance originating from the firm’s specific home institutional 
environment.  
Prior research shows that the long-term performance is lower with higher 
levels of information asymmetry (e.g., Miller, 1977; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Teoh 
et al., 1998). Information asymmetry problems are rooted in initial public offering 
due to the transition from private status to public status (Ritter, 1991, 2011). This 
is due to the potential agency conflicts that between different parties in the IPO 
process and the little operating history that is conditional to a grounded valuation 
process (Burton et al., 2010). There is also evidence that the institutional 
environment at the country of issuing affects long-term performance (Burton et 
al., 2010). These factors are unique in the foreign IPOs setting suggested in this 
paper. First, most of the prior research on foreign firms in the US only covers 
mature cross listed firms or ADRs. Second, the specific case in which a firm 
bypasses its home market and lists in a foreign market with different institutional 
factors make these firms different from domestic IPOs. Third, by studying the 
effects of the home country institutions this study also looks at the differences 
within the foreign IPOs group. Studying all foreign first time issues by focusing 
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on their home institutions may enhance the prior findings further especially with 
respect to the question of whether global listing helps to mitigate or maybe even 
eliminate the effects of home country institutions.   
The empirical findings reveal that foreign IPOs are of higher quality relative 
to domestic US IPOs. These results are consistent with previous studies such as 
Bruner et al. (2004). In relation to the country of origin, my findings show that 
IPOs, which are coming from stronger institutional environment, experience 
lower long-run returns. This is consistent across one, two and three years from 
IPO date. This evidence is consistent with Licht’s (2003) “trading down” 
argument and that bonding is not the overriding motivating factor in the decision 
to list on US capital markets. Furthermore, there is no evidence for a change in 
aftermarket stock performance for the foreign IPO sample as a whole in the post- 
SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period.  
Overall, being robust to a number of sensitivity tests the difference in 
findings are most likely relates to differences in reporting incentives, information 
asymmetry and regulatory oversight of foreign IPOs. Thus, listing in the US does 
not eliminate the effect of the home legal institutions, the causality behind which 
warrants further research. Nevertheless, a number of limitations apply to my 
research design. First, the empirical investigation uses three benchmarks to 
measure the abnormal long-term performance of foreign IPOs in the US. All these 
benchmarks are to firms traded on US markets (indices, matched US mature 
firms, domestic IPOS) but some of the cross-listed literature suggests that foreign 
firms are sensitive to non-US markets. Future research can focus on such 
alternative benchmarks. 
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Appendix 5. A: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
BHAR1 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns in foreign firms calculated 
as the excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in the first year of listing. 
COMPUSTAT  
BHAR2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns in foreign firms calculated 
as the excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in the first two years of listing. 
COMPUSTAT  
BHAR3 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns in foreign firms calculated 
as the excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in the first three years of listing. 
COMPUSTAT  
INST 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the product of 
law enforcement index (the International Country Risk 
Guide – ICRG – Law and Order index) and the revised 
anti-director index of La Porta et al. (1998) for the home 
country is above the sample median, 0 otherwise 
ICRG website and 
Spamann (2010) 
SOX 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the foreign 
registrant issues shares in the post-SOX period (2002 
onwards). 
 
EM Abnormal accruals in foreign firms calculated according 
to the regression in Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
COMPUSTAT and 
IPO Prospectus 
AUD 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditing 
firm is a Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990-1997, 1998-2001 
and 2002 onwards, respectively; 0 otherwise 
IPO Prospectus 
UW 
Underwriters Rank obtained from Jay Ritter’s website on 
06/05/2011 
IPO Prospectus and 
Jay Ritter’s website 
VC An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO is VC 
backed, 0 otherwise. 
IPO Prospectus and 
SDC Platinum 
INSIDER 
The percentage of shares retained in the firm after the 
offering to total shares outstanding after the offering 
IPO Prospectus 
AGE 
First I calculate Year of IPO minus founding year. Then I 
take the natural logarithm of (1+Age) 
IPO Prospectus 
HITECH An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm  
operates in a high-tech industry and 0 otherwise, as 
defined in Tech America Foundation54 
SDC Platinum and 
CRSP 
PROCEEDS 
Natural logarithm of offer proceeds. The variable is 
indexed to 2005 value of US dollars 
IPO Prospectus 
                                                 
54
 See http://www.techamerica.org/sic-definition. Retrieved on 02/08/2011 
Chapter 6. Bibliography 
 
- 216 - 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Chapter 6. Bibliography 
 
- 217 - 
 
Chapter 6: 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis attends to some unresolved questions regarding the impact of 
institutional differences on information asymmetry in foreign IPOs by studying 
the information asymmetry problems inherent in new foreign issues in the US. 
Using a unique dataset of foreign IPOs listing on US capital markets in the years 
1990-2009, I investigate the relation between the reporting quality, underpricing 
and aftermarket stock performance, and the soundness of home legal environment 
of these firms. I also investigate the effects of the enactment of SOX in the special 
case of foreign firms that make their initial public listing in the US. I further 
investigate whether the structural changes introduced by SOX have had a different 
impact on foreign firms coming from weak and strong institutional environments. 
This is an important focus since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduced 
higher costs for listed firms in the form of new reporting requirements, corporate 
governance and accounting mechanisms, and information disclosure requisites. 
All were created with the aim of increasing investors’ confidence and eventually 
decreasing costs of capital for listed companies. Although strongly debated and 
subsequently contested, these changes were imposed on both domestic and 
foreign firms listed on US capital markets.  
To date, much of the debate regarding the Act has focused on whether it has 
proven effective reduction of the costs of capital and its effects of the 
competitiveness position of US capital markets. Yet, to my knowledge, no study 
has investigated the specific effects of SOX on foreign issuers in terms of 
asymmetric information problems in the initial offering stage originating from the 
firm’s specific home institutional environment and the effects of the latter on the 
first day market performance. 
This chapter presents a summary of the main findings of this thesis. It then 
presents the research limitations and some potential future avenues of research.  
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6.2 Summary of Results 
This thesis presents a detailed analysis of the reporting quality around IPOs 
dates, the initial market returns and aftermarket stock performance of foreign 
IPOs listed on US capital markets. This analysis focuses on roles that the 
differences between the home legal institutions play. It goes further to investigate 
whether the enactment of SOX affected these roles. Chapter 1 introduces the main 
motivations of the thesis, its contribution to existing literature and the unique 
sample used in the empirical chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
theoretical background related to initial public offerings, cross-border listings and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Chapters 3-4 reports three empirical studies addressing 
the thesis motivations and focus.  
Overall, the main findings of this thesis suggest that home country legal 
institutions matter to the reporting characteristics, to the costs of capital at the initial 
listing date and to the aftermarket stock performance of foreign IPOs in the US. 
Furthermore, the empirical chapters present mixed evidence regarding the effects of 
the home country institutions and with respect to the effects of SOX on the reporting 
characteristics, to the cost of capital at the initial listing date and to the aftermarket 
stock performance. The findings support to the notion that firms from strong home 
institutions list in the US to avoid stricter regulations at their home markets but at the 
same time they show that investors pay a higher premium to IPOs that are coming 
from strong home legal environments relative to those who come from a weak one. 
Furthermore, in contrast with some previous research on cross-listed firms, the results 
of this study suggest that although foreign IPOs may abandon their home capital 
markets by listing in the US, their reporting characteristics and costs of capital are 
nonetheless influenced by home country institutions. The main findings for each 
empirical chapter are presented in the next subsections.  
6.2.1 Earnings Quality in foreign IPOs in the US: The Role of Home 
Country Institutions 
The first empirical study of this thesis (Chapter 3) examines the role of 
home country institutions in earnings quality of foreign IPOs listed on US capital 
markets. Foreign firms that conduct their IPOs in the US may be regarded as any 
other US firm. Issuing shares for the first time in the US subjects these firms to 
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the US regulation and enforcement while, arguably, escaping the effect of home 
institutions. Moreover, relative to mature cross-listed firms, foreign IPOs are 
exposed to a higher level of scrutiny by the SEC and other US market 
participants. Both arguments combined suggest that foreign IPOs are least 
expected to be influenced by their home institutions in making their reporting 
choices.   
This paper provides evidence pertaining to this prediction. The findings 
indicate a higher level of earnings management in foreign IPOs in than US IPOs. 
Further evidence show more extreme reporting (large positive or negative 
abnormal accruals), and of earnings inflation, in foreign IPOs. These findings are 
more pronounced for IPOs from countries with strong home legal institutions. 
This evidence is consistent with Licht’s (2003) “trading down” argument and that 
bonding is not the overriding motivating factor in the decision to list in the US.  
6.2.2 The Effects of Home Country Institutions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
on Underpricing of Foreign IPOs in the U.S 
In the second empirical study of this thesis (Chapter 4), I focus on 
underpricing as a proxy for adverse selection between management, investors and 
other stakeholders in the issuing firm. I argue that if SOX has been effective in 
reducing information asymmetry, there should be evidence of lower levels of 
underpricing for IPOs in the period following the Act’s enactment. Also, when 
focusing on the strong versus weak institutional environments of the home 
country for foreign IPOs, there should be no differences in reaction to SOX 
between the two groups. I also test for the differences in the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in IPOs coming from different institutional environments 
and for a potential change in this role as a result of the enactment of SOX.  
The empirical findings are only partially consistent with these theoretical 
formulations. First, IPOs coming from a strong institutional environment are less 
underpriced. However, there is no evidence for a change in underpricing in the 
post- SOX period. In addition, consistent with prior studies suggesting that 
voluntary governance tools can be used as a substitution for to regulations (Bruno 
and Claessens, 2010), I find some evidence that IPOs with prestigious 
underwriters underprice less. Furthermore, findings reveal that a public offering 
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with a prestigious auditor is underpriced less in the post-SOX period. I also find 
that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with underpricing when 
firms come from countries with strong home institutions. In addition, I use an 
alternative measure of initial performance which is commonly used in literature 
and one that captures the premium that investors’ assign to firm value above the 
net book value. Findings show that IPOs from countries with strong legal 
institutions benefit from a higher premium from investors. This premium is 
negatively related to their level of accounting conservatism. I show a decrease in 
premium in the post-SOX period. Collectively, the results of this study stress the 
difference between the two sets of groups, namely strong and weak home 
institutions but are unable to provide conclusive evidence towards the 
effectiveness of SOX, especially in achieving its primary objective of reducing the 
cost of capital in foreign IPOs.  
6.2.3 The Effects of Home Country Institutions on the aftermarket stock 
performance of Foreign IPOs in the US 
In the third empirical study of this thesis (Chapter 5), I investigate whether 
aftermarket performance of foreign IPOs is subject to their home legal. I further 
investigate whether the structural changes introduced by SOX have had a different 
impact on foreign firms coming from weak and strong institutional environments.  
The empirical findings reveal that foreign IPOs are of higher quality relative 
to domestic US IPOs. These results are consistent with previous studies such as 
Bruner et al. (2004). In relation to the country of origin, my findings show that 
IPOs, which are coming from stronger institutional environment, experience 
lower long-run returns. This is consistent across one, two and three years from 
IPO date. Furthermore, there is no evidence for a change in aftermarket stock 
performance for the foreign IPO sample as a whole in the post- SOX period 
relative to the pre-SOX period.  
Overall, being robust to a number of sensitivity tests, the difference in 
findings are most likely relates to differences in reporting incentives, information 
asymmetry and regulatory oversight of foreign IPOs. Thus, listing in the US does 
not eliminate the effect of the home legal institutions, the causality behind which 
warrants further research. 
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6.3 Limitations  
A number of limitations apply to the research design, some of which are 
discussed in this section.  
First, there is no control for potential self-selection bias. As mentioned in 
the thesis, the decision to list in the US follows at least two important steps. In the 
first step a firm decides to go public with all the implications of this strategic 
move towards growth. In the second step, the firm chooses to list in the US and 
bypassing its home capital market (or in some cases make an IPO in both at the 
same time). In this thesis, I do not study the decision of going public and why do 
the foreign issuers choose to list abroad. Similarly, SOX could change the nature 
of foreign firms coming to the US. This could have an impact on the findings.  
Second, there are different methodologies to capture earnings quality in 
firms. In the first empirical paper (presented in Chapter 3) I use only three models 
of discretionary accruals. These models, while broadly used in accounting 
research, may not be sufficient in evaluating the earnings quality of IPOs. In 
addition, throughout this empirical chapter, US IPO data is merely used to 
generate the model of normal accruals against which foreign IPO abnormal 
accruals are assessed, even though these firms themselves might be different from 
seasoned non-IPO US firms. An alternative research design could have proceeded 
based upon a model of normal accruals derived from non-IPO firms listed on US 
stock exchanges, and then applied to all IPOS, whether foreign or domestic. 
However, at this point in time this design is very challenging due to the limited 
information available in digital format.  
Third, although it is widely used, underpricing (used in the second empirical 
paper presented in Chapter 4) may not be a clear proxy for adverse selection 
problems as there may be other motivations behind underpricing such as 
increasing investors awareness of the firm by media coverage and protection from 
legal considerations. 
Forth, the third empirical paper (presented in Chapter 5) measures long-term 
abnormal returns up to the third year post-listing. This time horizon may not fully 
capture the impact of the factors which affect long-performance. Other papers 
such as Fama (1998) and Carter et al. (1998) use a longer time horizon to measure 
long-term performance. In addition, the empirical investigation uses three 
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benchmarks to measure the abnormal long-term performance of foreign IPOs in 
the US. All these benchmarks are to firms traded on US markets (indices, matched 
US mature firms, domestic IPOS) but some of the cross-listed literature suggests 
that foreign firms are sensitive to non-US markets.   
6.4 Future research  
This section discusses ideas for future research that follow the issues that 
are covered in this dissertation.  
First, as mentioned before, the main targeted markets to foreign listings 
have traditionally been the US markets but there is a recent increase in foreign 
listings in UK and Hong-Kong. Thus, it is highly interesting to explore the issues 
covered in this dissertation in the context of foreign IPOs in other global markets. 
Besides the immediate insights into these firms, studying global markets for 
foreign listings allow a greater understanding on the competition between stock 
exchanges on equity (e.g., Amira and Muzere, 2011; Zingales, 2007).  
Second, earnings management is a key accounting issue for both 
practitioners and academics. As such, its measurement and implications have been 
the focus of a large body of academic research. The most common techniques for 
measuring earnings management have being focusing on the “discretionary” share 
of the accrual component of earnings (e.g., Jones, 1991; Dechaw et al., 1995, 
Kothari et al., 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Teoh et al., 1998). Thus, in this 
thesis I measure earnings quality using three models of discretionary accruals. 
However, recent studies study other occurrences of earnings manipulations. For 
example, classification shifting is a case in which management reports core 
expenses as special items and in this way they report higher net earnings from 
core operations (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Thus, future research of foreign 
IPOs can explore the earnings quality by utilizing additional approaches to the 
ones covered in this dissertation. In addition, with information becoming more 
publically available future research can use more information from the 
prospectuses of both domestic and foreign IPOs to make an even more 
comprehensive investigation on earnings quality and their effects. 
Third, as to the long-term performance of foreign IPOs in the US, there is a 
large scope for future research. This paper accounts only to the cross-sectional 
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factors at the IPO stage and does not control for changes in factors over time. 
Although, this is a common approach in long-term performance studies, interest 
questions arise with controlling for the changes in factors. One example is the 
question of whether the IPO firm remains with the same auditors or change the 
auditing firm in the post-IPO era and how changing auditors affect performance. 
Also, prior research suggests a relation between initial IPO pricing and secondary 
equity offering (SEOs). While this dissertation does not follow the SEOs of 
foreign IPOs, the question of following offering is related to the initial pricing of 
foreign IPOs in the US is highly interesting. Furthermore, the dissertation does not 
study the delisting tendencies of foreign IPOs in the US and how delisting is 
related to home country institutions. An interesting extension of this research is 
therefore to focus on this relation. 
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